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Crucial to the prosecution of crimes are the concepts that define them. This thesis critiques 
an emerging lexicon of rape in international law in order to lay the groundwork for the 
creation of new models. As part of this analysis, it will explore how rape as a war crime 
has been reconceptualised as a gender-neutral crime in modern international law by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-present). It will argue that the current lexicon does not always 
accurately reflect the gender-neutral definitions constructed by these bodies. This problem 
is important because traditional heteronormative concepts of rape continue to influence 
prosecution outcomes in international law. The thesis examines primary sources, such as 
(inter)national law and trial transcripts, alongside (inter)disciplinary materials, including 
historical and philosophical texts. These sources affirm an ongoing relationship between 
traditional heteronormative understandings of rape and the lexicon used in modern 
international law. That relationship makes the application of such concepts unfit for 
purpose because they reinforce traditional ideas of the crime. For example, they frame men 
as permanent perpetrators of rape and women as agentless victims. In turn, female-
perpetrated rape is mostly overlooked. Male-male rape is also largely ignored or 
prosecuted as something else, for example, torture.  
Enabling the emergence of a more nuanced lexicon of rape will ensure that the 
terms used to categorise and prosecute rape reflect modern understandings of the crime in 
international law. Scholars, (international) non-governmental organisations and legal 
experts seeking to promote recognition of rape as a gender-neutral crime, which requires 
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Crucial to the prosecution of crimes are the concepts that define them. Where there is 
confusion over how a crime is defined and categorised as an offence, clarification is 
required for there to be confidence in the justice process. The emerging lexicon of rape in 
international law will be critiqued from this perspective in order to lay the groundwork for 
the creation of new models. This analysis is necessary because rape is inconsistently 
prosecuted in international law. In cases of male-female rape, for example, it is 
commonplace for prosecutions to bring a charge only for an act of rape. On occasion, that 
charge is accompanied by another headline offence, such as an outrage upon human 
dignity or a crime of torture. Male-male rape, on the other hand, is regularly either 
overlooked by the prosecution when drawing up the charges, or is prosecuted as something 
other than rape – for example, torture. Female-perpetrated rape is largely ignored. The 
categorisation of rape as a form of sexual violence adds a further level of confusion, 
because the terms ‘rape’ and ‘sexual violence’ are at times used interchangeably, with little 
clarification of the reasoning behind this switching. These terminologies used to categorise 
rape in international law will be examined in this thesis to assess their impact on these 
differing approaches and trial outcomes. Whether and how they can be used in an equitable 
way to reflect modern gender-neutral understandings of rape in international law will be a 
key consideration for the thesis. The thesis will not provide a suggested reform programme 
for rape prosecutions in modern international law. Nor will it attempt to address problems 
associated with criminal prosecutions reforms in international law. It does not explore in 
detail how individual prosecution cases are constructed, including evidence-gathering, the 





thesis is consideration of rapes committed in post-conflict environments by peacekeepers 
and other personnel associated with international missions. Rape as a peacetime crime is 
not considered within this analysis, except peripherally when invoked to explain 
developments in international law. While there is an acknowledgement of the impact on 
international law of national criminal laws and legal processes, no assessment will be given 
on national jurisdictions, individually or collectively. The thesis limits itself to 
consideration of the current lexicon drawn on for conflict-perpetrated rape in international 
law (both past and present) utilising interdisciplinary perspectives for this purpose in order 
to lay robust foundations for further development in this area of law. 
Historically women have commonly been identified in law as the possession of 
male relatives. Rape was a property crime committed against the man who formally or 
effectively possessed the woman. Male-male and female-perpetrated rape were excluded 
under this paradigm. In situations of armed conflict similar understandings prevailed. As 
‘spoils of war’ or ‘legitimate booty’, the rape of conquered women was considered normal 
conduct. It was not until the eighteenth century, when international law started to emerge 
as a formal system, that rape in war was identified as an offence constituting a violation of 
either family or female honour.1 
Such conceptualisations of rape are no longer considered fit for purpose. Yet, to 
date, a statutory definition of rape in international law remains absent.2 Since the twentieth 
century, this lack of clarity has sparked much debate regarding how rape as a war crime 
                                                          
1 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 
August 1874, available in D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), pp.22-34; The Laws of War on Land. Oxford, 9 September 1880, available in 
Schindler and Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, pp.36-48, (hereafter the Oxford Manual); Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, International Committee of the Red 
Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, (The Hague: International Conferences, 1907): 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195, (accessed 6 September 2019). 
2 To date, the UN Security Council (UNSC) for example has not introduced a resolution defining rape in 
armed conflict. See Chile Eboe-Osuji, International Law and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts, (Leiden 





should be defined. Feminist theorists have played a critical part in the discussions over 
how to arrive at such a definition.3 Driving the general feminist debates forward since the 
1960s have been figures like Judith Butler, Joan Scott, Elaine Showalter and Dale Spender. 
The results have been extensive considerations of the nature and extent of women’s 
oppression within patriarchal societies. Initially this was substantially undertaken using a 
predominantly Western perspective as well as providing what was essentially a national 
focus to these considerations.4 Their influence on feminist scholarship across the 
theoretical spectrum, including law, is extensive, even seminal, but the challenge is that it 
is far from uniform in their pattern of effects.   
This lack of uniformity of impact is particularly visible in the debates in law 
(particularly in the international sphere, the focus for this thesis) over the treatment of rape 
as a criminal offence. Feminist perspectives on debates about rape have been considered 
intrinsically radical in their challenge to established masculine thinking on law. In the last 
half of the twentieth century, radical feminist scholarship has, however, been identified as 
an aspect of feminist thinking alongside other labels, such as liberal feminism. Whether 
labelled as radical or any other kind of feminist scholarship, the work of figures like Butler 
have undoubtedly inspired and shaped the ongoing debates concerning rape. Yet, at the 
time of writing this thesis, there is no universal feminist stance about either what 
constitutes rape or how we can arrive at a robust legal definition for use in international 
law.  
                                                          
3 R. Tong, ‘Feminist Theory’, in James D. Wright, International Encyclopedia of the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, (University of North Carolina: Charlotte, NC, 2001), pp.5484-5491; P. England, 
‘Gender and Feminist Studies’, in Wright, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, pp.5910-5915. 
4 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); 
Joan W. Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’, American Historical Review, (1986), 





There are some constants of agreement across feminist thought. Using the 
relationship between men, power and dominance as a starting point, both radical and 
liberal feminist theory (albeit to varying different degrees) identify rape as a fundamental 
detrimental aspect of patriarchy. Accordingly, rape is rooted in constructions of sexuality 
and gender, which are located within broader systems of male power. Rape, in other words, 
is ‘not a deviation, but rather a deeply entrenched social practice that both expresses and 
reinforces far-reaching inequality and oppression of women in our society.’5 It is an 
offence that damages both the individual victim and women as a whole for which ‘all men 
in our society are collectively responsible’.6 A core trope in radical feminism, however, 
insists that women cannot genuinely consent to sex with men. As such, they argue, consent 
should be excluded as an element of rape.7  
The contribution of radical feminist theory with regards to rape in international law 
is invaluable. It has worked to recognise the harm committed by male perpetrators against 
female rape victims. But it is important to ask where male or non-binary victims and 
female-perpetrators of rape fit in to these debates. Liberal feminists, like myself, have 
taken up this issue but utilising a different perspective to that adopted by radical feminists. 
Liberal feminism, for example, places less emphasis on the powerlessness of women 
within patriarchal systems, seeking to recognise ways in which they have exercised 
agency, both past and present. Figures like Leonore Davidoff, Catherine Hall and Martha 
Nussbaum, in line with classic liberal thinking, have produced work shaped by their 
interest in reforms promoting an equality, of opportunity, of value and of respect between 
the genders in order to lessen the harmful affect of patriarchy.8 As part of this approach, 
                                                          
5 Igor Primorac, Ethics and Sex, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1998), p.497. 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid. 
8 See for example, Leonore Davidoff, Worlds Between: Historical Perspectives on Gender and Class, 





liberal feminists, notably, have looked at the role that law and the legal process can play 
in advancing challenges to patriarchy. Of crucial interest to them has been studies 
exploring areas of activism such as legislating for equal pay, equal opportunities, and 
equality in the division of labour. 
This ideology of equality is reflected elsewhere in liberal leaning scholarship, 
particularly with respect to rape. Experts such as Philip Rumney pick up on the feminist 
approach when they argue that it is important to frame rape not as a crime committed by 
men against women, but to identify rape as a gender-neutral attack on individual 
autonomy.9 Focusing on gender similarities rather than differences, this theoretical 
approach assumes that if men and women are treated equally and are presented with similar 
opportunities, there will be no variance in attitudes or behaviour between genders.10 As a 
dimension derived from an individualist form of feminist theory, it assumes that the 
choices and actions that each woman makes will contribute to their achieving equality.  
From this point of view, achieving gender equality is not contingent on the 
restructure of society, because inequality is not profitably understood as being the result 
of systemic oppression within social hierarchy or structures.11 As a general rule, the male 
sex (as traditionally and biologically understood) is, by feminist scholarship, identified as 
benefitting from the oppression of women. However, liberal feminism does not assume 
that as a social group, males are, or should be held universally accountable for the 
injustices experienced by women as a result of oppression, or blamed for upholding their 
position of privilege. There is instead potential for a recognition of individual nuance when 
                                                          
and History, (Blackwell: Polity Press, 2007); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
9 Philip Rumney, ‘In Defence of Gender Neutrality Within Rape’, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 
(2007), 6(1), 481-526. 
10 Annette Davies, ‘Liberal Feminism’, in Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos and Elden Wiebe (eds), 






exploring the roles of men in reaction to patriarchally-managed subjugation of women to 
masculine agendas.12 Rather, emphasis is placed on socialisation, which creates different 
gender and sex roles. Any differences or variances in the attitudes or behaviour between 
genders are thought to be a result of such sex or gender role socialisation as opposed to 
any innate psychological or biological difference.13 It is in this context that modern liberal 
feminists argue that rape needs to be categorised as a gender-neutral crime, certainly in 
international law, where the issue of consent in relation to conflict-perpetrated rape is 
generally deemed irrelevant.14  
The impact of these feminist theoretical approaches on the modern legal landscape 
is far-reaching. Nation states no longer refer to rape as a gendered property crime 
perpetrated by men against women. Increasingly, states acknowledge rape as a form of 
gender-neutral interpersonal violence. This shift in thinking is reflected at the international 
level. In the aforementioned absence of a statutory definition of rape in international law, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-present) have each defined rape as a gender-neutral crime 
committed against individuals in their own right.  
The creation of these gender-neutral definitions of rape are ground-breaking, and 
core to establishing the offence as a grave crime in international law. Despite this 
development, cases of male-female, male-male and female-perpetrated rape remain 
inconsistently prosecuted in international law with little explanation for that lack of 
uniformity from these modern specialist international courts. This inconsistency has 
sustained the debates. As the literature review will reveal, feminist scholars as diverse as 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 





Catharine MacKinnon, Ann Cahill, and Deborah Blatt have (if from different angles) 
sought to understand and explain this phenomenon by analysing a selection of the terms 
used to categorise rape in law. They have attempted to ascertain whether concepts like 
sexual violence, dignity and torture work to frame rape as a serious crime while still 
recognising the particular harm committed against female victims by male perpetrators. 
Yet little consideration has been given by them to the extent to which these terms 
perpetuate a gender-neutral understanding of the crime. This gap is the key focus of the 
thesis. Using what may broadly be termed as a liberal feminist lens, the thesis will analyse 
these concepts and how they are used to categorise or describe rape in international law. 
With a particular reference to its use in war crimes trials conducted by the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the ICC, it will explore how far these terms do work to frame rape as gender-neutral 
and provide recommendations regarding how these terms can be used more effectively by  
enabling  a greater consensus over their use.  
As part of this analysis, a critical consideration of the proceedings of these 
international courts is essential for any robust examination of the current strategies for the 
prosecution of rape in international law. Reference also needs to be made, as a frame for 
that exploration, to the key international body that implements and sustains international 
law in practice – the United Nations (UN, 1945-present). As the organisation that 
spearheaded the creation of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC (among other international 
courts), attention will be paid to the extent to which its institutional culture has influenced 
the perpetuation of the traditional heteronormative understanding of rape in international 
law. Account will be taken of the cultural biases discernible in the women, peace and 
security resolutions implemented through the UN Security Council (UNSC, 1945).  
A key challenge addressed in more detail in Chapter 1 (as well as being outlined in 





courts of other terms such as ‘conflict-related sexual violence’, ‘gender-based violence’ 
and ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’. These can signal, without explicit acknowledgment, 
an inclusion within a charge of acts of conflict-perpetrated rape.15 Such swapping or 
conflation of language without clarification presents methodological problems when, for 
example, collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative data. It can, as becomes 
plain in the body of the thesis, make it almost impossible to determine the nature of the 
type of specific offence that is being referenced.16 It is in this context that the thesis uses 
conflict-perpetrated rape as its primary case study, to provide a more focused and clearer 
understanding of the problems relating to this area of the categorisation of crimes in 
international law. It will examine the challenges associated with using such broad and 
varied concepts when describing rape in order to lay the foundation for the categorisation 
of other individual crimes of a sexual nature to be examined in the future. 
 
Literature Review 
As the following critique of the academic debates surrounding rape in international law 
will reveal, these discussions have been driven substantially by feminist thinkers and 
commentators across a range of interested disciplines. Feminist scholarship, in the form of 
a will to comment critically on existing legal and political structures, can be dated back in 
Western tradition as far as ancient Greece, with the work of figures like Sappho.17 In Book 
V of his Republic, Plato acknowledged Socrates’ perspective that women have ‘natural 
                                                          
15 Kirsten Campbell, ‘Producing Knowledge in the Field of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Research: 
Objects, Methods, Politics, and Gender Justice Methodology’, Social Politics: International Studies in 
Gender, State and Society, (2018), 25(4), 469-95, p.470. 
16 Ibid. 
17 This interpretation of feminist scholarship is drawn from the definition of feminism used by Jane 
Rendall, relating to ‘women who claimed for themselves the right to define their own place in society’, 
Jane Rendall, The Origins of Modern Feminism: Women in Britain, France and the United States 1780-





capacities’ equal to men for protecting and governing the state.18 In 1405, Christine de 
Pizan in The Book of the City of Ladies challenged the misogyny of her day by promoting 
broader notions of womanhood and female competence for rule. Other early feminist 
figures include Hannah Woolley, Juana Inés de la Cruz, Marie Le Jars de Gournay, Anne 
Bradstreet, Francoise Poullain de la Barre and Margaret Cavendish, the Duchess of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne.19 Towards the end of the Enlightenment, the comments of Olympe 
de la Gouges and, later in the 1790s, Mary Wollstonecraft, forced other philosophers 
during the nineteenth century, including Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and August 
Bebel, to reflect upon women’s rights in the context of democratic states.20 
By the nineteenth and early twentieth century (at least in the West), feminism as a 
concept and organised movement had started to take shape, actively campaigning for equal 
rights and legal protections of women.21 Originally primarily concerned with women’s 
suffrage, particularly in the UK and the US, the feminist agenda snowballed. From the 
mid-twentieth century, feminist activists campaigned for recognition of their claims to 
equality of opportunity and treatment to be protected by law on, among other issues, 
worker and workplace rights (including maternity leave and equal pay) and reproductive 
rights (particularly contraception and prenatal care). One of the earliest and most sustained 
areas of campaigning has addressed laws dealing with protection from domestic violence, 
sexual harassment and rape.22 As part of these developments, the relationship between 
patriarchy and the oppression of women attracted much comment from feminist writers 
                                                          
18 Plato, Republic, (translated, John Llewelyn Davies and David James Vaughan), (Ware: Wordsworth 
Editions, 1996), Book V. 
19 Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness from the Middle Ages to 1870, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993).  
20 Rendall, The Origins of Modern Feminism; Karen Offen, European Feminisms 1780-1950: A Political 
History, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). For a wider discussion of the literature on 
Western feminism and its wider implications globally, see June Hannam, Feminism, (Oxon: Routledge, 
2014).   
21 Rendall, The Origins of Modern Feminism. 
22 Stephanie Gilmore (ed.), Feminist Coalitions. Historical Perspectives on Second Wave Feminism in the 





across the spectrum, including Susan Brownmiller, Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan, 
Florynce Kennedy, bell hooks (also known as Gloria Jean Watkins) and Germaine Greer.23 
Their writings focused on the role of women in society from perspectives that revealed the 
cultural inequalities endemic to established gender norms. Alongside Kennedy, other 
writers, notably Kimberlé Crenshaw with her concept of intersectionality, ensured that the 
significance of race within those cultural inequalities formed a major part of the debates.24 
As part of second-wave feminism, these writers and other activists ensured that the 
traditional roles played by women in society, and the attached cultural values associated 
with gender identities, were consistently and extensively challenged. Their contribution 
has seen feminist thought achieve a greater impact than ever before, including on legal 
thinking.25  
Initially, the focus of feminist critiques on continuing legal inequalities was 
domestic. Even where comparative work was done, that too focused on national 
comparisons. Indeed, up to the 1990s, little critical attention was paid to gender 
inequalities within the domain of international law, substantially because (almost 
quintessentially) this type of law was seen as pertaining to public and so, by default, 
masculine dimensions such as trade, politics and diplomacy. This contextualisation helps 
to explain why, writing in 1994, Hilary Charlesworth described the feminist analysis of 
international law as being ‘at a very early stage.’26 Most international lawyers, she pointed 
out, ‘even those with a critical bent’ have largely ‘regarded their discipline as gender-
                                                          
23 See for example, Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 1975); Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, (translated, Constance Board and Sheila Malovany 
Chevallier); (London: Vintage Books, 1993); Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, (New York, NY: 
Penguin Books, 2010); Florynce Kennedy, Color Me Flo: May Hard Life and Good Times, (New Jersey, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976); bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black, (Boston, MA: 
South End Press, 1989); Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1971). 
24 Kimberlé Crenshaw, On Intersectionality: The Seminal Essays, (New York, NY: New Press, 2012). 
25 Sally Ann Drucker, ‘Betty Friedan: The Three Waves of Feminism’, Ohio Humanities, 27 April 2018: 
http://www.ohiohumanities.org/betty-friedan-the-three-waves-of-feminism/, (accessed 1 July 2019). 
26 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Critiques Of International Law and Their Critics’, Third World Legal 





free’.27 This perspective has endured, she insists, ‘long after feminist critiques of other 
areas of law have underlined the pervasiveness of gendered assumptions in national legal 
systems’.28 Charlesworth identified that, in national systems, the law utilises a 
public/private distinction when interpreting actions, placing the focus on actors because, 
she argues, ‘it is not the activity which characterizes the public and the private, but rather 
the actor’.29 Even more than for such national systems, the discussions of international law 
and its application must include a recognition of this dimension in the shape of a focus on 
the public/private dichotomy, and so acknowledging its potential for impacts on women’s 
legal identity and rights.30 Charlesworth, for example, makes the point that the 
incorporation of human rights considerations in international law post-1945 has ‘altered 
one set of boundaries’ between the public and the private, enabling international law to 
‘address violations of designated individual and group rights’.31   
Qualifying this point, she insists that this advance does not challenge the ‘deeper 
public/private dichotomy’ in law, which remains not only based on gender but also is set 
by agendas which focus on male fears about actions and initiatives which could threaten 
male dominance and female subordination.32 Her argument is that violence against women 
is, in particular, not properly addressed in international law because of its focus on 
‘“public” actions by the state’.33 Charlesworth identifies that the international legal 
definition of torture invokes the public nature of such actions,34 proceeding to argue that 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘’What Are “Women’s International Human Rights”?’, in Rebecca Cook (ed.), 
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 58-84, p.69. 
30 H. Charlesworth ‘Feminist Critiques’, p.1. 
31 H. Charlesworth, ‘Women’s International Human Rights’, p.71 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid, p.72.  
34 This definition establishes that ‘[i]t must be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 





what amounts to violence as torture for women happens also in the private sphere.35 
Earlier, in 1991, Charlesworth, alongside Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, had 
reflected on the persistence of the public/private dichotomy as providing the possible 
reason for international law resisting feminist analysis. Their intention to challenge this 
lacuna was encouraged by the reality that, thanks to the ending of the Cold War (1947-
1991), a new era was dawning for international law. The challenge, as these feminist 
scholars have underlined, was to refute the idea that, in primarily concerning itself with an 
idea of public law, the international dimension was still held not to ‘have any particular 
impact on women’.36 Scholars such as Charlesworth and Chinkin pointed critically to the 
accompanying assumption that ‘issues of sovereignty, territory, use of force and state 
responsibility’ were topics that were considered to be ‘gender free’ when it came to their 
application to ‘the abstract entities of states’.37 The arguments of such scholarship, in 
summary, were to the effect that it was only when international law began to be ‘considered 
directly [as] relevant to individuals’ that things would change.38 They pointed, in 
particular, to human rights law in insisting that it was possible to begin to develop ‘some 
specifically feminist perspectives on international law’.39 
Dianne Otto provides further insight into the growing feminist focus on 
international law. She explains that in the early twentieth century, in the aftermath of WWI 
(1914-1918), the focus for feminists and women’s international peace groups had been on 
efforts to support and inform the development of public international law. This was seen 
as being in the best interests of maintaining peace by the settlement of inter-state tensions 
without resorting to conflict, given that war was identified as having a particularly 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
36 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International 








damaging impact on women and families. These feminists had encouraged developments 
of international institutions (notably the League of Nations (1920-1946) and later the UN) 
in ‘the hope that they would provide a means to resolve international disputes 
peacefully.’40 Their efforts had led to some advancements, including the development of 
provisions for greater protection of civilians in armed conflict, the implementation of anti-
trafficking treaties as well as international labour organisation conventions regarding 
matters of women’s employment. This involvement with international law was for the 
most part uncritical. International law was understood, Otto explains, ‘as a hopeful site for 
feminist engagement’, providing a pathway to improve the lives of women and enabling 
peace.41  
It was not until the late 1980s that this perspective began to change. Feminist legal 
scholarship became increasingly critical of the complacency they perceived in 
international law, in that it had become clear to them that it was ‘largely impervious to 
feminist concerns’.42 They found that women’s issues were ‘marginalized by specialist 
institutions and instruments’ that related to international law, and that consequently, 
women were ‘still being treated protectively rather than as full rights-bearing subjects of 
the law.’43 In reaction to global events during the 1990s and early 2000s, the gaze of 
feminist scholarship increasingly fell on war and international law, and particularly on the 
impact of conflict-affected environments on women. In the light of events during this 
period, feminist commentators like Chinkin voiced their concerns that there seemed no 
likelihood that conflict-perpetrated rape would receive proper attention in international 
law, on the basis of past patterns in war crimes proceedings. As pointed out by Rhonda 
                                                          
40 Dianne Otto, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, Oxford Bibliographies, (2012, last reviewed 
2016): https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-








Copelon in the context of events in 1995, the rape of women in war had been accorded a 
low priority previously. It had, even in the aftermath of WWII (1939-1945), only ‘drawn 
occasional and short-lived international attention.’44 She describes how, rather than being 
perceived as a headline offence, rape, historically, had  merely ‘come to light as part of the 
competing diplomacies of war, illustrating the viciousness of the conqueror or the 
innocence of the conquered.’45 When war was over, rape was ‘comfortably filed away as 
a mere and inevitable “by-product,” a matter of poor discipline, the inevitable bad behavior 
of soldiers revved up, needy and briefly “out of control”.’46  
Around the same time, Judith Gardam looked more broadly at the gendered nature 
of law in relation to armed conflict.47 Seeking to use an objective lens, by reference to how 
an alien might perceive the contradictions, hypocrisies and assumptions contained within 
the rules and laws of armed conflict, she concluded that ‘the law of armed conflict 
perpetuates… all the assumptions of Western femininity and masculinity that permeate 
law in general.’48 In the laws of armed conflict, the female subject, she explains, is 
‘assumed to have certain “natural” characteristics such as modesty and weakness, which 
help to constitute her honour’.49 The provisions in international law which address or deal 
with her are based on these characteristics. She is also assumed, Gardam continues, to be 
the ‘natural prey of men’.50 Her honour, therefore, ‘must be protected from men’s 
“natural”’ uncontrollable lust.51 The male subject, on the other hand, ‘is the combatant and 
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has a “natural” affinity for arms’.52 Though generally held to be honourable, he is ‘prone 
to behaviour that is regarded as inimical to an honourable game, such as rape’, especially 
in conflict.53  
Interestingly for this thesis, while Gardam agrees that there are ‘two biological 
body types envisaged as natural by the law of armed conflict’, she is less convinced that 
they are both presumed to be heterosexual.54 She summarises that the woman is ‘perceived 
only in terms of her body as a sexual object for men and as a reproducer’, and so is framed 
as heterosexual.55 In contrast, the man, as the combatant, ‘does not appear to have a sexed 
body’ in the laws of armed conflict because ‘he is not protected from indecent assault’.56 
As such, man’s sexuality ‘is far more equivocal in the law of armed conflict than that of 
the woman.’57 
In seeking to move the discussion forward by providing reflection on the impact of 
these competing feminist perspectives, Otto explains that while ‘feminism’s basic 
commitment can be described as the struggle to realize women’s equality’, there are many 
different branches of feminism.58 These, at different times and in response to different 
events, have been used by feminist thinkers ‘to inform international legal theories and 
practices’.59 She adds a reminder that ‘women’s “equality”’ is perceived by some of these 
strands of thought ‘to be an inadequate aspiration.’60 In this light, feminist approaches to 
international law, she reflects, ‘have always fallen under a very broad umbrella, resulting 
in dynamic engagements with the law and its fraternity, as well as passionate internal 














critique and self-reflection.’61 Structural and postcolonial feminists, for example, have 
focused on the normative and institutional structures of international law, ‘finding them 
deeply committed to masculinist and imperial power and therefore in need of significant 
reconstruction.’62 The latter group in particular, alongside critical race feminist theorists, 
has played a significant role in the field of law that grew from European as well as 
patriarchal origins. Feminist debates concerning conceptions of gender and sexuality 
present another challenge to the established gaze of international law in terms of what it 
needs to address. The outcome, in terms of both those debates and the responses to them, 
has seen the emergence of a series of competing agendas that are often contradictory but 
are also argued for, in terms of the priorities they should assume, with considerable 
passion. That passion, however, in itself diminishes the chance of agreement between the 
competing perspectives in terms evolving strategies for managing these priorities. How to 
define and then proceed to prosecute conflict-perpetrated rape constitutes one area where 
the consequences have been particularly problematic in practice, as this literature review 
and subsequent chapters, combine to reveal. 
The origins of a key aspect of the international debate on prosecution of conflict-
perpetrated rape as a crime lie, in part, in the seminal contribution of the philosopher and 
sociologist, Michel Foucault. The theoretical challenges that he presented to feminist 
theory during the 1960s and 1970s focused on the relationship between the body, power, 
sexuality and the law. In particular, his claim that rape should be categorised as a form of 
violence as opposed to sexual violence provoked hostility from second-wave feminists 
across the board. Indeed, it continues to serve as a bone of contention amongst many 
feminists broadly. Specifically in relation to the considerations of this thesis, that 







contention has affected their interchanges with other international (legal) scholars on the 
topic.63 Leading feminist theorists such as Cahill, MacKinnon, Monique Plaza and 
Winifred Woodhull have challenged the validity of his conclusions, arguing that Foucault 
does not appreciate how gender, power, forces, and the law are interconnected.64  
The challenge for this thesis is that these debates largely centre on the persistence 
in them of a traditional identification of women as (certainly quantitatively, on the basis 
of the records) the primary victims of rape. Though different perspectives are assumed in 
those debates about the implications of that identification, one significant consequence has 
been the equal persistence of a belief that this quantitative primacy entitles them to some 
privileged form of special consideration. This position manifests itself particularly when 
defining the basis on which prosecutions for conflict-perpetrated rape should be brought. 
Notably, such a combination of thinking sets up a widespread expectation that women’s 
experiences as rape victims should be used to define the nature of the experience for all 
when consideration is made of how rape is prosecuted in any criminal justice process. This 
perspective is challenged in Chapter 5, in particular, where the impact of Foucault’s 
thinking in shaping the theoretical approaches to rape in international law as well as the 
reflective commentary on the work of the international courts will be explored. As touched 
upon earlier, conflict-perpetrated rape is recognised as a serious gender-neutral crime in 
modern international law. A key question is whether, by focusing strictly on the limitations 
or advantages of Foucault’s desexualisation theory with regards to female victims, the 
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discussion has remained circular and overly narrow. Even where feminists like Cahill 
attempt to broaden the debate beyond women’s victimisation, a wider scope to the 
discussion is largely absent. This lack is rooted in the constant referencing back to the 
essentially binary perspective used by Foucault, alongside the reality that he also privileges 
a Western perspective and assumes its universalism. Female-perpetrated rape continues to 
be largely overlooked, while male-male rape is only mentioned in passing.65  
For Sandesh Sivakumaran, a significant problem is that even where male-male rape 
victims are acknowledged, their experience is regularly explained in similar terms which 
echo those used for the female experience. It is a perspective that is recognised, even 
insisted on, by a number of feminist scholars. Plaza, for example, holds that when ‘men 
rape women, it is… because they are socially women’.66 She claims that when a man is 
raped, he is also raped as a woman.67 Radical feminist legal scholar and activist, 
MacKinnon describes how men who are raped are ‘stripped of their social status as men. 
They are feminized: made to serve the function and play the role customarily assigned to 
women as men’s social inferiors.’68  
Experts like Philipp Schulz, Augusta DelZotto and Adam Jones have attempted to 
challenge the persistence of the cultural assumptions supporting this perspective in order 
to widen the discussion.69 They argue that describing male-male rape in terms of being 
homosexualised or femininised is inherently harmful,70 because it reinforces damaging 
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concepts about heterosexuality and masculinities.71 This thesis will, in subsequent 
chapters, explore how persistently such understandings remain entrenched in feminist 
discourse on conflict-perpetrated rape. In critiquing the categorisation of conflict-
perpetrated rape as a crime of torture in international law, for example, a number of 
feminist scholars largely focus on the extent to which this development works to benefit 
female rape victims. Blatt, for example, considers how far this characterisation 
acknowledges the way rape is used as a gendered political tactic in order coerce or 
intimidate women.72 MacKinnon, on the other hand, looks at whether it would be more 
beneficial to characterise all rapes of women as torture, regardless of the contexts of 
perpetration or prosecution.73 Presenting an alternative perspective, Karen Engle suggests 
that describing rape as torture works to create a situation where ‘women are not capable 
of not being victimized by the rapes.’74 Central to these debates is persistence of a trope 
where both rape and torture are identified as being inherently gendered. Little attention is 
given in these discussions which might reflect on why, on the basis of evidence from the 
international courts, there is a clear inconsistency in prosecution strategies for male-female 
rape in terms of whether or not to identify it as a form of torture. This dimension becomes 
more challenging when we consider that male-male rape can be described simply as a 
crime of torture, with details of the sexual dimension obscured. Equally the challenge of 
how to prosecute female-perpetrated rape is largely ignored under this heading. These 
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amount to unresolved conversations, which this thesis will address in Chapter 7 exploring 
the invocation of rape as torture, to promote a better understanding of the extent to which 
such debates actually obstruct the development of a consensus over how to define rape as 
a crime in modern international law.  
 In recognising the dilemma that is posed by use of different descriptors for rape, 
it cannot be ignored that women remain the normative targets for this crime. Nevertheless, 
if a robust and meaningful examination of how to prosecute rape is to be achieved for 
international law, then the broader dimensions of the crime must be considered. In line 
with Eric Heinze’s even-handedness theory, male-male rape and female-perpetrated rape 
cannot continue to be side-lined if the scholarship is to move forward and advance a 
genuinely gender-neutral lexicon of rape in modern international law. It is important to 
rethink the current pro-binary and quintessentially Western traditions in the ongoing 
scholarly discourse in ways that can include wider issues and perspectives. Without 
changes, a feminist hostility to such a development risks continuing the ghettoization of 
women as the only ‘real’ victims of rape, thereby dismissing the validity of male-male rape 
in its own right while also failing to recognise female-perpetrated rape victims. 
Substantiation for this point is partially provided in what have become the well-worn 
discussions on the gendered nature of rape, which largely differ only with the fresh 
incidents included, rather than as a result of a new approach to the material. Work on 
female-perpetrated or male-male rape continues to be largely excluded from the wider 
trope.75 The approaches discussed in the ongoing debates centre on how to identify and so 
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define rape in modern international law. When combined with evidence on prosecutions 
for rape in the international courts, this focus underlines the necessity for taking an 
interdisciplinary approach to expand the lens used to draw conclusions about the nature of 
a lexicon. This will be explained in further detail in the Methodology section below.  
 
Methodology  
Central to the execution of any study is a coherent and reasoned methodological approach 
that both takes account of and responds to the existing literature, and revisits the relevant 
evidence. The following section will provide an outline of the different methodologies 
drawn on to develop my thesis approach, giving the rationale behind my choices and 
emphasis.  
 
(a) Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
The terms ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ refer to two different types of research methods, 
which are invoked either explicitly or implicitly by scholars in their analyses of collected 
data. The former, Aikaterini Argyrou explains, looks at ‘socially constructed facts’, while 
the latter examines evidence that is independent and measurable.76 Historically, 
quantitative data collection was the favoured approach in identifying judicial decision 
patterns. Since the 1990s, with the growing prominence of the socio-legal approach to 
legal history, qualitative legal research has become increasingly popular, especially 
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amongst experts looking to uncover information relating to decision-making processes.77 
This thesis uses a qualitative format for data analysis, while acknowledging the value of 
the quantitative approach in areas where robust data can be cited.  
In focusing on what Jelke Boesten refers to as ‘conflict-related sexual violence’, 
including rape, an examination is provided of the unease between these different 
methodological approaches and how both quantitative and qualitative data can inform 
policy development and call for justice.78 Responding to the demands for international 
criminal accountability for conflict-related sexual violence, she claims that researchers are 
looking for ways to improve our understanding and knowledge of its prevalence as an 
aspect of conflict.79 For Boesten, such research is vital in determining whether there are 
patterns which can be identified in the perpetration of sexual violence in conflict-related 
situations which, if found, can be used to secure accountability for such crimes. If we 
persist simply to state that rape in conflict is inevitable or endemic, she continues, then it 
perpetuates the fallacy that rape is related to men’s natural aggressive behaviour and, in 
turn, is something to be expected.80 This thesis responds to her challenge to see whether 
understanding these trends through collecting and analysing statistical evidence can work 
to both dispel such myths and improve intervention and accountability.81  
The thesis recognises that a problem with this approach is, as Boesten points out, 
finding sufficiently reliable or accurate statistical data in (post-)conflict environments. 
Finding robust evidence provides a challenge affecting rape prosecutions in peaceful 
democratic states where there are established institutions and mechanisms which might be 
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expected to generate robust relevant data.82 Thus, regardless of the wider context, many of 
the obstacles and difficulties in obtaining or accessing reliable data are similar. In 
peacetime or in conflict environments, most data relating to sexual and gender-based 
violence that is not anecdotal derives from police reports or those made by local authority 
bodies, such as healthcare providers and social workers.83 In (post-)conflict scenarios such 
testimony is still likely to be filtered through such bodies. A commonality is that the 
number of victims reporting such offences is low, and most statisticians accept that this 
reportage is unlikely to reflect anything more than a small percentage of actual incidents 
of rape. In this vein, Boesten asks ‘[w]hich part of the population reports, and which does 
not? How do class, race, family structures, marital status, perpetrator profile, intention, 
stigma, shame and/or age influence whether a victim-survivor reports or recounts their 
experiences or not?’84  
These factors, Boesten writes, add a further complication when analysing and 
applying collected data in a meaningful way. The risk in adopting a quantitative approach, 
therefore, is not only that of dramatically underrepresenting instances of sexual violence, 
but that a percentage of victim types (based on gender, race, ethnicity, for example) would 
be underrepresented and others overrepresented.85 Language, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, presents an additional challenge to employing a quantitative approach. For 
example, how terms such as ‘rape’, ‘sexual violence’ and ‘gender-based violence’ are 
understood or defined, ‘what words are used to refer to certain experiences and who can 
be victim or perpetrator influences both data collection as well as its interpretation.’86 
Because of these issues, Boesten insists that it is nearly impossible to compare data 










from different states and bodies, even with advances in data collection techniques and 
analysis methodology.87 It is on this basis that she argues that if quantitative data is to be 
used in a reliable way, it must examined in conjunction with qualitative contextual 
information.88 Focusing primarily on quantifiable data as part of policy development 
without the contextual and historical background exposes any analysis to the danger of 
statistical anomaly, and so distorting the conclusions reached. She points out that ‘there 
are a set of epistemological assumptions underlying a focus on numerical evidence’ that 
are incompatible with qualitative research.89  
Substantiating her argument that despite its apparent value, the quantitative 
approach is inherently vulnerable to flaws, Boesten refers to the work of a range of 
different types of experts, including Trisha Greenhalgh and Jill Russell, who reflect on the 
use of quantitative data in biomedical research.90 In their article ‘Evidence-Based 
Policymaking: A Critique’, they argue that ‘measuring the social world and translating this 
into comparable numbers and indicators represents a specific positivist worldview in 
which context, history and subjectivity lose ground’.91 Boesten also considers the 
observations of Sally Engle Merry,92 who claims that focus on ‘quantifiable indicators for 
policy has moved from national governance’ (in terms of health, for example) ‘and 
economic analysis to development and global governance.’93 She points out that 
‘composite indicators to monitor human rights performance’,94 for example, ‘promote 
quick comparisons of countries along a scale but ignores the specificity of various human 
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rights and conceals particular violations’.95 Measurements and indicators, she writes, often 
overlook an array of factors that shape our universe,96 and ‘have embedded theories and 
values that shape apparently objective information and influence decisions’.97  
Boesten raises crucial points regarding the challenges associated with quantitative 
data use, particularly in the context of rape in modern international law. It is in light of 
these critiques that I decided that quantitative methods will not be directly used in this 
thesis. Instead, statistical data collected by other experts will, at times, be referenced to 
demonstrate the prevalence of rape in (post-)conflict. To contextualise such data in ways 
that can make it relevant to the analysis in this thesis, qualitative research will be invoked 
as a framing device throughout. Typically employed to enable an understanding of the 
impact or meaning a research topic or subject has or gives to a phenomenon, as opposed 
to authenticating or generating theories retrieved from scholarly literature, this research 
method largely relies on reasoning based on facts and data, which are categorised into 
patterns and themes.98 It can be generally used for explanatory or exploratory purposes, 
and lead to causal or descriptive conclusions.99 Particularly in law, it can be used to expose 
legal realities or discourses, revealing the limited parameters of organisational action, 
insider views or perspectives as well as experiences of the law.100 
Already used extensively within feminist scholarship on sexual violence,101 this 
thesis applies qualitative research approaches in order to assess a selection of the terms 
used to categorise and prosecute rape in modern international law. Relevant primary 
sources in the shape of trial literature, and policy documents and statements from key 
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bodies, notably the UN, have been identified for the contemporary post-1990 period in 
particular. The pertinent secondary literature has been synthesised according to the themes 
identified by the research questions for this thesis. This exercise will advance the critical 
enquiries and will bring together primary and secondary material.102  
Examining primary sources, including national and international law as well as trial 
transcripts, this thesis explores how understandings of what constitutes rape in 
international law have changed. It argues that, if there is to be an advance towards a more 
robust understanding of how to improve prosecution practices for rape in international 
courts, questions need to be raised on a number of fronts. In particular, the relationship 
between traditional heteronormative understandings of conflict-related rape and the terms 
used to categorise such offences needs to be revisited. To inflect the conclusions reached 
on this basis, questions will also be asked about how far that relationship makes the 
application of such concepts unfit for purpose because they reinforce traditional ideas of 
the crime. Do these concepts so influence practice that, for example, they undermine the 
status of rape as a serious crime in international law? Do they promote a reality where men 
are framed as permanent perpetrators of rape and women as agentless victims? Linked to 
such debates, further consideration needs to be given to the implications for victims of 
male-male rape, where their experience is often likened to that of the female victim. Does 
the primacy of this understanding not only damage a male victim’s sense of masculine 
identity, but also work to reinforce the social stigma of rape by making it something 
pertaining to homosexuality, which in itself is often seen as having a feminine character? 
To what extent are female-perpetrators of rape factored into this construct? Approaches 
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which involve a range of other disciplines besides law are used in this thesis to help 
advance solutions and establish a robust methodology.  
 
(b) Interdisciplinary Approach 
Interdisciplinary scholarship is central to the methodology for this thesis. This term 
represents the use of two or more distinct academic disciplines in order to draw on 
information and knowledge from other fields. There is a need for caution from scholars 
when employing such an approach to research, because it is difficult to balance the 
competing agendas of different disciplines in ways that provide robust analysis-based 
conclusions. It is owing to these challenges that Sanne Taekema and Bart van Klink, for 
example, contest the usefulness of such research, arguing that academic disciplines often 
have polarising research processes or different conceptualisations of a subject matter.103 
As a result, any scholarly conclusions drawn from such research are, they maintain, 
potentially compromised. This thesis, in line with arguments put forward by Argyrou, 
instead insists that inspiration can be taken from other academic fields so long as a 
consciousness exists of their individual agendas. Such awareness includes taking account 
of the differing assumptions made by different disciplines when setting up data-gathering 
strategies as well as the priorities for evidence interpretation. A valid interdisciplinary 
approach which prioritises the legal dimension but allows for it to be inflected by the 
considerations of another discipline, such as history, can be taken when ‘the response to 
the problem defined in the research question “is not predicated solely on the concrete body 
of legal rules”’.104 A further caveat to interdisciplinarity is provided when an enquiry 
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concerns ‘a hermeneutical quest for a legal meaning and/or interpretation.’105 What is 
implicit here is a warning that quantitative approaches to data are particularly problematic 
when utilising an interdisciplinary methodology, because it is not always possible to marry 
the different data collection and analytical processes between disciplines. This point 
further reinforces use of a methodology invoking qualitative approaches to the sources for 
this thesis. 
Adopting an interdisciplinary approach through employing a socio-legal 
perspective has been identified as essential for this thesis because it takes account of the 
cultural and social history which frames legal developments over time.106 Socio-legal 
research has been traditionally used to bridge the divide between sociology and law, and 
economics and social policy.107 However, there is increasing level of interaction between 
law and those disciplines traditionally located within the arts and humanities.108 For the 
purposes of examining the lexicon of rape in international law, the policy and economic 
aspect of socio-legal studies is of little relevance. As such, the ‘socio’ dimension, which 
includes cultural studies,109 is significant because of the wider socio-cultural issues 
associated with conflict-perpetrated rape and the terms used to categorise the offence in 
international law. This dimension is of critical importance as it permits an analysis that 
looks beyond the narrow parameters of legal studies.  
In order to determine the impact of the terms used to categorise rape in international 
law have on prosecution outcomes, legal history (invoked from a perspective generally 
labelled as historico-legal studies) is equally essential. Focusing on ‘events of the past that 
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pertain to all facets of the law’, historico-legal scholarship analyses certain 
laws, legal bodies, institutions and individuals who work or operate within the 
legal system, and the sway of law and the legal process on society and its attitudes.110 Lorie 
Charlesworth explains that historical contextualisation is a distinctive feature of socio-
legal research. Many, she explains, ‘if not all, examples of socio-legal research inevitably 
presuppose at least certain aspects of knowledge of the past.’111 Using the examination of 
law and discrimination as an example, Charlesworth points out that researchers arguing 
for progressive legal intervention, which expands ‘the rights of historically disadvantaged 
groups’ rarely directly refer to historical sources.112 Yet their analyses typically accept that 
such groups have historically been discriminated against.113 This emphasis on historical 
contextualisation is key to understanding the perspectives of such groups and their 
attitudes towards rape as a crime. 
Even so, it is important to engage with questions that have been raised regarding 
the relevance of historico-legal research as part of socio-legal scholarship.114 The argument 
is made that because a phenomenon of the modern age can be summarised in terms of 
growing cultural instability of or within communities as a result of rapid cultural, social, 
and technological change, all continuity with the past is disrupted. Historical research is 
therefore rendered obsolete where present realities of crimes, like rape, are examined.115  
In response, this thesis invokes Charlesworth’s point that it is seldom possible to 
draw a clear line between the past and present, and that sound socio-legal scholarship 
recognises the continuing impact of historically-rooted cultural traditions. As she reflects, 
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the state of any research topic remains ‘encrusted with the legacy of all that it is perceived 
as having become over a sustained period of time.’116 Even experts that do not employ a 
strict historical research approach identify the need to reflect on developments within their 
research subject.117 Likewise, lawyers, with their reliance on precedence, often attempt to 
reconstruct historical events during trial proceedings.118 In modern international war 
crimes prosecutions, for example, the legacy of previous war crimes tribunals, notably the 
IMT and the IMTFE have been repeatedly referenced.119  
The perspective taken by this thesis is that the process of examining law or 
legislation in action cannot overlook the historical. Taking a topic or event as the subject 
of socio-legal, or another form of research, requires historical analysis in order to 
understand how far key values, beliefs, and ideas underpinning the research subject have 
come into being.120 The effect of shifting contexts as well as ‘the resulting lessons of the 
power of contingency, provisionality and openness to transformation’, Charlesworth 
explains, ‘are positively enhanced by historical contextualisation’.121 This occurs in ways 
that question recognised socio-legal narratives and other accounts of legal subjects.122  
Robert Gordon is another scholar who explicitly recognises that legal history can 
be used to critique those ideologies that support current state of affairs: 
[Anything] that produces disturbances in the field – that inverts or scrambles 
familiar narratives of stasis, recovery or progress; anything that advances rival 
perspectives (such as those of the losers rather than the winners) for surveying 
developments, or that posits alternative trajectories that might have produced a 
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very different present – in short any approach that unsettles the familiar 
strategies that we use to tame the past in order to normalise the present.123 
On this basis, failure to examine the emergence of rape as a war crime in international law 
without providing any historical context for this development would constitute poor 
scholarship.  
Use of a feminist methodology will work to mesh these different research 
approaches effectively. Elizabeth Grosz has pointed out that generally a feminist analysis 
is, on the one hand, a response or reaction to the ‘overwhelming masculinity of privileged 
and historically dominant knowledges, acting as a kind of counterweight to the imbalances 
resulting from the male monopoly of the production and reception of knowledges’.124 On 
the other it is ‘a response to the political goals of feminist struggles’.125  
In law, feminists, broadly speaking, have doubts about leading legal methods and 
are critical of them for representing, what Lydia Cloughtery identifies as, ‘male power 
structures, considering only a male view of the world, and ignoring the female view’.126 
Attempting to fill this gap, legal feminist scholars typically look to ‘incorporate the 
experience of women and women’s voices into jurisprudence.’127 This methodological 
approach is key to this thesis because it not only recognises the ‘injustices in society that 
are borne out across the lives of women’, but it continually raises new questions about the 
law, encouraging ongoing dialogue or conversations, in order to move theory forward.128 
Established mainstream methodological techniques typically favour research conclusions 
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that either exclude or marginalise the experiences and perspectives of women. Such 
practices also promote definitions of minority groups utilising binary and Western 
perspectives on race, ethnicity or class.129 Feminist methodologies are more equipped to 
alert users to the need to be conscious of the dangers of such essentialist approaches, 
diminishing the tendency to fall back on a prescriptive approach.130 As Caroline 
Ramazanoglu points out, the choices made by feminist methodologies ‘are particularly 
powerful in the politics and practices of knowledge production’, because they promote a 
more considered understanding of the implications of taking for granted a relevant 
presumption or stereotype.131 Gina Heathcote points out that ‘the compulsion towards new 
ways of understanding, new ways of listening and new ways of constructing and imagining 
the law, within feminist legal scholarship’ represents what she dubs ‘the life of feminist 
thinking’.132  
Addressing the main focus of feminist thinking, Heathcote points to three 
questions:  
1) How a theory and a political process can speak for all women without losing 
respect for the diversity of individuals (the question of essentialism);  
2) How to articulate women’s disadvantage and the everyday harm women 
encounter without negating women’s agency (the question of victim versus 
agency); 
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3) How to develop, without losing the strength of feminists’ real world action 
or losing the sophistication of the theoretical understandings of the limits 
and strengths of feminist methods (the question of praxis).133 
These questions will underpin the analysis provided in this thesis, in order to provide 
a fresh reflection on the terms used to categorise conflict-perpetrated rape in 
international law.  
Demonstrating a sensitivity towards diversity of opinion across a range of factors, 
including the historical time dimension and its impact on presentations of topics, such as 
age, class, sexual orientation, culture, race and ethnicity, is key to this study.134 A 
conscious inclusion of these different perspectives can ensure that important variances in 
the debates among women and feminists are not obscured or ignored.135 Here, it is 
important to acknowledge my own identity. As a white Western feminist, I benefit from 
certain privileges because of my ethnicity and place of residency, which do not necessarily 
reflect the realities or experiences of other groups, particularly those of non-Western states. 
To avoid privileging my own perspective, I pursue a similar type of feminist politics to 
Heathcote, whereby I ‘actively and consciously (and always with more to discover)’ 
attempt ‘to make political space for those who do not have the privilege to speak in the 
same forums as I have.’136 While feminism does consider ‘oppressive practices that operate 
against white, privileged women’, there is a danger that the end conclusions ‘may readjust 
the allocation of privilege, but fail… to reconstruct the social and legal significance of 
gender’ as it affects non-white women or other minority groups.137 
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As part of this methodological approach, it is important to note and understand 
tensions within feminist scholarship ‘as an integral and necessary part of feminist 
methodologies’.138 As indicated earlier, ‘[t]here is no single school of feminist 
jurisprudence.’ 139 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright suggest that ‘[m]ost feminists would 
agree that a diversity of voices is not only valuable,’ but crucial, and that the ‘search for, 
or belief in, one view, one voice is unlikely to capture the reality of women’s experience 
or gender inequality.’ 140 My starting point is that the idea of ‘“[o]ne true story”’ suggests 
that an alternative story cannot be told with equal validity, favouring ‘the permanent 
partiality of feminist inquiry.’141 This thesis accepts the need to be alert to the significance 
of variances in feminist debates surrounding the identification of rape as a gender-neutral 
crime in modern international law. Echoing Heathcote, it recognises the importance, most 
specifically, of analysing the law in a way that does ‘not collapse back into accounts of 
women as victims and marked as externally vulnerable’.142 Acknowledging that there can 
be a ‘split between feminist message[s]’ relating to the experiences of women and feminist 
methodologies theorising about expertise and knowledge within the law is equally critical, 
and will play a pivotal role in this thesis.143 
 
(c)  Case Study Approach    
As already indicated, a case study approach has been chosen as part of this analysis. Robert 
Yin, a leading figure in case study development, defines a ‘case study’ as a means of 
investigating ‘a contemporary phenomenon in-depth within its real-life context, especially 
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when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident’.144 
It refers to the critical analysis of a particular subject, involving an individual, a group or 
a social experiment or phenomenon, in order to determine and evaluate patterns of 
behaviour or outcomes. Case study research is typically used in academic scholarship to 
generalise information learned from one subject to another, so as to find a common 
dominator that can be linked to the failure or success of a case. Reports, interviews and 
court cases, among others, can be used as a case study to collect information.145 
For Argyrou, case study research lacks objectivity, rigour and precision.146 Yin, on 
the other hand, argues that it is useful tool in conducting in-depth analysis where ‘why or 
how-based’ research questions are asked, as this thesis does. It delivers detailed 
information relating to events, activities, processes and situations concerning the 
behaviour of people or a phenomenon.147 Lisa Webley explains how, in law, case study 
research is used to identify the extent to which legislation is (mis)applied, observed or 
rejected and its impact on other areas, such as policy and legal making processes and court 
decisions.148 Expanding on this point, Terry Hutchinson argues that case study research 
works to explore inconsistent legal outcomes, explain differences or reasons behind certain 
legal processes, something which undoubtedly characterises the realities of rape 
prosecutions in the international courts.149  
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It is on this basis that case studies are used throughout this analysis, starting with 
the main subject of this thesis – rape in international law. The focus of this discussion is 
on rape committed in war, because it is only under such circumstances that international 
law is invoked. Other incidents of rape remain under national jurisdictions.150 However, 
rather than use the older terminology such as ‘rape in war’ reference will instead be made 
throughout to ‘conflict-perpetrated rape’, as reflecting a more current usage for rape in 
international law.151 
In order to provide a sense of focus, this thesis looks at the terms used to categorise 
only that crime. It is hoped that by using rape as the primary case study, this analysis can 
address the specific problems affecting the categorisation of one act, rather than generally 
examine multiple offenses under the umbrella of one overarching label. This approach is 
not without its difficulties. As touched upon earlier, Kirsten Campbell acknowledges how 
‘rape’ and other terms such as ‘gender-based violence’, ‘conflict-related sexual violence’, 
‘sexual violence’, and ‘sexual exploitation and abuse’ are often used interchangeably in 
scholarship.152 This conflation of terminology, amounting to a lack of precision, she 
argues, poses numerous challenges for a case study approach. Indeed, scholars often 
generalise between and within empirical studies, and use different methods of data 
collection for comparison between studies.153 Care will need to be taken to ascertain when 
an incident which could be categorised specifically as rape is being discussed under 
another headline such as sexual violence.154 
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Other case studies include the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC – the first modern 
specialist international criminal courts to provide their own definitions of rape and 
prosecute alleged perpetrators in international law. These organs are important because 
even where other international courts such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC, 1997-present) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, 2002-13) 
have addressed rape as a war crime in international law, they have referred to and built on 
the precedence set by the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. Examining the methodology used 
by these bodies shows not only their thought processes behind conceptualising rape as a 
serious crime in international law, but their shortcomings. For example, the failure of these 
tribunals to consider wider factors like the extent to which the terms used to categorise 
rape reflect traditional understandings of the crime.  
In terms of their function as case studies, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC have all 
referenced various national and international legislation in developing their respective 
definitions of rape. As such, this thesis draws, if indirectly, on the work reflecting both on 
different international bodies as well as on individual state engagement with those bodies. 
They provide the exemplars within the wider case studies enabling exploration of the 
problems associated with terms used to categorise rape. Here, it is worth reiterating the 
point raised by Charlesworth about the significance of acknowledging the legacy of what 
a legal concept such as rape has been in the past when understanding the current realities 
of a topic.155 In line with this reflection, the point of origin for the analysis pursued by this 
thesis invokes a longer chronological perspective to underline the entrenched nature of the 
traditions contextualising national and international law. 
 
 
                                                          






Prior to the twentieth century, developments in laws of war, particularly with regards to 
rape, were limited in their scope. Though rape was – at least from a legal perspective – no 
longer regarded as (by default) part of the ‘spoils of war’, it continued to evade 
prosecution. Even in the aftermath of WWII, conflict-perpetrated rape was largely 
overlooked, despite its identification as a violation of female or family honour in 
international law. It was not until the 1990s, thanks in part to the media reportage of the 
Yugoslavian and Rwandan wars, that the legal landscape shifted. Theodor Meron remarks 
that ‘[t]here is nothing new in atrocities or starvation. What is new is the role of the media. 
Instant reporting from the field has resulted in rapid sensitization of public opinion, greatly 
reducing the time lapse between the perpetration of such tragedies and responses to 
them.’156 Such coverage resulted in an increase in the demand for international courts and 
tribunals to be established to prosecute and punish not just states (via war reparations),157 
but also individual perpetrators accused of crimes perpetrated in conflict. Following 
sustained pressure from international/non-governmental organisations (I/NGOs) and 
activists, rape was (eventually) added, among other crimes, to the list of charges 
prosecuted by the ICTY and the ICTR. As part of this development, these tribunals defined 
rape as a gender-neutral crime committed against an individual in their own right – 
something which was later picked up by the ICC. One important question for this thesis is 
whether conflict-perpetrated rape has, and is, being prosecuted in ways that reflect these 
gender-neutral definitions. Here, it will be essential to consider the role was played in 
prosecution outcomes by the terms chosen in various cases to categorise rape.    
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In order to set up this analysis, Chapter 1 surveys the terminology used to frame 
and push forward the debates identified in the literature review.  It examines key concepts, 
such as hegemonic masculinity and patriarchy, to understand how far, and in what ways, 
they have shaped both historic and contemporary understandings of rape in international 
law. This examination will enable a better appreciation of the extent to which historical 
understandings of rape have retained a persistent cultural power, which will be reflected 
on throughout the analysis presented in this thesis. Building on this survey, the evolution 
of rape as a crime in international law between ancient times and WWII is examined in 
Chapter 2, in order to establish the residues of the past. It explores the origins of 
international law and how rape as a war crime, in line with hegemonic masculinity, was 
traditionally understood as a violation of female or family honour. The emergence of 
modern international law from the setting-up of the UN onwards is analysed in Chapter 3. 
Its focus is on the mechanisms introduced and inspired by that body, in particular the 
ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC, and the legacy they established for the prosecution of rape 
by subsequent specialist international courts. Taking this analysis further, Chapter 4 
explores the issues associated with legal terminology. It examines the different definitions 
of rape created by the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC in further detail as well as reflecting 
on trial outcomes. It shows how traditional (hegemonic masculine) conceptualisations of 
the crime continue to retain salience, affecting how male-female/male-male/female-
perpetrated rape have been categorised differently under the headings of sexual violence, 
torture and dignity. Chapters 5-7 considers the extent to which these terms used to 
categorise rape in international law perpetuate such traditional understandings of rape and, 
in turn, examine their usefulness as part of a lexicon of rape in modern international law. 
Starting with the term ‘sexual violence’, Chapter 5 explores the challenges associated with 





gender-constructs and asks whether the term ‘gender-based violence’ offers an alternative. 
Chapter 6 moves beyond this focus to consider the value of utilising the concept of dignity, 
given its ongoing connection with the hegemonic masculine concept of ‘honour’. Chapter 
7 examines the term ‘torture’. Reflecting on the ways in which male-female and male-
male rape have been prosecuted differently under this heading by these specialist courts, 
this chapter focuses on the debates concerning the private/public dichotomy in 
international law and its impact on rape prosecutions in international law. Returning to a 
focus on the application of theoretical concepts, Chapter 8 looks at the role of institutional 
power and authority, namely the UN. As the organisation that played a pivotal role in the 
creation of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC, the UN certainly influenced institutional and 
cultural framework of these organs. It is important, then, to examine the UN’s attitude 
towards and response to conflict-perpetrated rape in the shape of its UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR). This analysis will determine the extent and significance of the 
cultural messages disseminated by the UN on these specialist international criminal courts. 
An Appendix is provided outlining the definitions created by the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
ICC as well as selected cases discussed in this thesis, including the charges brought and 










As the Introduction to this thesis revealed, feminist scholarship, among other researchers 
across the academic spectrum, has used various concepts to examine conflict-perpetrated 
rape in international law in both a historical and contemporary context. In order to critique 
the terms used to categorise rape in international law, it is important to establish an 
understanding of these broader concepts, because they reveal not only how rape in 
international war crimes trials is understood, but also the underlying assumptions and 
expectations on which such usage rests.  
The concepts used to contextualise rape in international law typically invoke 
powerful underlying assumptions about the criminal nature of rape. The challenge then 
becomes understanding how these assumptions affects usage of the different terms 
employed, which include ‘gender-based violence’, ‘conflict-related sexual violence’, and 
‘sexual exploitation and abuse’. Typically, they have a different value or meaning within 
different areas of scholarship as well as in different cultures. Other key concepts used in 
the debates are also in need of clarification, notably ‘gender’, ‘patriarchy’ and ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’. This chapter will therefore examine these terms, taking account of their 
interdisciplinary applications, as a basis for their role in the analyses provided in the 
remainder of the thesis. It will also establish what constitutes a lexicon in law and conflict-









(a) A Lexicon in Law 
A ‘lexicon’ refers to ‘[a] stock of terms used in a particular profession, subject, or style’.1 
The words we use to describe or contextualise an act, situation or event are important, 
especially in law. In criminal law, for example, they should address the mens rea (the 
criminal mind-set or intent of the alleged perpetrator)2 and the actus reus (‘the commission 
of an act prohibited in law’) of a crime.3 Over time, understandings of what constitutes an 
offence as well as its classification can change. These developments should be reflected in 
the terms used to categorise a crime if the law is to remain relevant. The challenge in law 
is that specialist legal terms used to categorise an offence are often vague, making it 
unclear when crime constitutes a specific harm and what that categorisation effectively 
represents. 
Throughout history, scholars have attempted to provide their own lexicons for use 
in various areas of law. In 1892, John Wharton in Law Lexicon (also advertised as a 
Dictionary of Jurisprudence) provided not just literal translations of the Latin maxims used 
in law but their explanatory meanings.4 More recently, Sarah Wilson explored the lexicon 
of financial crime as part of her wider analysis of white collar crime.5 Susan Marks and 
Andrew Clapham proposed their own lexicon in international human rights law, arguing 
that such a tool is essential to secure ‘emancipatory change’ within international human 
rights law.6 Reflecting on the practical realities of constructing an international lexicon at 
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the end of colonialism, Marks and Clapham turned to Edward Saïd’s work on orientalism 
and the messages conveyed by imperial terminologies for their colonies. Saïd explained 
that if the existing axes of ascendancy were to be successfully reconceptualised at the end 
of colonialism, similar language to that used by the dominant group or power would need 
to be employed.7 If international law is to reflect and respect a broad range of belief 
systems, then the dominant powers must ensure the language used is accessible to all.  
 
(b) Conflict-Perpetrated Rape 
To date, no consensus exists between states on what, in law, constitutes rape. Legal 
definitions of the crime differ between states. They are still continuously debated but 
without achieving agreement. This lack is due to the gendered interpretation of the concept 
of rape.8 Some state penal codes, including those of England and Wales and Pakistan, 
define rape as penetration of the vagina by the penis by force, including threat or 
intimidation.9 Others, such as the Penal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicate that 
force can be directed at a third person. Providing clarification, Ch XIX, Article 203 states 
‘[w]hoever coerces another by force or by threat of immediate attack upon his life or limb, 
or the life or limb of someone close to that person, to sexual intercourse or an equivalent 
sexual act, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term between one and ten years’.10 In 
other words, if an individual is forced to have sex to prevent a relative’s murder, for 
example, this can constitute rape. Some national jurisdictions have omitted the element of 
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penetration completely, which can make judgments about the gravity of incidents 
unclear.11 This point relates to the wider dimension of sexual assault, as in some societies 
where people are often packed into tight spaces, such as overcrowded transport, fondling 
or frottage might also count as an assault (or battery in the classical sense of non-
consensual touching) although it is non-penetrative. Arguably, such acts, even if admitted 
as assaults or battery, are overall too trifling and deflect attention from graver incidents. 
Recognising instances where penetration is forced upon oneself rather than upon someone 
else also presents an issue. For example, an adult woman coercing an under-age male into 
sex or even an adult male forcing penetration by and not upon another male. There are 
inconsistencies in the legal recognition of rape as a gender-neutral crime12 and the use of 
objects to rape an individual.13 Forced oral sex also provides a challenge for determining 
what constitutes rape, as does the issue of consent.14 Valerie Oosterveld, for example, 
points out that a focus on non-consent is the core or central concern of many of domestic 
legislators.15 
The mens rea and actus reus involved presents a test for jurisprudential thinking 
about rape. As Susan Caringella points out, in the US, on the one hand ‘the overwhelming 
majority of contemporary rape statutes contain no explicit mens rea requirement’, which 
works to reinforce the idea that mens rea is not important in defences against rape. The 
grounds for making such claims rest in the theory that excluding this element should make 
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it easier to prove either intention or recklessness.16 On the other, there is evidence from 
those same US courts which suggests that the emphasis on force and consent could 
provide, in practice, a basis for claiming that the mens rea remain significant in rape 
prosecutions.17 There seems, to date, to be no sign of a consensus being achieved on this 
point of contention. 
In the absence of a statutory definition of rape in international law, the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the ICC sought to create their own definitions of conflict-perpetrated rape for 
their prosecution purposes (Appendix 1). Inevitably, the court personnel responsible for 
evolving such definitions looked to national jurisdictions, where the ambiguities 
mentioned above, both between and within states, ensured there was no easy path towards 
constructing a single workable definition. The proceedings in these, constituting the first 
modern specialist international courts to define, categorise and prosecute rape as a war 
crime in international law, provide the focus of this thesis.18 Key to this analysis are the 
similarities and differences shared between these definitions, namely how they each frame 
rape as gender-neutral. The application of these definitions by these respective bodies will 
also be examined. Particular attention will be paid to how those definitions were applied 
and whether any patterns emerge where rape (by and against either gender) is, or is not, 
prosecuted as a different type of offence. Whether this pattern reinforces traditional 
heteronormative understandings of rape will also be considered. 
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(c) Heteronormative Rape 
The term ‘heteronormative’ is intrinsically gendered, and denotes or relates ‘to a world 
view that promotes heterosexuality as the normal or preferred sexual orientation.’19 Rape 
has typically been understood, both legally and culturally, as a crime perpetrated solely by 
men and only against women, a reality which also relates to patriarchy (defined below). 
The term ‘heteronormative rape’ is employed within this thesis to signal the traditional 
understanding of rape as an expression of heterosexuality, which by default identifies men 
as perpetrators and women as victims. 
For this thesis, the challenge is that such fixed ideas and understandings about the 
nature of victims, perpetrators and conflict works to narrow our understanding of what 
constitutes rape. One point which this thesis will reflect on is whether it will be, in future, 
possible for legal thinking and practitioners genuinely to move beyond this understanding, 
with the implications that might have for shifting broader cultural mind-sets.   
 
(d) Patriarchy  
Originally used to refer to a ‘system of society or government by fathers or elder males of 
the community’,20 the term ‘patriarchy’ is another intrinsically gendered term which has 
evolved to describe ‘[a] system of society or government in which men hold the power and 
women are largely excluded from it.’21 Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha: Or The Natural 
Power of Kings (1680) explored long-standing beliefs encapsulated in the Fourth of the 
Ten Commandments about the ‘natural’ authority of fathers over their families and 
households (women and children). He employed such beliefs to provide a philosophical 
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justification for what he identified as the equally natural authority of kings (as patriarchs) 
over their subjects. Filmer’s interpretation of the naturalness of this hierarchy of authority, 
which excludes women from any independent authority, is rooted in his insistence that a 
hierarchy of authority started with Man, and that Woman was formed out of Man for Man. 
Women are therefore bound to obey men.22  
The impact of this exposition of patriarchy on cultural, social and legal attitudes 
towards women has since then been examined by feminists as varied as Gerda Lerner,23 
Eva Figes24 and Susan Brownmiller.25 They argue that in extreme patriarchal societies men 
are socialised to link masculinity to power and entitlement.26 To achieve and maintain 
dominance and control, physical and mental violence, including rape, are perceived as 
acceptable tools.27 Brownmiller explains that ‘[i]t seems eminently sensible to hypothesize 
that man’s violent capture and rape of the female led to the establishment of a rudimentary 
mate-protectorate and then sometime later to the full-blown male solidification of power, 
the patriarchy.’28  
The relationship between patriarchy and the criminalisation of rape in international 
law is pivotal. The historical identification of rape in war as being an offence is because it 
constituted a violation of family or female honour epitomised, in masculine terms, the 
significance of women’s purity29 and chastity.30 Though it is no longer described in such 
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terms legally, this thesis examines how far the cultural influence of such patriarchal 
attitudes continues to affect the terms used to categorise rape in international law.  
It is important to note, as part of this analysis, that to draw a connection in this way 
between patriarchal notions of masculinity and violence is not to make a claim that ‘men 
are naturally violent.’31 In the context of this thesis, an exploration of the relationship 
between patriarchal masculinity and violence acknowledges that in many cultures and 
communities ‘violence is associated with men and boys in a way that it is not associated 
with women and girls.’32 Breaking down such conceptualisations is vital if we are to ensure 
that the harms committed by and against either gender are recognised, or to enable 
inclusion of non-binary identification, are recognised in the language used to describe rape 
in international law. 
 
(e) Hegemonic Masculinity 
From the Greek hēgemonia, meaning ‘leadership, a leading the way, a going first’ and 
hēgemon ‘leader, an authority, commander, sovereign’,33 the term ‘hegemony’ describes 
‘the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group’.34 
Since the nineteenth century, various experts have used the concept of hegemony to 
explore ideas of authority. Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, for example, notably 
employed the term to analyse forms of established political authority, evolving his theory 
of cultural hegemony in the context of emerging interwar fascism in Italy.35 Since the 
1950s, against the background of the decolonisation of European overseas empires, 
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political and imperial historians have also used hegemony to explore the ways in which 
ruling classes or empires establish and maintain domination within states.36 Social 
scientists, on the other hand, use the concept to analyse the construction of cultural 
hierarchies of authority within societies. Mike Donaldson comments that ‘[h]egemony 
involves persuasion of the greater part of the population, particularly through the media, 
and the organization of social institutions’, in ways that seem or look ordinary, normal or 
natural.37 Punishment for non-conformity to the established hegemonic norms is central to 
the enforcement and negotiation of the state’s standards.38 Legal systems are an important 
aspect of this process in that they are inherently an expression of a hegemonic authority. 
As Michel Foucault notes, punishment is more than a strict legal procedure. It is about 
cultural pressure where transgressors can be shamed for their actions, enhancing a will to 
conform to the dominant culture.39  
The power of hegemony has since been used to explain the inherently gendered 
notions of masculinity and masculine authority and their impact on society and the law. 
Men’s power over women and the idea that violence is a natural, normal expression of 
masculinity is central to a hegemonic analysis of the networks of power and authority 
within societies.40 For example, social scientists argue that masculinity and violence are 
core to masculine-dominated institutions such as armies as part of the exercise of 
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patriarchal authority.41 The relationship between hegemony and masculinity is particularly 
important when examining rape in international law. Historically men have been the key 
players in international law, drafting treaties and determining what constitutes an offence. 
As such, international law is the product of masculine values and agendas.42 Within such 
value systems, women have been identified as lesser beings, and one consequence is that 
from a feminine perspective, they have not been adequately safeguarded from rape.43 As 
touched upon by Judith Gardam ‘the society or societies appear to have highly developed 
ideas of what is fair and what is not, as evidenced by the rules as to perfidious and 
treacherous means of warfare.’44 As child bearers, she continues, ‘[t]his is the female norm 
worth protecting, to some extent, by the law of armed conflict.’45 This point makes it plain 
that women have been framed as sexual objects for men, rather than players with a right 
to a voice and an assertion of authority. This framework is the product of hegemonic 
masculinity whereby women exist purely for the sexual needs of men.46 
Experts have extensively examined the relationship between hegemonic 
masculinity and conflict-perpetrated rape.47 Yet (with some exceptions such as Gardam) 
little attention has been paid to the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and the 
broader terms used to conceptualise rape in international law. Given that rape was 
originally constructed in hegemonic masculine terms as a property crime committed 
against the man who effectively owned the woman, this examination is critical to 
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developing a lexicon of rape in international law, and understanding how these terms are 
currently used. Linked to this analysis is consideration of the concept of hypermasculinity.  
 
(f)  Hypermasculinity  
Originally a psychological term used to describe two forms of unhealthy masculine 
identity – the so-called ‘man’s man’ and the ‘ladies’ man’ – the term ‘hypermasculinity’ 
or ‘hypermasculine culture’ has since been expanded by social scientists.48 
Hypermasculinity is identified as having a callous sexual attitude towards women, rooted 
in the idea that violence is manly and danger is exciting for males.49 Varda Burstyn 
describes it as an ‘exaggerated ideal of manhood linked mythically and practically to the 
role of the warrior’,50 ‘the ideal man in the masculinist conception’,51 and ‘the belief that 
ideal manhood lies in the exercise of force to dominate others.’52 Hypermasculinity 
indicates an amplification of stereotypically masculine behaviours and traits, including 
physical strength, dominance heterosexuality, violence and sex drive.53 It describes men’s 
willingness to use violence, albeit sexual, against others to safeguard their families, 
communities, and nation.54 This ability to control and dominate others is argued to have 
become a fundamental part of those social rituals, practices and norms that determine a 
person’s – and nation’s – ‘manhood’.55  
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Hypermasculinity is central to the critique of masculine military cultures. 
Feminists have long identified a link between ‘militarism, an ideology which legitimises 
violent solutions to conflict and disorder, and patriarchy, an ideology which legitimises 
the domination of men over women.’56 It has traditionally been held that militaries need a 
gendered ideology to enable them to function efficiently.57 Historically armed forces have 
largely been composed of men. Expectations regarding their conduct have been powerfully 
gendered, normalising violent acts as part of a necessary strategy to enable them to defeat 
the enemy. Women are stereotypically labelled as being always potential ‘victims’ who 
should either be protected or sexually exploited, depending on the view taken by the 
dominant military authority.58 The outcome is the normalisation of war and male-
perpetrated violence in patriarchal societies.59 Like hegemonic masculinity, 
hypermasculinity has affected how rape has been perceived and dealt with as a crime in 
international law. The question remains how far and in what ways has hypermasculinity, 
with its emphasis on an interpretation of society along gendered lines, influenced the terms 
used to categorise rape in international law.  
 
(g) Gender 
Central to the concepts discussed thus far is the issue of gender. Originally used to refer to 
the ‘grammatical inflection of nouns’,60 the term ‘gender’ has long been used as a synonym 
for ‘sex’.61 In 1860, in The Mill on the Floss, for example, George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans) 
wrote, ‘[p]ublic opinion, in these cases, is always of the feminine gender—not the world, 
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but the world’s wife’.62 From the fifteenth century, the Oxford English Dictionary quotes 
the use of gender for sex, though in the first edition of the 1899 Dictionary, this turn of 
phrase was ‘described as jocular.’63 J. Money’s 1955 article on ‘Hermaphroditism, gender 
and precocity in hyperadrenocorticism: Psychologic findings’ marked an early attempt to 
reconceptualise the concept of gender within academic scholarship.64 As part of his 
analysis of ‘gender roles’, Money suggests that the term ‘sex’ be used ‘refer to the 
biological classification of male/female’ and ‘gender’ be used to describe the ‘differences 
in behaviour by sex’.65  
Money’s conclusion provided a revolutionary stepping-stone for second-wave 
feminist scholarship. Across different academic disciplines, such scholarship has regularly 
expanded on the idea that concepts of sex and gender should be treated differently. One 
cultural anthropologist, Gayle Rubin, coined the phrase ‘sex/gender system’ to describe ‘a 
set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is 
shaped by human, social intervention’.66 As part of her excavation of the oppression of 
women within society, Rubin describes gender as the ‘socially imposed division of the 
sexes’.67 While biological differences are fixed, she argues, gender differences are the 
result of social conventions or interventions, which dictate how men and women should 
act or behave.68 Gender, in other words, is a social construct. It is, for Rubin, and for the 
majority of feminist scholars, something mutable that can be altered by changing 
demographics as well as social and political reform initiatives.  
Use of gender as a broad headline term has become commonplace, and the sub-
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sections which follow provide a discussion of key terms used to negotiate ideas 
surrounding gender identities and expectations of assigned gender roles, showing how 
these can differ both over time and between societies at any one chronological point. This 
ensures that developments in social thinking about the nature and operation of gender 
present an enduring challenge to an achievement of universal understanding, as current 
considerations of the non-binary in gender underlines. The descriptive or defining 
terminologies employed consistently invokes legacies of ambiguity.69 When drawn on by 
theorists and practitioners, these descriptors and constructions are significantly influenced 
by an individual’s age, ethnicity, culture, and sexuality.70 The assumptions underlying the 
terms explored above are re-examined using explicitly gendered terminologies favoured 
by more recent gender scholarship when discussing rape in conflict. One reality noted for 
this thesis is that gender continues to be used as a simple synonym of sex, which, in part 
can be linked to gender essentialism.71  
 
(h) Gender Essentialist Standards 
‘Essentialism’ is a term used to summarise the philosophical idea that fundamentally 
objects have a nature based on qualities that are immutable and timeless.72 When 
essentialism is applied to gender, the concept of gender essentialism reflects the idea that 
men and women are born with different natures, which are biologically determined rather 
than socially or culturally constructed.73 From this perspective, men are portrayed as 
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natural aggressors (relating to both hegemonic masculinity and its expression in a 
hypermasculine culture).74 Women are stereotyped as nurturers, wives and mothers.75 
They are considered not only passive, submissive and fragile beings,76 but also powerless, 
weak victims.77 In international relations and international law, a convenient link is often 
made between gender essentialism and cultural essentialism.78 The latter concept draws on 
thinking about both race and gender identity to assume that communities and societies 
possess deep-seated structural features.  
These conceptualisations of essentialism have played a powerful role in not only 
the perpetration of gender-based violence (discussed below) against women in conflict-
related environments, particularly the idea of women as ‘spoils of war’, but in its historic 
conceptualisation of rape as a violation of family rights. As discussed earlier, men too have 
been targets of rape in order to undermine their status.  
Following the reconceptualisation of gender as a social, rather than biological 
construct in the mid-twentieth century,79 international bodies such as the United Nations 
(UN, 1945-present) have officially largely abandoned traditional gender essentialism. 
However, this thesis questions the extent to which the legacy of gender essentialist 
thinking continues to have an influence on the terminology used to categorise rape in 
international law. This analysis is important because international actors like the UN 
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continue to be accused of perpetuating the idea that women are victims and men are 
perpetrators because of the language they employ in their legal documents. Such 
assumptions are more fully explored in the thesis chapters. 
 
(i) Gender-Based Violence 
Feminist scholars have used the term gender essentialism to identify how gender plays a 
critical role in the mistreatment of both men and women.80 Michelle Jarvis makes the point 
that gender constructs ‘form an inherent part of the fabric of any community group’.81 
Damaging that community often involves ‘targeting the [traditional] gendered 
constructions on which the community rests’.82 From this perspective, rape is typically 
used as a tool in conflict-affected environments to commit such injury. Women, for 
example, are stereotypically seen as the reproducers of the community. In ethnic conflict, 
rape is a tool used by a group to obtain and maintain social control and redefine ethnic 
boundaries by impregnating the women of another group.83 Men too are often interpreted 
as targets of rape as part of a deliberate intent to harm a community group. For many 
communities, heterosexuality continues to be considered integral to masculinity and a 
requirement of manliness.84 Homosexuality is regarded as a challenge to traditional 
masculinity in many cultures and is illegal or considered morally deviant in many states.85 
Rape is often used as a tactic during conflict to ‘homosexualise’ and demoralise the 
                                                          
80 Jarvis, ‘Overview’, p.11. 
81 Ibid, p.12. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Laura Smith-Spark, ‘How did rape become a weapon of war’, BBC News, (publication date not 
available): http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4078677.stm, (accessed 14 April 2020). 
84 Miranda Alison, ‘Wartime sexual violence and women’s rights’, Review of International Studies, (2007), 
33(1), 75-90, p.77. 
85 Ibid. As of 2017, 72 states prohibit homosexuality, including Uganda, Kenya and other African states as 
well as Indonesia and Malaysia. Pamela Duncan, ‘Gay relationships are still criminalised in 72 countries, 
report finds’, The Guardian, 27 July 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/gay-





enemy.86 These acts of directed harm are referred to as gender-based violence.  
Though undefined in international law,87 the UN does make use of the term. It 
describes ‘gender-based violence’ as ‘any harmful act directed against individuals or 
groups of individuals’ based on their gender.88 These acts include rape, sexual violence, 
trafficking, domestic violence, forced marriage and destructive traditional practices.89 For 
James Lang, gender-based violence is a form of ‘violence rooted in prescribed behaviors, 
norms and attitudes based upon gender’.90 Human Rights Watch calls it a form of ‘violence 
directed at an individual, male or female, based on his or her specific gender role in 
society’.91 It is used to destroy the political, religious and ethnic group with which victims 
identify.92  
In theory, the concept of gender-based violence acts as a useful descriptor for rape 
in international law. A gender-neutral term, it can be used to describe targeted violence 
used by or against either gender as well as encompassing non-binary groups, while also 
appearing to acknowledge the associated harm of rape for the victim. Problems arise in its 
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practical application. Instead of being generic, employment of gender-based violence as a 
term remains typically associated with violence perpetrated by men against women – a 
problem that the term ‘sexual violence’ also shares, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.   
 
(j) Sexual Violence 
The concept of sexual violence is another term which does not have a statutory definition 
in international law. The ICTR therefore provided its own definition, which was later 
adopted by the ICTY. It describes sexual violence, ‘which includes rape, as any act of a 
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. 
Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include 
acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.’93 The usefulness of 
describing rape as a form of sexual violence has been strongly contested. There debates 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
(k) Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 
Over time, common catchall labels used to categorise rape and among other crimes have 
been revisited by international organs such as the UN at the behest of state actors. Most 
notable is the emergence of the term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’. The origins of this 
concept is located in the UN Security Council Resolution 1960 (2010).94 Kirsten Campbell 
argues that the term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ is broader than ‘sexual violence in 
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armed conflict’, which reflects earlier international humanitarian legal frameworks.95 For 
her, adding the qualifier ‘conflict-related’ widens the investigative landscape to include 
acts committed in (armed) conflict and post-conflict environments.  
In theory, ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ is another valuable gender-neutral 
collective term for those examining all types of sexual violence committed in war or in 
environments where the residue of conflict remains. However, challenges have been made 
regarding the extent to which this term overlooks the role gender plays in the perpetration 
of conflict-related rape. Such debates will be examined in Chapter 8. 
 
(l) Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
Sexual exploitation and abuse is a blanket term used by the UN, among other 
organisations, to describe rape (along with other crimes of a sexual nature) committed in 
conflict-related situations. In the absence of a statutory definition of these terms in 
international law, the UN has made several attempts to explain what constitutes these acts. 
As part of the UN’s so-called ‘zero-tolerance’ policy on acts of sexual exploitation and 
abuse committed by its personnel,96 the Secretary-General introduced a Bulletin entitled 
Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2003).97 The 
Bulletin describes ‘sexual exploitation’ as ‘any actual or attempted abuse of a position of 
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited 
                                                          
95 Campbell, ‘Producing Knowledge in the Field of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Research’, p.470. 
96 The UN defines ‘zero-tolerance’ as ‘establishing that sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations 
personnel is prohibited and that every transgression will be acted upon’. See Task Team on the Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse Glossary for the Special Coordinator on improving the UN response to Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse, UN Glossary on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Thematic Glossary of current 
terminology related to SEA in the context of the UN, 24 July 2017, Second Edition:  
https://hr.un.org/sites/hr.un.org/files/SEA%20Glossary%20%20%5BSecond%20Edition%20-
%202017%5D%20-%20English_0.pdf, (accessed 24 August 2019), Section I, 1.1.2. See also Machiko 
Kanetake, ‘The UN Zero Tolerance Policy’s Whereabouts: On the Discordance between Politics and Law 
on the Internal-External Divide’, Amsterdam Law Forum, (2012), 4(4), 51-61, p.51. 
97 UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 





to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.’98 
The term ‘sexual abuse’, on the other hand, refers to ‘the actual or threatened physical 
intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.’99  
Attempting to provide further clarification, the UN later revisited these definitions 
in its Glossary on sexual exploitation and abuse: Thematic Glossary of current 
terminology related to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in the context of the United 
Nations (2016, reissued 2017).100 The Glossary initially defines sexual exploitation and 
abuse as a single concept: ‘[a] breach of the provisions of ST/SGB/2003/13 (Special 
measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse), or the same 
definitions, as adopted for military, police and other United Nations personnel.’101 The 
document then, confusingly, provides a separate definition for the term ‘sexual 
exploitation’, which states ‘[a]ny actual or attempted abuse of position of vulnerability, 
differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting 
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.’102 The Glossary 
‘Comments’ section clarifies that ‘“[s]exual exploitation” is a broad term, which includes 
a number of acts…, including “transactional sex”, “solicitation of transactional sex” and 
“exploitative relationship”’.103  
Though much has been written on the problems associated with the prohibition of 
transactional sex, this offence is not the focus of this thesis.104 Instead, we turn to the 
                                                          
98 Ibid, Section 1. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Task Team, UN Glossary on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. The 2017 reissue has been referenced here 
as representing the most up-to-date version. 
101 Ibid, Section I, 1.1.7. 
102 Ibid, Section I, 1.1.6. 
103 Ibid, p.5. 
104 See Dianne Otto, ‘Making Sense of Zero Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies’, in 
Vanessa E. Munro and Carl Stychin (eds), Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements, (Abingdon: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2014), 259-82; Katayanagi, ‘UN Peacekeeping and Human Rights’, p.145. Muna 
Ndulo explains that such peacekeeping environments are characterised by broken economies, fragile 
‘judicial systems, corrupt and ineffective law enforcement agencies, weak or non-existent rule of law, and 





Glossary’s definition of ‘sexual abuse’ – ‘[a]ctual or threatened physical intrusion of a 
sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions’.105 The 
‘Comment’ section adds that ‘[a]ll sexual activity with a child is considered as sexual 
abuse. “Physical intrusion” is understood to mean “sexual activity”. “Sexual abuse” is a 
broad term, which includes a number of acts described below, including “rape”, “sexual 
assault”, “sex with a minor”, and “sexual activity with a minor”.’106  
This exhaustive definition not only buries rape alongside other crimes under the 
broader category of sexual abuse but risks conflating rape with other offences, notably 
sexual assault, for example, causing ambiguity. The Glossary’s definition of rape is 
equally problematic. Described as the ‘[p]enetration – even if slightly – of any body part 
of a person who does not consent with a sexual organ and/or the invasion of the genital or 
                                                          
conflict-related realities expose civilians, and particularly women and girls, to risk of sexual exploitation. 
Ndulo, ‘The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation’, p.130. As Maria Henry and 
Paul Higate rightly underline, when communities collapse, ‘the power differentials configuring pre-conflict 
gender relations are reinforced’, leading to the perpetuation of women’s insecurity, placing them at greater 
risk of sexual abuse. Marsha Henry and Paul Higate, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, Power and 
Performance in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia, (London: Zed Books, 2013), p.142. The UN instead avoids 
recognising that conflict-affected settings often lead to women, as well as men, exchanging sex for food 
and shelter in order to survive (survival sex). Henri Myrttinen, ‘From Pillars to Practice: Pushing the 
boundaries of “Women, Peace and Security”’, unpublished paper, LSE Women Peace and Security 
conference, 29 December 2018. By prohibiting transactional sex without any explanatory qualification, the 
UN is able to overlook the gender profile intrinsic to poverty in such regions, and the wider realities and 
consequences associated with poverty-driven choices. This ongoing perspective serves to institutionalise 
not only gender inequality, but also feeds the poverty cycle in conflict environments. For a discussion 
regarding survival sex, see Otto, ‘Making Sense of Zero Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual 
Economies’, pp.261-7,278. The UN’s universal embargo also denies individual sexual agency. Though 
survival sex often involves forced consent in the face of stark alternatives, the blanket ban rejects even the 
potential for choice on the part of the persons offering their services. Both male and female professional 
sex workers, for example, are known to migrate to peacekeeping missions to engage in transactional sex 
with troops. This framework is generally seen as cementing the low economic and social status of females 
in particular because it reinforces the idea of females as agentless victims, not as survivors. Otto, ‘Making 
Sense of Zero Tolerance Policies in Peacekeeping Sexual Economies’, p.271; 273-74; Katayanagi, ‘UN 
Peacekeeping and Human Rights’, p.145. Even if we look beyond the problems associated with the UN’s 
prohibition of transactional sex, it is clear that such acts are tolerated in the field. Jasmine-Kim Westendorf 
reports of UN mission leaders who advised peacekeepers to wear civilian attire and not leave UN vehicles 
in plain view when visiting brothels. A total of 800,000 condoms were sent to Cambodia to prevent the 
spread of sexual diseases. Westendorf, ‘WPS, CRSV and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace 
Operations’, p.2. These instances underscore the UN’s unspoken tolerance towards the sexual exploitation 
of women by its peacekeeping personnel, which has implications for its lack of sensitivity to incidents 
where boundaries between transactional sex and rape are crossed by its own peacekeepers. 
105 Task Team, UN Glossary on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Section I, 1.1.4. 





anal opening of a person who does not consent with any object or body part’,107 this 
delineation echoes definitional problems similar to those raised by the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the ICC (which will be addressed in Chapter 4). 
A further complication is found in the Glossary’s definition of ‘[s]ex with a minor’, 
which states:  
Sexual penetration of a person younger than 18. Sexual penetration include(s) 
the penetration of the vagina, anus, or mouth by the penis or other body part, 
and also includes the penetration of the vagina or anus by an object. Sexual 
penetration of a child is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or consent 
locally and is considered as sexual abuse. Mistaken belief in the age of a child 
is not a defence.108  
‘Sexual activity with [a] minor’, on the other hand, is defined as ‘[s]exual activity with a 
person younger than 18. All sexual activity with a child is prohibited regardless of the age 
of majority or consent locally and is considered as sexual abuse. Mistaken belief in the age 
of a child is not a defence.’109 The normative conclusion is that sexual activity or sex with 
a minor, with or without consent, constitutes rape. It remains unclear why these acts are 
separated from the definition of rape or are not described as constituting rape. Introducing 
the issue of age of consent without further qualification also presents a number of 
problems, (which will also be addressed in Chapter 4). These definitional problems are 
indicative of a broader issue within the UN’s institutional culture, which will be addressed 
in Chapter 8.  
 
 
                                                          
107 Ibid, Section I, 1.2.8. 
108 Ibid, Section I, 1.2.10. 






Though different scholars have used the concepts outlined above at different times to 
explain or contextualise different phenomenon or articulate different theories, it is clear 
that these concepts can each be usefully called on in this thesis to critique the lexicon of 
rape in modern international law. The next chapter explores the evolution of international 
law from ancient times to WWII (1939-1945), and the subsequent identification of rape as 
a war crime. In providing a starting point for the analysis of conflict-perpetrated rape, it 
will consider the impact patriarchy and an associated hegemonic masculine culture had on 
the framing of rape as a violation of family or female honour. This historical analysis is 
considered crucial to comprehending not only how rape was traditionally understood as a 




















Historical Context: Evolution of Rape as a War Crime in International Law 
 
Introduction 
Following on from the previous chapter which identified the key concepts which have 
played an instrumental role in shaping understandings of rape in international law, 
attention now turns to the historical contexts out of which these concepts emerged. A key 
question for this thesis involves consideration of how far they have provided a legacy that 
continues to frame current understandings of the crime. Consequently, Chapter 2 provides 
an examination of the treatment of rape in armed conflict from ancient times to WWII 
(1939-1945). It looks at the emergence of international law, including the legal prohibition 
of rape, to identify how it was traditionally understood as a crime and how far this 
framework continues to have an impact on modern-day prosecutions. Central to this 
analysis is the examination of various legal instruments that played an intrinsic role in the 
development of international law, including those that established rape as a crime in this 
context. These include the General Headquarters of the Army, General order No.20 1847,1 
the Lieber Code 1863,2 the Declaration of Brussels 1874 (hereafter Brussels Declaration),3 
the Oxford Manual 1880,4 and the Hague Convention 1899 and 1907.5 Focusing on the 
                                                          
1 Scott, Winfield. General Headquarters of the Army, General Order No. 20, February 19, 1847, Tampico, 
Mexico. Translated, Gauthereau-Bryson, Lorena. Tampico, Mexico: Imprenta de la calle de la Carniceria, 
1847. From Woodson Research Center, Rice University, Americas collection, 1811-1920, MS 518: 
https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/27562/3/aa00208tr.tei.html, (accessed 5 September 2019).  
2 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, 
LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863, (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1898), available at the University of Chicago: 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100868332, (accessed 6 September 2019), (referred to hereafter as the 
Lieber Code). 
3 Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 
August 1874, available in D. Schindler and J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), pp.22-34. 
4 The Laws of War on Land. Oxford, 9 September 1880, available in Schindler and Toman, The Laws of 
Armed Conflicts, pp.36-48, (hereafter the Oxford Manual). 
5 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 





language used in each of these instruments to frame rape as a crime in international law, 
this chapter examines the effect of hegemonic masculinity. As part of this examination, 
the impact that hegemonic masculinity has had on the way rape was described as a crime 
in early international law as well as the role played by cultural and societal norms will be 
explored. Consideration will also be given to the challenges associated with the 
proliferation of such language in the modern era.  
Rape in conflict is as old as war itself. Yet how it has been perceived between 
ancient and contemporary times has changed. Initially regarded as inevitable in war, by 
the eighteenth century, rape was prohibited in international law as a violation of family 
honour rather than as an offence against the individual (stereotypically female) victim. The 
perpetuation of this framework is damaging to rape victims. It constructs rape as a lesser 
property offence committed against the man who owned the woman, ignoring the harm 
caused to the victim. Other types of rape recognised formally as part of the modern 
landscape of international law, notably male-male and female-perpetrated rape, are also 
excluded. Analysing this historical background is important because it not only enables us 
to understand how rape in international law was traditionally framed as a crime but it helps 
contextualise modern prosecution practices in international law. Only when the past is 
understood can we understand the impact it continues to have.6    
 
Emergence of Rules of War  
Rooted in the moral codes of a particular society, basic principles of rules of war have 
existed since ancient times. Modern concepts of war crimes have emerged as valid out of 
these historical roots. The evidence for such rules suggests that they were unevenly applied 
                                                          
Cross: International Humanitarian Law Databases, (The Hague: International Conferences, 1907): 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195, (accessed 6 September 2019). 





and respected in practice, but, as Judith Gardam points out, their very existence testifies to 
a widespread consciousness of the need for them.7 Indian religious texts, for example, 
outlined laws of warfare,8 indicating that ancient Hindus distinguished between 
combatants and non-combatants.9 Other Indian custom-based, spiritual texts stipulated 
also that religious places of worship and homes, which belonged to non-combatants or 
property that did not belong to the armed forces could not be destroyed or attacked.10 
Though there are accounts of women in battle throughout history, the taking up of 
arms within an organised military force, in terms of cultural traditions, has been held to 
fall into the masculine province of capacity. As a result, examples of female combatants 
have entered the realms of mythology as extraordinary.11 Homer’s The Iliad, a comparable 
ancient text, claimed that ‘war will be men’s business’.12 These rules of war were created 
                                                          
7 Judith Gardam, ‘An alien’s encounter with the law of armed conflict’, in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J. 
Owens, Sexing the Subject of Law, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997), 233-50; Eve La Haye, War 
Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, (Cambridge and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
pp.33-4; Kelly Dawn Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes 
Tribunals, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p.19. This diversity of context helps to explain 
why no clear codes emerged which could form a foundation for international law until towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, by which time the economic and political dominance of Western powers globally 
reduced the complexity of the challenge to the emergence of international law. See Jennifer Pitt, 
Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). 
8 Some of these provisions are echoed in the Geneva Convention 1949 and Additional Protocol I, ‘making 
ancient India a civilisation with the highest humane ideals of warfare.’ La Haye, War Crimes in Internal 
Armed Conflicts, p.33. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Amazons, female mythical warriors, transgressed gender norms by cutting off their right breasts in 
order to perform archery more effectively. See Herbert Sussman, Masculine Identities. The History and 
Meanings of Manliness, (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), p.15. We know of other women combatants 
who both led and served in combat units. Egyptian queens Cleopatra Thea and Cleopatra VII led battles, as 
did Zenobia, queen of Palmyra who created a kingdom in the late 3rd century AD. The Iceni Royal 
Woman Boudica declared war on the Romans who occupied her land in c. AD60. The Brigantes Royal 
Woman, Cartimandua, also led her troops in battle. Celtic women of Ireland and the British Isles often 
fought alongside men, with descendants such as Grace O’Malley, the late sixteenth century Irish chieftain. 
Eve MacDonald, ‘Warrior women: despite what gamers might believe, the ancient world was full of 
female fighters’, The Conversation, 4 October 2018: https://theconversation.com/warrior-women-despite-
what-gamers-might-believe-the-ancient-world-was-full-of-female-fighters-104343, (accessed 11 May 
2020); Judith Cook, Pirate Queen, the life of Grace O'Malley 1530–1603, (Cork: Mercier Press, 2004). 
Muslim warrior Khawlah bint al-Azwar, who fought in battles during the life of the Islamic prophet 
Muhammad, is regarded as one of the greatest female military leaders throughout history. Farhana Qazi, 
‘The Mujahidaat: Tracing Early Female Warriors of Islam’, in Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry (eds), 
Women, Gender, and Terrorism, (London and Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 29-56, p.34. 
12 Homer, The Iliad, (translated, Rodney Merrill), (Michigan, MI: University of Michigan, 2010). It is 





to regulate and legitimise certain forms of male-male violence between enemy combatants 
in conflict.13 Drawing on Plato’s Republic, David Konstan points out that the purposes 
behind the establishment of these rules of war were intended to ensure that masculine 
violence was targeted only towards enemy combatants and not his own side.14 He quotes 
from Menander’s comedy, The Shorn Girl, to underline his point further; ‘be careful not 
to do anything rash, given that you’re a soldier’, adding that ‘men conditioned to violence 
are potentially dangerous’.15 There is no mention of women’s potential for violence, and 
as Aristophanes comedy Lysistrata underlines, women’s weapons were identified as love 
(or more realistically, sex).16   
Because of the emphasis placed in these codes on the quintessentially masculine 
dimensions to maintenance of individual honour and reputation,17 at least some aspects of 
these rules were respected and enforced.18 In religious texts such as the Mahābhārata and 
the Rāmāyaṇa, which depicted the Kurukshetra Wars, the rules of war operated 
powerfully.19 Though there is little evidence that the Kurukshetra Wars actually took place, 
the survival of these tales indicates that the ethics of warfare and the concept of honour 
were important to Hindu culture. 
                                                          
13 Frederic Megret, ‘The Laws of War and the Structure of Masculine Power’, Melbourne Journal of 
International Law, (2018), 19(1), 200-26, p.205. 
14 David Konstan, ‘War and Reconciliation in Greek Literature’, in Kurt A Raaflaub (ed.), War and Peace 
in the Ancient World, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 191-205, pp.192-3. 
15 Ibid, p.193. 
16 Aristophanes, Lysistrata, (translated, Douglass Parker), (London: Penguin Signet Classics, 2009). 
17 The issue of personal honour will be returned to later in the chapter, however, it is noted here that as part 
of a broader discussion regarding homicide, Michael Kimmel and Amy Aronson briefly discuss the 
relationship between violence perpetrated by men and concepts of honour and reputation Michael Kimmel 
and Amy Aronson (eds), Men and Masculinities: A Social, Cultural, and Historical Encyclopaedia: 
Volume I: A-J, (Santa Barbra, CA, Denver, CO and Oxford: ABC: CLIO, 2004), p.388. 
18 Kaushik Roy, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present, (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.30. 





Under these rules, the sexual use of conquered women was regarded as normal and 
not identified as an offence.20 Brutality against a defeated enemy and the acquisition of 
property were treated as a reward to the victorious troops and a deterrent to further action 
from the defeated side.21 As the possession of male relatives, women were identified as 
property. Like other goods and chattels, they were considered ‘legitimate booty’ in war.22 
Even where sexual despoilment was disputed, it was in terms of whether war had been 
properly declared prior to invasion. Though evidence suggests that male rape was often 
used as a tactic in war,23 its purpose was to emasculate, homosexualise or feminise the 
enemy,24 and strip them of their ruler or warrior status.25 By contrast, the sexual defilement 
of men was not considered a part of the ‘spoils of war’ paradigm.  Instead male rape was 
understood as being an act of war rather than a reward of valour. Under a hegemonic 
masculine framework, women primarily exist as sexual objects for men.26 The potential 
for men to be sexual objects for other men is negated.27 Male rape was not – could not be 
– formally acknowledged as rape when perpetrated in the context of conflict.   
                                                          
20 See for example, Tuba Inal, Looting and Rape in Wartime: Law and Change in International Relations, 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2013), p.4. 
21 Victoria Canning, ‘Who’s human? Developing sociological understandings of the rights of women raped 
in conflict’, in Patricia Hynes, Michele Lamb, Damien Short and Matthew Waites (eds), Sociology and 
Human Rights: New Engagements, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 39-54, p.42. 
22 ‘Rape entered the law through the back door, as it were, as a property crime of man against man. 
Woman, of course, was viewed as the property.’ Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and 
Rape, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975), p.18; Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in 
International War Crimes Tribunals, p.21. 
23 See for example, Michael Carden, ‘Homophobia and Rape in Sodom and Gibeah: A Response to Ken 
Stone’,  
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, (1999), 24(82), 83-96, p.90. 
24 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict’, European Journal of 
International Law, (2007), 18(2), 253-76, pp.254; 260; 270-3. 
25 Dennis O’Brien, Understanding Male Sexual Abuse: Why Male Victims Remain Silent, (Bloomington, 
IN: iUniverse, 2011), p.12. 
26 Mike Donaldson, ‘What Is Hegemonic Masculinity?’, Theory and Society, Special Issue: Masculinities, 






Throughout history, only women’s bodies have played an important role as 
sexualised ‘spoils of war’.28 The Iliad details the sexual enslavement of women.29 
Plutarch’s Lives depicts the rape of the Sabine women as a constructive aspect of the 
creation of Ancient Rome.30 Kelly Dawn Askin references another Roman thinker, Cicero, 
reflecting that he advised that war should be fought humanely and urged armed forces to 
obey the laws of warfare.31 According to Askin, he concluded that wars for glory or 
property are just but should be conducted with minimum hatred.32 Cicero’s principles were 
not often observed in practice. It is plain that the Roman military machine operated as a 
brutal weapon of destruction and that the rape of women as part of the crushing of an 
enemy formed part of the tactics used by Roman soldiers.33 The gap between the rules and 
the reality of their enforcement is plain. But the fact that not only was there held to be a 
need for such rules but also that they are, as Gardam points out, both intricate and elaborate 
is of great significance to understanding the evolution of war crimes as a legal concept.34 
These rules of war proved influential in the classically educated West. The 
combination of such ideas with Christian-inspired codes eventually resulted in a cultural 
conceptualisation whereby a consensus emerged that certain individuals and groups should 
be spared in war on moral or religious grounds, and that consensus became elaborated over 
time as warfare and its techniques also evolved.35 Though the term ‘civilian’ had yet to be 
                                                          
28 See for example, Gina Marie Weaver, Ideologies of Forgetting: Rape in the Vietnam War, (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2010), p.1. It would be possible to add children’s bodies to this, but 
boys were often slaughtered, and only young virgin girls were usually safe, thus the gender dimension is 
preserved. 
29 Homer, The Iliad; see Janie L. Leatherman, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict, (Cambridge and 
Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), p.1974; Weaver, Ideologies of Forgetting, p.1. 
30 Weaver, Ideologies of Forgetting, p.1; Chile Eboe-Osuji, International Law and Sexual Violence in 
Armed Conflicts, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), p.xv. 
31 Askin, War Crimes Against Women, p.19. 
32 Ibid, pp.19-20. 
33 See for example, Sara Elise Phang, The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 B.C.-A.D. 235): Law and 
Family in the Imperial Army, (Leiden, Boston, MA and Köln: Brill, 2001), p.256. 
34 Gardam, ‘An alien’s encounter with the law of armed conflict’, p.237 





fully defined or protected, Christendom36 was on the verge of distinguishing between the 
innocent and the guilty in war by the end of the tenth century.37 This evolution led to the 
emergence of the informal chivalric code for soldiers and knights during the eleventh and 
twelfth century in the West.38  
 
From Chivalry to the Development of International Law 
A hegemonic masculine concept rooted in social hierarchy,39 the chivalric code was built 
on the idea that those men who possessed arms were honourable and those who did not 
were less so.40 The willingness and ability of these men to fight cemented their high social 
status.41 Steven and Naomi Shatz describe how chivalry was understood as an ‘exclusive 
class-institution; it placed a gulf between the knightly order and the commonalty, and 
restricted its code of honour and courtesy peculiarly to members of its own caste; it 
generated a contempt for social inferiors and a disregard for their feelings’.42 The focus 
was on preserving honour amongst combatants not the protection of non-combatants.43  
The code of chivalry stipulated that rape of a woman deemed a ‘lady’ was 
unacceptable unless she had been won in combat: 
                                                          
36 Christendom refers to those areas of Western Europe owning at least spiritual allegiance to the Papacy. 
37 Askin, War Crimes Against Women, p.22. 
38 La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts, p.34. See for example, David Crouch, The Birth of 
Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France, 900-1300, (New York, NY: Pearson Education 
Limited, 2014), pp.80-6. 
39 See for example Cindy Wood, Studying Late Medieval History: A Thematic Approach, (Oxon and New 
York, NY: Routledge), p.156. 
40 Stephen Shatz and Naomi Shatz, ‘Chivalry is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty’, 
Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law and Justice, (2012), 27(1), 64-110, p.68; A. J. Pollard, John Talbot and 
the War in France 1427-1453, (Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2005), p.122. 
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[A]ny knight meeting a damsel who is alone should slit his own throat rather 
than fail to treat her honourably, if he cares about his reputation. For if he takes 
her by force, he will be shamed forever in all the courts of all lands. But if she 
is led by another, and if some knight desires her, is willing to take up his 
weapons and fight for her in battle, and conquers her, he can without shame or 
blame do with her as he will.44 
Deriving from standards of male dominance, the harm caused by rape was 
identified as the dishonour brought on the lady’s male protector.45 The sexual defilement 
of men was not included in the code because rape was still understood as an offence 
committed by men against women only.46 Thus, the concept of male-male rape was 
excluded from this chivalric provision.47 Because the code of chivalry applied to only 
women of similar class to knights, the rape of women of a lower class was not considered 
dishonourable.48 Nor was it considered dishonourable for a knight to rape his wife; he was 
permitted to use physical force and violence against his spouse if he could argue that her 
conduct warranted it.49  
                                                          
44 Cited in Shatz and Shatz, ‘Chivalry is Not Dead’, p.69, (original source unknown). Use of the term 
‘damsel’ here is significant, in that it was a term generally applied only to women possessed of some social 
status, otherwise descriptors like ‘wench’ or ‘maid’ would be preferred. See Jennifer Higginbotham, 
Girlhood of Shakespeare’s Sisters, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp.37-9. 
45 See for example, Shatz and Shatz, ‘Chivalry is Not Dead’, pp.67-9. See also Shira Schwam-Baird, 
‘Terror and Laughter in the Images of the Wild Man: The Case of the 1489 Valentin et Orson’, in Edelgard 
E. DuBruck and Yael Even (eds), Fifteenth-century Studies, Volume 27: A Special issue on Violence in 
Fifteenth-century Text and Image, (Rochester, NY and Suffolk: Camden House and Boydell and Brewer, 
2002), 238-56, p.243. 
46 For a discussion regarding male rape victims, see Amrita Kapur and Kelli Muddell, When No One Calls 
it Rape: Addressing Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys, (New York, NY: International Center for 
Justice, 2016): https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Report_SexualViolenceMen_2016.pdf, 
(accessed 8 September 2019). 
47 Owing to their lack of power and lower ranking social position, women could not be knights. The issue 
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The decline of feudalism and the rise of dynastic states, which depended on trade 
and commerce, saw the professionalisation of bearing of arms for all ranks. As the 
significance of the knightly class in warfare diminished, the chivalric code became 
obsolete.50 By the late Middle Ages, use of mercenary armies equipped with cutting-edge 
weaponry increased. Conflicts that followed were frequently marked by widespread, 
limitless devastation. During this period, national military codes were increasingly used to 
punish non-elite soldiers for acts of undisciplined violence, including rape. Theodor 
Meron, for example, describes how soldiers who committed rape were ‘subjected to capital 
punishment under national military codes such as those of Richard II (1385) and Henry V 
(1419).’51 This development paved the way for the first international military court to be 
established in 1474, where Sir Peter von Hagenbach was tried for terrorising the town of 
Breisach without declaring war. He was prosecuted for war crimes, including rape 
committed under his commandment.52 Sir Peter was found guilty of rape only because war 
had not been declared.53 At the time, a due declaration of intent to attack was required. If 
he had declared war, Sir Peter’s actions in despoiling the town of Brisach would have been 
considered acceptable.  
By the end of the early modern period in the West expectations of what should 
happen to defeated populations, including the women had begun to change. Following the 
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destruction caused by the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France, the Thirty Years’ 
War (1618-1648),54 the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) and the emergence of 
Enlightenment thought,55 philosophers focused on the development of international law.56 
States, in turn, felt pressured to examine ways of limiting the damage caused by war, 
because of its commercial impact and re-evaluated the status of defeated populations as 
spoils of war. Addressing combatants’ attitudes towards non-combatants was deemed 
crucial in ensuring conduct was appropriate in conflict.57 This change in attitude resulted 
in Western governments introducing legally binding instruments, which aimed to protect 
vulnerable groups from the devastation of war.  
In 1785, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between His Majesty the King of 
Prussia, and the United States of America58 was introduced. Despite its attempt to 
safeguard non-combatants, the legal language used to protect women in war is unclear and 
rooted in a traditional conceptualisation of rape,59 declaring that women and children ‘shall 
not be molested in their persons’.60 However, the wording of the Treaty makes it plain that 
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rape was identified as a crime of interpersonal violence, perpetrated by men against 
women. Rape (by and against either gender) was not explicitly addressed or prohibited, 
nor did the Treaty state what the consequences of any breach would be. There is little 
evidence to suggest the instrument was used to prosecute rape.  
Part of the problem is that victims often did not report being raped because of the 
stigma attached to the offence. Religious and cultural attitudes and beliefs relating to 
female chastity or purity mean that rape victims are still often seen as spoiled goods, 
resulting in their expulsion from their communities and families as well as wider society.61 
Another problem is that rape continued to be seen as acceptable in conflict. For example, 
during the War of 1812 (1812-1815) between the US, the UK and their respective allies, 
General Andrew Jackson allegedly coined the phrase ‘booty and beauty’ to make clear 
what sort of spoils go to the victor.62 Captain Charles Napier, a British naval officer, later 
noted that ‘every horror was committed with impunity – rape, murder, pillage. And not a 
man was punished!’63 Such comments emphasising only the breach of military discipline 
not only underline the prevalence of rape in conflict, but its general acceptance as a natural 
by-product of war. 
Addressing this issue, the US government during the Mexican-American war 
(1846-1848) created the General Headquarters of the Army, General order No.20. The 
Order gave the commander legal authorisation to prosecute American troops and Mexicans 
for crimes committed in the occupied areas, which were not listed in the Articles of War 
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(1776).64 To ensure the Order was effectively implemented, military commissions were 
instructed to prosecute and sentence soldiers for their crimes.65 
Under the Order, rape that was not instructed by a superior officer,66 was prohibited 
and ‘severely punishable’.67 On the one hand, this article constitutes an advance. It clearly 
lists rape as an offence, which can be punished. On the other, the Order fails to prohibit all 
acts of rape. This instrument demonstrates that attitudes towards women as sexual objects 
had not substantially changed. Sexual access to women continued to be perceived as one 
of the consequences of war, helping to explain why, where rape perpetrated by soldiers 
was prosecuted, it was as a breach of military discipline or honour.68 
Similar problems are found in the Lieber Code,69 which created the foundation for 
the modern laws of land warfare.70 Established during the American Civil War (1861-
1865) by Francis Lieber, a German-born US political philosopher and jurist,71 the Code 
provided a list of instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field on how combatants should conduct themselves in conflict, and what constituted 
acceptable and unacceptable conduct in war.72 It stipulated that those found guilty of 
misconduct were to be held individually responsible for their actions.73 
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Under Article 44 of the Code, ‘all rape’ is prohibited as a form of ‘wanton 
violence’.74 Patricia Viseur Sellers states that the term ‘wanton’ refers to ‘[u]nnecessary 
violence committed against inoffensive citizens and soldiers alike’.75 Thus, ‘[a]ll rapes 
were presumably characterized as wanton violence’ and went ‘beyond the bounds of 
military necessity.’76 For Sellers, rape was clearly outlawed and punishable by death.77 
Evidence suggests that Article 44 of the Code was substantially enforced. Union military 
courts, for example, prosecuted approximately 450 cases involving rape and other sexual 
crimes committed against black and white women during the American Civil War.78 In 
some instances, perpetrators were sentenced to death. On this basis, Sellers argues that the 
Code extended the reach of prohibitions of rape under humanitarian law to include conduct 
previously considered legal.79 
While it is clear that Article 44 of the Code was enforced during the American 
Civil War, it is not necessarily because the act of rape itself was considered a serious 
offence. The term ‘wanton’ needs consideration here. Rooted in the Middle English word 
‘wantowen’, meaning ‘undisciplined’,80 by the start of the eighteenth century, ‘wanton’ 
was used in law to signify immoral or undisciplined conduct.81 The term was used in the 
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Code to differentiate between unofficial, unauthorised acts of aggression and those 
sanctioned by issue of official orders.82 For example, under General Order No.20, the 
General Headquarters of the Union Army clarified that only rapes that had not been 
ordered by a superior officer were prohibited under the Code, a clear indication that it was 
the indiscipline, not the act committed or any resultant harm that was being sanctioned. 
Even where rape was prosecuted following the American Civil War, it is not necessarily 
because of a change in attitude towards the rape of women, but because these incidents 
were considered unauthorised acts of violence or attacks against the American men who 
‘owned’ those women.83 This distinction is important in that determining official attitudes 
towards a tradition of women being perceived as acceptable ‘spoils of war’ in US military 
culture.84  
The failure of the Lieber Code and military court judgments to unequivocally 
prohibit all rape meant that Western military cultures effectively endorsed avoiding 
making clear sanctions against conflict-perpetrated rape, preventing the emergence of a 
different focus.85 In 1874, for example, the Declaration of Brussels (hereafter Brussels 
Declaration) was introduced, which attempted to codify the laws and customs of war 
internationally. Article XXXVIII stated ‘honor and family rights should be respected’.86 
The Oxford Manual, which was created to act as a model for internal legislation regarding 
the laws and customs of war,87 established: ‘[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of 
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individuals, as well as their religious convictions and practice, must be respected.’88 The 
language used in these instruments suggests that the real damage of rape relates to the 
institution of the family (in itself seen as a key contributor to the stability of the state), 
which is traditionally understood as being male dominated. The harm committed against 
the (presumed female) victim is ignored.  
These instruments were, in practice, rarely imposed as controls upon military 
behaviour. During the Boer War (1899-1902), only fourteen imperial and British troops 
were charged with rape or with aiding, abetting or attempted rape, nine of them being 
acquitted.89 Stephen Miller suggests that such action was not rooted in military discipline 
but in the British government’s interest to keep the official rape statistics down.90 There 
may be some merit to this interpretation because the Boer War was widely criticised by 
other states, making it important for Britain to portray a heroic and valiant image of the 
British armed forces during the conflict. Acknowledging that rapes of Boer women had 
been committed by British troops would not have been considered conducive to this 
presentation,91 whereas prosecuting soldiers for the murder of prisoners, for example, was 
considered necessary to preserve the Army’s honour. Another possible explanation, 
however, is that the British army had their own imperatives relating to troop discipline. 
Local commanders, for example, were most concerned with the conduct of British troops 
involved in the removal of Boer women to concentration camps.92 
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Little evidence indicates that rape was addressed or dealt with in the Russo-
Japanese war (1904-1905). Lieutenant-General C. J. Burnett, a British soldier, noted that 
during his time with the Imperial Japanese Army, he was not privy to any instance of ill-
treatment committed by a Japanese soldier against either Russian prisoners or locals.93 
This statement does not mean that rapes did not occur. Rather, it implies that any acts were 
not perpetrated in direct view of foreign parties, and not reported or prosecuted. This point 
suggests that any incidents of rape were not perceived as such by figures like Burnett, 
probably because any instances involved local Chinese or Korean women, who might be 
regarded as legitimate spoils of war. Given the realities of WWII and the sexual 
enslavement of the so-called ‘comfort women’, one may argue that it is most likely that 
rapes occurred but went unmarked officially because they were not considered an offence 
by that army. 94   
Despite the continuity of cultural attitudes, the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars are 
important to mention because they had a transformative impact on attitudes towards 
warfare in the twentieth century. Advancements in weapons technology meant that the 
Russo-Japanese war had a devastating effect on civilian populations as well as combatants. 
Changes in traditional military strategies and a reliance on armed forces in pitched battles 
meant that the rate and extent of the brutality sustained by non-combatants in the Boer War 
was equally unprecedented.95 The West determined that the rules of war needed more force 
if the scale and impact of warfare was to be contained within civilised limits. The Hague 
Convention 1899 and 1907 was introduced which, alongside the Geneva Convention 
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1864,96 aimed to codify the laws and customs of war on land captured in the Lieber Code.97 
Yet rape continued to evade clear prohibition. Article 46 of the Hague Convention stated 
that ‘family honour and rights, the lives of persons… must be respected.’98  
The language of ‘respect’ for ‘family honour and rights’ used in the Brussels 
Declaration, the Oxford Manual and the Hague Convention has received much comment 
from scholars, including feminists. Anne Marie de Brouwer, for example, writes that it is 
clear that rape was prohibited under these regulations. These instruments, she insists, 
signalled a shift in attitudes towards rape in conflict; it was beginning to be seen as a crime 
against the female rather than a prize for the victorious.99 M. Cheriff Bassiouni suggests 
that the language of ‘family honour and rights’ was understood to be a euphemism for rape 
and was clearly prohibited.100 Kim Stevenson notes that during this period, euphemistic 
language was often used by the courts to describe sexual behaviour.101 However, given the 
language used in other articles within the Hague Convention, to suggest that euphemism 
was being employed does not provide an adequate explanation of the omission of any 
mention of rape from within the Convention. If the delegates genuinely wanted to address 
and prohibit rape in conflict, one would expect the use of the term ‘prohibit’ or the mention 
of women in the article.102 Contextualising the omission in the Convention, there were 
extant discussions on rape within the jurisprudential and philosophical areas, as J. S. Mill’s 
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work reveals. Equally Lieber explicitly prohibited rape in his Code.103 It does, though, 
have to be admitted that generally during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Europe 
experienced a rise in the concept of delicacy, the new prudery, which meant that public 
reference to sexuality such as that provided by Lieber was considered offensive.104 The 
term ‘rape’ was considered to be a vulgar one, enunciating a primitive violent act, which 
civilised Western nations should neither engage in nor discuss.105 Western women were 
considered too intellectually and emotionally delicate to cope with terminology that was 
considered to be blunt and brutal, and that this left a linguistic legacy in terms of the 
explanations used is plain from an examination of early twentieth century documents.106 
As this thesis notes, it means that the instruments developed in this period may have felt it 
less necessary explicitly to address and prohibit rape as previous, less delicate regulations 
such as the Lieber Code had done. This point is, though, particularly damning in modern 
eyes given that the Brussels Declaration and the Hague Convention relied heavily on the 
Code when developing the laws and customs of war.107 There are broader factors that need 
to be considered. The language of diplomacy and inter-state treaties are typically born of 
compromise and negotiation. As a result, coy terms are often used alongside vague, 
aspirational language. The Leiber Code was not an inter-state instrument and could 
therefore afford to be more explicit and definitive, but this was not the case with either the 
Brussels Declaration or the Hague Convention. 
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In developing the documentation laying down the modern rules of war, the issue 
with the continuing use of the concept of family honour and rights lies in its implicit 
endorsement of the identification of women, culturally at least, as male property, incapable 
of full agency and autonomy. Women continued to be held as core figures in the conceptual 
construction of the family and were primarily valued for their chastity as well as their roles 
mothers and as domestic caretakers.108 As touched upon by Gardam, in the thinking 
underpinning these codes women are perceived only in terms of their bodies as a sexual 
objects for men and valued as a reproducers of a masculine heritage.109 Over time, attitudes 
towards women have modified, yet one constant has been the expectation that they will 
fulfil a domestic, and so a passive, non-combatant role, which entitles them to masculine 
protection. Women’s conduct in relation to their domestic profiles also continues to be 
used to estimate the moral and social status of a family in wider society. By employing the 
language of ‘respect’ for ‘family honour and rights’, the Brussels Declaration, the Oxford 
Manual and the Hague Convention effectively continue to frame women as male family 
property.110 Such language reinforces ideas of the importance of ‘male entitlement and 
female chastity’.111 Rape is cast as a moral injury,112 whereby ‘the damage done to one’s 
conscience or moral compass when that person perpetrates, witnesses, or fails to prevent 
acts that transgress’ their own moral and ethical values or codes of conduct.113 The moral 
fault thus rests with the victim, not the perpetrators because they were held to have made 
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themselves vulnerable to their attackers.114 Even where they are given protection, it is as 
privileged or specialist persons, because of their subordinate social status as women.115 
The language of ‘family honour and rights’ does not capture the use of rape as a 
weapon or tool of warfare used to obtain  or maintain power over an individual or group.116 
It fails to reflect the consequences associated with rape for the victim, including forced 
impregnation, contraction of sexual infections or diseases or other types of sexual or 
mental health injury. Nor does it address the issues of force or coercion or include the 
concept of consent. Employing ‘honour’ as a descriptor of conduct works to privilege 
masculine standards as the key marker of family honour. It signals continuation of a theme 
extant in historic records which evidence the origins of honour as a military concept in 
ancient history (notably Rome) and refreshed in the code of chivalry. This privileging of 
masculine values essentially serves to reject any idea of female autonomy. Actions taken 
by and against women have traditionally been measured solely against male standards. 
Male-male and female-perpetrated rape therefore cannot logically be included under this 
understanding of family honour. 
In summary, the Brussels Declaration, the Oxford Manual, and the Hague 
Convention proved to be inadequate at effectively prohibiting rape because of the way in 
which they were shaped by gender essentialist thinking. As Margaret Davies points out, 
‘law is gendered’.117 Laws, in both legal and cultural terms, she argues, are ‘constructed 
around a masculine subject and an associated set of masculine characteristics, and that 
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these characteristics associated with masculinity are valued by law.’118 Against this 
standard, the Brussels Declaration, the Oxford Manual, and the Hague Convention, fail to 
define or explain what the terms ‘family honour’, ‘family rights,’ or ‘respect’ mean in 
practical applications. An obligation for states to prevent rape by their soldiers is notably 
absent.119 Even if we accept Askin, Stevenson and Sellers’ observations that the language 
of ‘family honour and rights’ was understood as referring to rape, it remains unclear if 
states had a responsibility or duty to prevent such acts.120 Use of the term ‘respect’ instead 
of the term ‘prohibition’ had led to rape being perceived as a low obligation in international 
law.121 In the event that prosecutions for violation of the regulations occurred, the 
likeliness that rape would have been included in the charges was nearly non-existent.122 
The exclusion of the term ‘rape’ from these instruments did not go unnoticed by 
contemporaries. Belgium’s Hague delegate, Beernaert, stated that use of the language of 
‘family honour and rights’ in the Hague Convention was unclear and too vague.123 When 
Beernaert commented on the term ‘honour’, a debate ensued regarding the language used 
in Article 46 regarding ‘appropriation of private property’.124 No change was made to 
clarify the position on rape.125 Instead, the Netherlands’ delegate, General den Beer 
Poortugael, stated, ‘it is neither necessary nor possible to define’ in more ‘detail the sense 
of this article [on rape], the purport of which is evident.’126  
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Echoing the earlier point regarding the language of diplomacy, Tuba Inal suggests 
that use of the terms ‘honour’ and ‘family rights’ in the Convention was a deliberate 
attempt to make general acceptance of the article easier since these terms are sufficiently 
flexible to allow for various interpretations.127 As summarised by Beernaert, ‘there are 
certain points which cannot be the subject of a convention and which it would be better to 
leave, as at present, under the governance of that tacit and common law which arises from 
the principles of the law of nations.’128 
Inal has provided other explanations for the laws prohibiting rape to be vague.129 
She echoes earlier comments on the new prudery in diplomacy when she suggests that 
emphasis on finesse, decency, propriety and manners in nineteenth century Europe 
established a convention which meant that still, in the early twentieth century, the delegates 
thought it was not appropriate to make direct reference to the term ‘rape’ in a diplomatic 
legal document.130 But the point she makes is that the delegates were undoubtedly aware 
of the importance of clarity in law and its language. Whilst they deliberately excluded 
measures that did not comply with extant legal practices, where they could not avoid 
making a legal judgment or statement, they sought to implement unclear provisions to make 
them less obligatory.131 This point relates to Inal’s use of the term ‘normative shock’ in 
relation to rape. The phrase refers to the everyday public reaction to conduct which is 
considered unacceptable, but at the same time normal for perpetrators – as is the case for 
most criminal behaviours. It is only when public attention is drawn to ‘calamitous 
circumstances or events’,132 ones which are considered outside the normal scope of 
criminal events that ‘the public conscience’ is shocked into ‘focusing on particular 
                                                          










activities or institutions’, in ways that change the norms of a society.133 It was WWI (1914-
1918), the first modern-age global conflict, which forced a change to the previous 
parameters of normative shock in reaction to the conduct of soldiers towards civilian 
populations. In the aftermath of that war, it made a reliance on the unclear provisions in 
the Oxford Manual, the Brussels Declaration and the Hague Convention unsatisfactory 
even in the eyes of many who had previously preferred the nuances to the obligations on 
states.134 
 
World War I  
The end of WWI led to the formal identification of war crimes as a matter for international 
law. Due to the scale and nature of that war, questions were raised regarding the treatment 
of non-combatants, including women.135 As well as the issue of war reparations to be paid 
by states, the international community focused on individuals accused of what came to be 
labelled as war crimes. In 1919, the War Crimes Commission was created to investigate 
violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the Axis powers.136 The 
Commission established that German soldiers had committed rape against Belgium and 
French women, among other crimes.137 In 1921, the Leipzig War Crimes Trials were held 
to prosecute those responsible for committing war crimes before the Reichsgericht. Yet 
there was no criminal prosecution in international law; the trials were conducted under 
German criminal law.138  
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The Leipzig trials are generally considered a failure by the international community 
because of the few cases prosecuted as well as the court’s perceived leniency towards 
offenders. Rape also continued to elude prosecution. Despite this omission, De Brouwer 
argues that the inclusion of rape as a violation of the laws and customs of war meant that 
the criminal nature of the offence was starting to be recognised.139 However, recognition 
alone is easy and meaningless when enforcement is so easy to evade because of a 
fundamental lack of will to identify rape as a serious war crime. Turning to the WWII 
criminal tribunals, this chapter examines the extent to which the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT, 1945-1946) and the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1948) demonstrated a willingness to address the issue of conflict-
perpetrated rape.  
 
World War II 
The legal approaches taken by IMT and IMTFE raise interesting points about the topicality 
of a public shift away from accepting certain types of conduct in conflict as simply 
normatively shocking.140 Echoing this point, Meron remarks that ‘[i]t is a pity that 
calamitous circumstances are needed to shock the public conscience into focusing on 
important, but neglected, areas of law, process and institutions.’141 The more horrifying 
the event, the greater the public pressure for swift change. The atrocities committed by the 
Nazis and the public’s knowledge of them, he continues, led to the creation of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals; ‘the evolution of the concepts of crimes against peace, 
crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide; the shaping of the fourth Geneva 
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Convention; and the birth of the human rights movement.’142 But this leads us to question 
where the prosecution of rape as a war crime fitted into that listing.  
The IMT and IMTFE were the first international criminal tribunals of significant 
value to the history of prosecutions of rape as a war crime.143 They were established by 
international treaty to enable the prosecution of those accused of being the major criminals 
from the European Axis powers and Japan for war crimes, crimes against peace, and 
crimes against humanity committed during WWII. Many other war criminals were tried 
separately before national military courts, which were led by the victorious nations under 
Control Council Law No. 10.144 For the first time, individuals rather than states were held 
criminally responsible in international law.145 The establishment of these bodies resulted 
in the international legal response to war crimes becoming more coherent and focused on 
the issue of wrongful behaviour towards non-combatants and prisoners of war. Both organs 
made some significant advances in prosecuting offences committed during armed 
conflict.146  
The extent to which this development improved the regularity of rape prosecutions 
is debatable. To verify the systematic campaign of genocide and terror committed by the 
Nazis, rape was entered as supporting evidence at the IMT.147 The Molotov Note148 
described acts of looting: 
which took place in every community, of general devastation, of revolting acts 
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of rape, ill-treatment, and mass murder – all committed against peaceful citizens 
by the fascist German occupational forces during their advance, during the 
occupation, and during their withdrawal.149 
During the trial, the French prosecutor, Charles Dubost, briefly presented further evidence 
of rape. He described the rape of a 21 year-old woman by a German soldier in occupied 
France in 1944150 as well as the rape of women and girls in St Donat, Crest, Die, and 
Saillans.151   
Feminists like Nicola Henry have criticised Dubost for his indifference and off-
the-cuff remarks when describing these offences.152 His comments, she argues, signal that 
rape was not deemed important enough to warrant detailed discussion or analysis during 
the trial.153 Dubost clarified with the President if he was required to read the entire 
document. For Henry, Dubost’s actions made it appear like an arduous task to read out the 
documents.154 It appears that rape was still regarded legally and culturally in a similar way 
to looting and pillaging; they were considered crimes, but not sufficiently heinous to 
warrant specific prosecution.155  
Dubost’s response illustrates the persistence of a hypermasculine culture in 
international war crimes prosecution proceedings. The IMT did not attempt to prosecute 
rape or even refer to the term ‘rape’ in its judgments.156 Though not specifically referenced 
in its statute, rape could have been prosecuted as a form of ill-treatment under the war 
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crimes and crimes against humanity categories as an inhumane act under the Lieber Code, 
the Hague Convention, or under Control Council Law No. 10, which lists rape (either 
implicitly or explicitly) as a crime against humanity.157 This omission of rape prosecutions 
ensured that acts of male rape were also overlooked despite its prevalence. As Ray Douglas 
points out, ‘I’m not aware of any major conflict including both world wars where you will 
not find examples of sex violence against men and boys in quite substantial numbers.’ (See 
Appendix 4).158 
Various theories have been proposed to explain why rape was not prosecuted at the 
IMT. De Brouwer, for example, claims that the Allied forces were concerned that they too 
might be prosecuted for rape and so were complicit in downgrading the seriousness of such 
incidents.159 Miriam Gebhardt agrees, estimating that after the war, ‘860,000 women (and 
a good number of men) were raped.’160 Of these, around 190,000 were attacked by 
American troops, others by Belgium, French or British soldiers.161 Had both the Allied and 
the German forces been publicly held accountable for their actions, this would have 
undermined the moral high ground on which the victors were determined to stand.162 On 
the other hand, following the end of WWII, Allied armies prosecuted some of their own 
troops for criminal misconduct during the conflict in their respective military courts. 
Though official courts martial details remain sealed, it is probable that these bodies did 
address instances of rape committed by Allied soldiers.163 
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Others are less convinced of the soundness of the reasons for not giving a higher 
ranking to rape prosecutions. Henry, for example, argues that it amounts to a failure of the 
Tribunal that it did not specifically prioritise prosecution of rape as a war crime and links 
this failure to status accorded to war crimes committed against women in international 
law.164 She insists that the tradition of silence surrounding rape is ‘connected to the politics 
of wartime rape and the gendered nature of legal discourse’ given that law is a patriarchal 
institution.165 Certainly, crimes committed largely against women continue to be seen and 
treated as lesser offences. Women’s lack of formal involvement in the proceedings was 
also held to indicate a cultural and legal disinterest in prosecuting rape.166  
The IMTFE is largely held as having been more effective in addressing rape.167 
During the proceedings, instances of rape were made public, including the Nanking 
massacre.168 The court recognised that in 1937, between 20-80,000 Chinese women and 
girls were systematically raped in the occupied region.169 The Tribunal established that 
these acts of rape were committed under the command of General Iwane Matsui, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army (CCAA) during the invasion of 
Nanking. The Tribunal determined that Matsui ‘knew what was happening… [but] did 
nothing, or nothing effective to abate these horrors’.170 He was sentenced to death for war 
crimes committed under his command.171 
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The IMTFE found Kōki Hirota, Japanese foreign minister at the time the CCAA 
occupied Nanking, guilty on similar grounds. The Tribunal concluded that upon receiving 
information from the Nanking consulate of the atrocities being committed, he should have 
intervened more vigorously with the War Ministry to end the atrocities.172 Failing to obtain 
an appropriate response from the Ministry, Hirota should have approached the Cabinet and 
taken immediate action to stop the massacre.173 He too was sentenced to death.174 
Rape was also prosecuted in the minor trials in the Far East. While Major-General 
Akira Mutō, Chief-of-Staff in the Philippines, was acquitted for his role in the rape of 
Nanking, he was charged and found guilty for his part in the outrages committed in the 
Philippines, including the Bantangas and Manila massacres.175 The Tribunal found that 
during his tenure as Chief-of-Staff ‘a campaign of massacre, torture and other atrocities 
was waged by the Japanese troops on the civilian population, and prisoners of war and 
civilian internees were starved, tortured and murdered.’176 Presumably rape was included 
amongst ‘torture and other atrocities’ because such acts were committed during the Manila 
massacre. The Tribunal rejected Muto’s defence that he did not know of the abuses 
committed177 and sentenced him to death.178 Likewise, in the minor trial of Tomoyuki 
Yamashita, the former Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the 
Imperial Japanese Army, the US Military Commission concluded that the accused was 
criminally responsible for rape, amongst other offences, committed by troops under his 
command and sentenced him to death.179  
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The IMTFE’s prosecution of rape under the Hague Convention and the Geneva 
Convention 1929 as a form of inhumane and ill-treatment and, once again, as a violation 
of family honour and rights has received much comment.180 Brownmiller writes, for 
example, that if it was not for the Tribunal, the magnitude of the rape of Nanking would 
have been difficult to accept.181 Though the major trials of this ad hoc Tribunal were 
conducted under international law, like the IMT, the minor trials were conducted under the 
rules of military law approved by a US Presidential Commission. This approach enabled 
the minor trials to be more creative in bringing prosecutions, particularly regarding rape 
prosecutions. The Tribunal established that during WWII, the Japanese government had 
institutionalised rape on a mass scale for the benefit of their soldiers, and was prepared to 
prosecute both high-ranking individuals and those further down the hierarchy. Askin 
comments that the inclusion of rape as a war crime in the proceedings was a positive 
feature of the Trials, meriting inclusion of rape in future prosecutions.182 Henry remarks 
that the Tribunal’s prosecution of rape marked a deviation from the silence surrounding 
rape and stands in stark contrast to the IMTs failure to prosecute perpetrators of rape.183  
The IMTFE was not without fault. Like the IMT, rape was not clearly referred to 
in the Tokyo Statute.184 As mentioned earlier, during the war, the Japanese Imperial Army 
created comfort stations in occupied territories where over 200,000 women were sexually 
enslaved.185 Yet no reference was made to the state’s involvement in the sexual 
enslavement of these women during the proceedings. To date, the Japanese government 
has offered only monetary compensation to survivors. The victims and activists deem this 
proposed submission inadequate because it holds neither a formal apology nor 
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acknowledgment of the existence of comfort stations.186  
Even where rape was addressed by the IMTFE, victims of rape were not called to 
provide their testimony.187 It is unclear from the records whether they were deemed 
incompetent witnesses, which is unlikely, or whether practical difficulties about getting 
them to the Tribunal location intervened. The most reasonable assumption is that victims 
were reluctant to come forward because of the ongoing stigma attached to such offences. 
Another likely factor is that the testimony of rape victims was seen as less important than 
testimony relating to the headline offences because rape continued to be seen as a lesser 
offence when measured against other crimes involving mass fatal atrocities.188 Needless 
to say, the IMTFE failed to address instances of male rape. 
Despite the number of rape prosecutions, the IMTFE proceedings cannot be held 
to signify a shift in international attitudes towards conflict-perpetrated rape. In the appeal 
to the Supreme Court by General Tomoyuki Yamashita in 1946 (Yamashita v. Styer) 
Justice Murphy stated, ‘[f]rom the earliest conflicts of recorded history to the global 
struggles of modern times inhumanities, lust and pillage have been the inevitable by-
products of man’s resort to force and arms.’189 His remark cements not only the 
understanding that rape in war is linked to men’s uncontrollable sexual urges and desires 
but once again raises the suggestion that hypermasculinity remains prevalent in conflict. It 
also suggests the continuation of the attitude that rape is unavoidable in conflict-related 
environments and cannot be discouraged because of the challenge this would provide to 
military morale.  
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Between 1948 and 1990, conflict-perpetrated rape continued to be committed 
largely with impunity.190 In the Vietnam War (1955-1975), US soldiers systematically 
raped Vietnamese women.191 During the Indo-Pakistani War (1971), Pakistani troops 
raped more than 200,000 Bengali women.192 Khmer Rouge officials as well as the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces frequently perpetrated rape during the Cambodian genocide 
(1975 and 1979).193 In the late 1990s, local women were raped by Indonesian military 
during the battle for independence in Timor.194 Despite reports of these atrocities, rape 
continued to elude prosecution.195  
Part of the problem is linked to rape’s lack of ‘normative shock’ value.  This point 
also relates to the earlier discussion regarding post-Enlightenment will in the West to avoid 
discussing rape openly as a matter of polite convention. To do so was considered vulgar 
and uncivilised. Here, Stevenson’s point about the use of ambiguous language in the 
reportage of rape cases being deliberate becomes significant. Such ambiguity is justified 
by the need to avoid offending public morals and sensibilities and the traditional usage of 
this trope helps to explain the lack of public outrage over the failure to prioritise rape 
prosecutions.196 It enabled a presumption that such matters were being dealt with, but 
discreetly in the interests of that public morality and of the victims themselves. Rape still 
did not enter overtly into public knowledge of the details in prosecution cases in the courts 
                                                          
190 This caveat is included should there be a retrospective decision, as with Northern Ireland, to investigate 
and possibly prosecute for war crimes. 
191 See Weaver, Ideologies of Forgetting, p.19. 
192 Tompkins, ‘Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime’, pp.848-9. 
193 For a discussion on the Khmer Rouge and abuses, see for example, Human Rights Watch, Cambodia’s 
Dirty Dozen A Long History of Rights Abuses by Hun Sen’s Generals, (New York, NY: Human Rights 
Watch, 2018).  
194 Martin Kich, ‘East Timor, Abuse of Women during War’, in Bernard A. Cook (eds), Women and War: 
A Historical Encyclopaedia from Antiquity to the Present, Volume One, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 
2006), 160-1, p.160. 
195 Stevie Greenleaf, ‘A war within a war’, The Guardian, 10 June 2013: 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/jun/07/war-within-war, 
(accessed 2 August 2019). 
196 Kim Stevenson, ‘Unearthing the Realities of Rape: Utilising Victorian Newspaper Reportage to Fill In 





in the period up to and including the post-WWII trials.197 Though the international 
community was aware of the perpetration of rape during WWI and WWII, it was not 
reflected in news coverage or in reportage of war crimes proceedings because of this habit 
of discretion. During this period, there was no shift in expectations regarding the need to 
prosecute rape as a war crime.198  
It was not until the Yugoslavian and Rwandan conflicts that the international 
community demanded a change. Following extensive media coverage of the mass 
atrocities committed during these wars, the UN Security Council (UNSC, 1945-present) 
founded specialist courts in the shape of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR, 1994-2014) to prosecute those deemed responsible for the perpetration of war 
crimes. Resulting pressure from activists and international/non-governmental 
organisations (I/NGO) led not only to rape being added to the prosecution agendas of each 
of these Tribunals but its reconceptualisation as an offence in international law. Both the 
ICTY and the ICTR created their own individual gender-neutral definitions of rape 
(Appendix 1). The establishment of these Tribunals left a powerful legacy, paving the way 
for the establishment of other international criminal organs, including the permanent the 
International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-present), which also constructed a separate 
gender-neutral definition of rape for its prosecution purposes. The context in which these 
bodies and their definitions of rape were created will be explored in the next chapter.199 
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Initially considered acceptable conduct as part of the rules of war, rape was later prohibited 
as a violation of family or female honour in international law. This characterisation is 
damaging. It not only perpetuates the hegemonic masculine idea that women are the 
property of men who either formally or effectively possess them, but it frames rape as an 
attack against women’s families and the wider community’s status, not on the victim. As 
a result, rape victims are often stigmatised and exiled from society because they become a 
symbol of the loss of community and family honour or status. The language of family or 
female honour does not convey the use of rape as a weapon in war or as a tool to obtain 
and exercise power over the individual and their community. Nor does it reflect the 
consequences of and harm caused by rape. Rather, describing rape as a violation of family 
or female honour reinforces the traditional understanding of rape being a heteronormative 
crime. Consequently, acts of male-male and female-perpetrated rape are excluded from 
this framework.  
Even if we look beyond the symbolic significance of such terminology and accept 
the premise that the introduction of such laws indicates a change in attitudes towards rape 
in war, there are critical issues relating to their implementation. As this chapter has shown, 
even in the conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century, rape was rarely prosecuted 
or addressed as a war crime. Yet the potential for doing so existed under the Lieber Code, 
the Brussels Declaration, the Oxford Manual, and the Hague Convention. Though the 
IMTFE, for example, acknowledged the prevalence of rape in WWII, the Tribunal omitted 
to prosecute offenders explicitly for committing rape as a war crime. Without a will for 
enforcement, these instruments have proved of little practical value. 





in international law as a serious crime in its own right, figures such as Askin, Meron, and 
Henry have written extensively on how rape should be addressed as a crime in modern 
international law. Such scholarship has had a significant impact on modern-day attitudes 
towards conflict-perpetrated rape, culminating in the international community’s response 
to the Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts. The worldwide media reportage on systematic 
rape of civilians during these wars made the issue topical, substantially accounting for the 
successful pressure brought on the UN by I/NGO and activists to prosecute perpetrators. 
This development was transformative, leading not only to the establishment of the ICTY 
and the ICTR, and later the ICC, but also to these specialist international courts creating 
their own definitions of rape as a war crime.  
Before analysing the prosecution of rape by these organs as well as their definitions 
of the crime, it is important to examine first the evolution of modern international law from 
1945 in order to comprehend and situate such advancements. Developments over time in 
international law are rarely the by-product of a single event or isolated incident. They 
typically result from a combination of factors working to highlight fresh areas of public 
reaction, including changes in social attitudes towards what is considered (un)acceptable 
conduct and shifts in public expectations regarding how the international community 
should respond to such activity. Attention now turns to the broader developments and 
events that led to the founding of specialist courts to deal with international criminal 
prosecutions in the shape of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. Their individual structure 
and the background that guided their individual decisions to create their own different 
definitions of rape will also be analysed, as will their impact on subsequent war crimes 
prosecutions, including the launch of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC, 1997-present) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, 2002-





ICTR and the ICC, and their legacy but their decision to define and prosecute rape in 
international law as well as the key factors that influenced their approach, including their 
decision to categorise rape as an offence under headings such as sexual violence, an 





Modern International Criminal Tribunals 
 
Introduction   
The previous chapter examined the development of international law from ancient times 
until WWII and the way in which rape emerged as a war crime. Chapter 3 takes that 
historical analysis into the twenty-first century by exploring the developments from the 
setting up of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 up to mid-2019. This examination will 
contextualise the discussion in the succeeding chapters regarding the categorisation of 
conflict-perpetrated rape in modern international law.  
At the end of WWII, after the failure of the League of Nations (1920-1946) to 
maintain global peace, members of the Allied forces, principally the UK and the US, 
founded the UN as an institution with a global membership and remit. That body emerged 
out of the wartime War Crimes Commission (1943-1948) based in London. Shaped by the 
Commission, the UN’s initial agenda was largely in keeping with Allied expectations of 
how best to maintain international peace and security. As part of its founding commitment, 
the UN created the Security Council (UNSC) in 1945.1 Paralysed during most of the Cold 
War era (1947-1991),2 the UNSC’s powers rapidly expanded in the 1990s, leading to the 
launch of numerous peacekeeping and military operations as well as the establishment 
of international sanctions and courts. The UNSC played a significant part in developing 
the concept of specialist international criminal tribunals as a peacebuilding tool in conflict-
afflicted regions in the post-Cold War era.3  
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Though the establishment of modern international criminal tribunals and courts 
will be examined more broadly, particular attention will be paid to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC, 2002-present). These were the first bodies to address both the conceptualisation and 
categorisation of rape as a war crime in international law. While other tribunals have since 
been established, for example, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC, 1997-present) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, 2002-2013), their 
contributions both relate to and build on the work of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. In 
this context, these specialist international hybrid courts are not subjected to the detailed 
critical examination accorded to the ICTY, ICTR and ICC because, for this thesis, their 
significance relates to the impact and legacy of these tribunals and the ICC.  
Returning to the themes that will be discussed in this chapter, consideration will be 
given the role played by the judiciary, to provide context for the later discussion of their 
involvement in evolving the definitions of rape invoked by the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
ICC. This analysis will include a consideration of the gender and nationality of individual 
judges. Such framing is key to understanding the factors that contributed to the 
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The International Court of Justice  
Established by the UN Charter in 1945, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the first 
and main permanent judicial body of the UN. The founders of the UN initially saw the ICJ 
as the essential arbitration organ for securing global peace.4 Sitting in The Hague, the 
jurisdiction of the Court is limited by its mandate, which is rooted in a traditional 
understanding of the remit of international law. Sir Francis Jacobs QC recollects that when 
taking his ‘first steps in international law’, the original mantra was that ‘“only states were 
the subject of international law” – and perhaps later, progressively, international 
organisations’.5  
The role of the ICJ is to settle only legal disputes or challenges submitted by 
Member States in line with international law as they relate to states as well as to give 
advisory opinions on legal queries raised by authorised UN organs and specialised bodies.6 
Only Member States can appear before the ICJ in contentious cases, which relate to inter 
or intra-state obligations in international law.7 The ICJ does not have the jurisdiction to 
address applications from corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGO) or 
individuals, unless they are specially designated UN organs or agencies. Even if a Member 
State were to take up the case of one of its nationals in order to petition against a wrongful 
act, which its national claims to have endured at the behest of another Member State, the 
dispute would be between those Member States, not the national.8  
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Objects of Contemporary EU Law, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), ix-xi, p.ix. 
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The Court, in theory, has the capacity to address acts of sexual and gender-based 
violence, including rape, which involve a Member State’s failure to live up to the 
obligations of the treaties and conventions to which they are signatories.9 The ICJ Statute 
states that ‘[t]he Court shall have the power to indicate provisional measures which ought 
to be taken.’10 This provision protects states pending a decision on their case. Moreover, 
the Court may order states to end practices, which disproportionately affect women.11 On 
this basis, the ICJ’s judgments may influence state obligations in international law in 
relation to rape, with an emphasis on the obligations of named states.12 In the Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) (Provisional Measures) Order of 13 
September 1993, for example, the Court held: 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and its agents and surrogates are under an 
obligation to cease and desist immediately from its breaches of the foregoing 
legal obligations, and is under a particular duty to cease and desist 
immediately… from the murder, summary execution, rape, kidnapping, 
mayhem, wounding, physical and mental abuse, and detention of the citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.13 
Later in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
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10 UN, Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 41.1.  
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12 Ibid. 
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Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) (2008),14 the ICJ considered whether rape and other acts of 
sexual violence constitute genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948).15 Under the Convention, genocide is the 
deliberate attempt to exterminate an ethnic or religious group by state actors. Genocide is 
a breach of a national obligation in international law for which a state takes responsibility 
and it is therefore a state matter, bringing it under the remit of ICJ. Though it falls within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, it lacks any enforcement mechanism to back up any of the 
judgments made under this heading. 
The ICJ does not have the authority to prosecute individual perpetrators of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity or to define such offences.16 The nascent UN 
determined instead that a specially constituted permanent ICC would deal with these 
crimes separately (to be discussed later in the chapter). By the time the UN was formally 
established in 1945, attempts to develop such a body were put on hold in the light of the 
urgent need to address the German and Japanese war crimes. As a result, the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945-1946) and the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1947) were set up to deal with the immediate emergency. Their 
focus was the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of war crimes during WWII only; they 
were never intended as a permanency. The UN envisioned that once the IMT and IMTFE 
proceedings had concluded, an ICC would be developed for future international use. It was 
planned that the ICC would operate alongside the ICJ, but it was not anticipated that 
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individual prosecutions from future major conflicts would be within its main remit. The 
ICJ was expected to prevent such wars from developing. This parallel project did not 
materialise. In the wake of the main conclusions of the IMT and IMTFE, discussions 
regarding the development of an ICC resumed behind the scenes from 1948 until 1954, 
but were shelved when the Cold War started to escalate.17  
During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, intra and interstate conflicts 
continued to breakout across the globe, most notably in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
in the 1990s. In the absence of a permanent ICC, the UN was forced by international public 
pressure to revert to the post-WWII precedent and create two new specialist ad hoc 
tribunals to deal with crimes perpetrated during these respective wars.18 A significant 
problem for the establishment of these bodies was that the IMT and the IMTFE provided 
the only substantial models for such prosecutions.19 The challenge for these modern 
international tribunals was that the nature of warfare had changed following WWII, and 
the IMT and the IMTFE could not provide direct precedents for the new ad hoc tribunals. 
The crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda did not directly parallel with 
those perpetrated between 1939 and 1945. These new tribunals had to adopt different and 
novel prosecution strategies in order to respond effectively to this challenge.  Despite calls 
from locals to situate the respective tribunals in country, the UNSC decided to locate the 
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ICTY in The Hague, the Netherlands and the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, in order to 
maintain the necessary security for witnesses and avoid being sucked into ongoing 
corruption in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.20  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
The former Yugoslavia was embroiled in conflict throughout the 1990s. Starting with the 
death of its long-term Communist leader Marshal Josip Broz Tito in 1980, the demise of 
communism in Eastern Europe, and the downfall of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia’s 
political and economic systems came under enormous pressure. By 1989, the state 
collapsed. Fuelled by ethnic conflicts and faith-based insurgencies, nationalist and 
separatist movements grew, resulting not only in the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a state 
entity, but in the outbreak of war amongst and within the five successor independent states 
- Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia.21 Owing to global media reportage, the abuses committed by all sides 
during these conflicts grew in international awareness and outrage.22 As a result, the UNSC 
founded the ICTY in 1993 to prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity, 
crimes of genocide and war crimes.23  
The ICTY was the first post-WWII international tribunal to implement and embody 
the aims and objectives of international criminal justice, paving the way for other specialist 
international criminal tribunals, including the ICTR and the ICC.24 The Tribunal consisted 
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of a Chamber, which included three Trial Chambers with three judges attached to each, 
and an Appeals Chamber that comprised of five judges. The latter Chamber was shared 
with the ICTR. The Tribunal’s Registry worked with the Chambers to arrive at the agreed 
legal procedural rules, while the Office of the Prosecutor managed the prosecutions agreed 
by the Tribunal.25 
The ICTY judges were responsible for determining the innocence or guilt of those 
alleged to have committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia as well as sentencing those 
individuals whom they convicted. In its operations, the ICTY did follow the precedent of 
the IMT and IMTFE in that its key focus was on holding senior military and political 
figures to account for abuses perpetrated under their command.26 During a trial, they 
listened to the testimony of witnesses called by both prosecution and defence during 
proceedings. The panels examined the evidence presented in court by the prosecution and 
defence and issued judgments on the basis of that evidence.27 
From the start, the ICTY was not without opponents. Peter Verovšek remains 
critical of the Tribunal, both in terms of the original remit and the rules it worked out for 
its daily operations. One of his key points is that by situating the ICTY at The Hague, 
‘thousands of kilometres from the killing fields of the former Yugoslavia’, evidence 
gathering for both sides was compromised because international tribunals do not have the 
authority to detain or suspects and summon witnesses.28 Victims were prevented from 
independently accessing the Tribunal, diminishing the potential for their voices to be 
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heard.29 It was seen as a problem that the terms under which the ICTY was set up made it 
a matter for the appointed legal members of the Tribunal rather than local experts to agree 
on the range of prosecutions and priorities. Local victim bodies and groups have vocalised 
their ‘bitterness when they learn of ICTY plea bargains,’ which is ‘unheard of in their 
national legal systems.’30 Making matters worse, the Tribunal provided no explanation to 
the local judiciary, let alone the wider population, for decisions over when and why to 
strike a plea deal.31 Its lack of engagement with these complaints has led to nationals 
expressing their dissatisfaction with Tribunal’s operations.32 Frank Dame points out that 
many former Yugoslavians condemn the ICTY ‘as a threat to the delicate balance of power 
in the region’.33 They view it as an apology from the UN for letting the conflict take hold 
in the first place rather than an instrument of justice.34 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the backgrounds of the judges. Though 
a concerted effort was made to allocate positions on the bench to individuals from around 
the world, Bosnia’s UN ambassador, Mohamed Sacirbey, criticised the Tribunal for its 
lack of Muslim judges, stating that ‘[i]t is absurd that most of the victims are Muslim, yet 
they have no representatives on the Tribunal.’35  
In a similar vein, Nienke Grossman argues that those affected by war should be 
adequately represented among the decision-makers, notably judges. International courts, 
she explains, ‘exercise public authority by interpreting and shaping international law.’36 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Frank Dame, ‘The Effect Of International Criminal Tribunals On Local Judicial Culture: The Superiority 
Of The Hybrid Tribunal’, Michigan State International Law Review, (2015), 24(1), 213-77, pp.230-1. 
31 Ibid, pp.230-1. 
32 Ibid, p.229. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Nienke Grossman, ‘Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of International 
Courts?’, Chicago Journal of International Law, (2012), 12(2), 647-84, p.670 
36 Nienke Grossman, ‘Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication’, Virginia Journal of 




Thus, ‘[t]he de facto law-making role played by international judges cannot be denied.’37 
This authority, she writes, must be justified, ‘and democratic values such as representation 
provide a meaningful justification.’38 Both men and women in affected civilian 
populations are supposed to be the key beneficiaries of the international tribunals and 
courts. As such, these populations, she insisted, should both play a role in judicial decision-
making for these organs in order to hold justified authority.39    
Sharing Grossman’s view, local non-governmental organisations (NGO) with 
support of some interested international NGOs (INGOs), campaigned for the inclusion of 
female judges in the belief that this would work to ensure rape would be prosecuted as a 
serious crime in its own right.40 The National Alliance of Women’s Organisations, a 
British umbrella body that focuses on women’s human rights and equality, for example, 
proposed ‘[t]hat at least 50% of the personnel involved at every level and in every aspect 
of the Tribunal's functions be women.’41 The Organization of the Islamic Conferences also 
called for the ICTY judges to ‘represent, on an equitable geographic basis, the world’s 
major legal systems, with particular representation from the Islamic countries and with due 
regard to gender representation.’ 42  Likewise, the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights 
recommended that standards for the election of judges be ‘designed to ensure diversity in 
terms of geographic origin, gender and religion.’43  
The UNSC Resolutions that established the ICTY are limited in this respect. They 
provide almost no direction or guidance on national nominations practices and procedures, 
let alone on any other strategy to achieve a balance in representation on the basis of gender, 
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race or religion.44 UNSCR 1329 (2000), for example, states that UN Member States and 
non-Member States maintaining permanent observer missions at the UN can nominate up 
to two candidates for permanent judges and four candidates for ad litem judges to the 
ICTY. The Resolution simply stipulates that the candidates meet the qualifications 
requirements and are not of the same nationality as each other or as a sitting member of 
the ICTR or the appeals chamber.45 Greater detail and stronger rules would almost 
certainly have made it impossible to pass the necessary Resolutions through the UNSC.  
Amongst other imbalances, this lack of clarification ensured that women continued 
to be marginalised in the initial composition of the ICTY. Though they occupied 41% of 
the ad litem positions between 1999 and 2015, women held only 11% of the permanent 
slots.46 True, the UN Secretary General’s Report on the establishment of the Tribunal 
encouraged the hiring of female staff, as did the US representative to the Security 
Council.47 Conrad Harper, US State Department Legal Adviser, told the press that the 
Clinton Administration thought it was important that at least one woman was nominated 
as an ICTY judge for each panel ‘because of the use of rape as an instrument of warfare in 
the Bosnian conflict.’48 As targets of such abuse, he asserted, women should also judge 
the offenders.49  
Though the UNSC did not initially include a requirement for gender-balanced 
representation in the ICTY Statute,50 it eventually responded to such criticism. 
Consequently, it was later amended to mirror Article 36(8)(a) of the ICC Rome Statute 
(2002), which included a clause regarding gender representation. Article 13 of the ICTY’s 
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revised Statute states that the election and appointment must provide a ‘fair representation 
of female and male candidates’.51 However, this provision only applies to ad litem judges 
– a judge selected to sit on a specific trial.52 Regrettably, while over its lifespan 86 ICTY 
judges were appointed, only 23 of those were women.53 
Various judges, including Patricia Wald of the former Yugoslavian Tribunal, argue 
that adequate gender representation is particularly important in rape cases. She insists that 
a judge is ‘the sum of her experiences and if she has suffered disadvantages or 
discrimination as a woman, she is adept to be sensitive to its subtle expressions or to 
paternalism.’54 Former ICTR Judge Navanethem Pillay – a key figure in the prosecution of 
rape by the Rwandan Tribunal in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998)55 – maintains 
that women ‘come with a particular sensitivity and understanding’.56 Lady Baroness Hale 
echoes this sentiment, stating that ‘women bring different perceptions to the task of fact 
finding which is what most judges do much of the time’.57  
Reflecting on these comments, Grossman refers to a study, which indicates that 
ICTY panels with female judges presiding prescribed ‘more severe sanctions on defendants 
who assaulted women, while male judges imposed more severe sanctions on defendants 
who assaulted men.’58 These results underline how the differences between men and 
women judges’ own life experiences often influence the ways in which they interpret the 
law and their judicial decision-making in rape cases. 
                                                          
51 ICTY Statute, Article 13(b). 
52 Ibid, Article 13(b). 
53 Gender at the ICTY: https://www.icty.org/en/in-focus/gender-at-the-icty, (accessed 29 August 2020). 
54 Grossman, ‘Sex on the Bench’, p.656. 
55 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgment), ICTR-96-4-T, ICTR, 2 September 1998. Akayesu 
was originally charged with committing crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Initially, gender-related crimes were not included in the indictment. The charges were only amended to 
include rape, amongst other acts of sexual violence, after witnesses testified that such offences had been 
committed during the genocide. In 1998, Akayesu was found guilty of rape and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. See Appendix 2. 






Grossman points out also that at the ICTY and the shared Appeals Chamber level, 
out of 25 judges, eight had no prior criminal judicial experience. Of these 25 judges, a 
majority had no previous ‘experience in international criminal law’ or had less than ‘fifteen 
years of relevant professional experience.’59 The International Bar Association found that 
for many sittings of these courts, no consideration is given to whether ‘candidates for 
appointment to international judicial office conform to the requirements for appointment 
according to any stated criteria.’60 Seats at the international courts are typically used as 
‘bargaining chips in the diplomatic process,’ where individuals ‘receive votes because of 
the lobbying efforts and power of their states, not because of their individual 
achievements.’61 
For Grossman, this lack of emphasis on qualifications and merit works negatively 
to affect diversity within the international courts, arguing that ‘candidates have already 
been nominated’ by the time states vote.62 Where international courts have screening 
procedures, she contends, they often have more women on the bench. For example, the 
ICC, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR, 1959-present), and Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975-present), had a greater number of 
women judges in mid-2015, or a higher percentage of slots allotted to women from 1999, 
or since their establishment, whichever came later.63 Courts and tribunals with a lower 
percentage of slots allotted to women, she argues, included those bodies with minimal 
levels of screening.64  
Lacking such screening, courts like the ICTY end up with fewer women judges, 
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which has had implications for the choices made on any prioritisation of the prosecution 
of rape as a serious crime in international law. Thus LaShawn Jefferson, women’s rights 
expert at the Ford Foundation, describes the ICTY’s record on rape prosecutions as 
‘underwhelming’.65 Activists, she explains, had hoped that the Tribunal ‘would pursue 
cases of sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia as vigorously as, and on equal terms 
with, other crimes committed during the wars.’66 However, the Tribunal failed to meet 
expectations for ensuring accountability for crimes of rape and sexual violence in the 
region.67 
As a background to the setting up of the ICTY in 1993, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 780 in 1992. The Resolution created a Commission of Experts to investigate 
violations of the Geneva Conventions and other serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law committed during the Yugoslavian conflict.68 The Commission 
subsequently received reports of systematic rape of women, amongst other crimes. The 
collection of evidence and information relating to such acts amounted to 65,000 pages of 
documents, a database cataloguing the information in these documents, over 300 hours of 
videotape, and 3,300 pages of analysis, which the Commission submitted to the Prosecutor 
of the ICTY between April and December 1994 – four years prior to ICTY’s first attempt 
at prosecuting rape.69 In this context, it can be seen as a failing of the ICTY that it was the 
later Rwandan Tribunal that first prosecuted and came up with a definition for use in its 
proceedings, despite the lower public profile accorded globally to this conflict.70  
Despite such shortcomings, the ICTY did break new ground. Building on the 
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precedent already set by the ICTR in Akayesu, the former Yugoslavian Trial Chamber 
created its own definition of rape in the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (1998),71 where the 
accused, a commander of a special unit of the Croatian Defence Council was prosecuted 
for commissioning acts of rape against Bosnian Muslim detainees. The Furundžija 
definition described rape in so-called ‘mechanical’ terms, referring to the specific acts, 
body parts and objects used in rape: 
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:  
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any 
other object used by the perpetrator; or  
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;  
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.72  
This definition was later revisited by the ICTY in the Prosecutor v. Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (2001),73 where the defendants were tried 
for their roles in the commission of crimes against the Bosnian Muslim civilians between 
1992 and 1993. The Trial Chamber agreed to remove reference to ‘coercion or force or 
threat of force against the victim or a third person’ from the definition.74 Instead, it added 
‘where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim’.75 This 
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amendment was intended to provide an advanced conceptualisation of rape compared to 
many civil and common law jurisdictions.  
Significantly, the judges in these cases can be shown to have played a pivotal role 
in the development of the definitions of rape within these Tribunals. Presiding in the 
Furundžija case for the ICTY was Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba (Zambia) 
– the only female judge on the bench. She sat alongside Judge Antonio Cassese (Italy) and 
Judge Richard May (UK). Judge Mumba again presided in Kunarac, with her male 
colleagues Judge David Hunt (Australia) and Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy). In consultation 
with the Registry, these judges examined the criminal codes of their own nation state when 
constructing the Furundžija and Kunarac definitions of rape.76  
These outcomes reinforce the emphasis given earlier on the practical importance 
of adequate gender representation on benches hearing rape cases. Indeed, Wald’s opinion 
that it is a given that a judge’s politics or origin will affect their judicial opinion and choices 
is plainly substantiated by this evidence of the role played by Judge Mumba. It underlines 
Wald’s experience-based observation that a judges’ mind is not compartmentalised: they 
do not perform their duties by using some sort of ‘insulated, apolitical internal 
mechanism.’77 It is clear that the ‘institutional culture of the Chambers is influenced inter 
alia’ by a judge’s personal and professional background.78 This point is particularly 
pertinent given that, early on in the ICTY’s operations, the Tribunal judges were 
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predominantly academics or long-serving appellate judges. By 2016, the Tribunal judges 
had more varied professional and personal backgrounds.79 Continuing to reflect along 
these lines, Mia Swart’s comment is useful as a reminder to the researcher: ‘[i]t remains 
instructive to look at whether the judges have experience in trying criminal cases or 
whether the judges are diplomats or judges with a more academic background in 
international law.’80 Whether a judge comes from a common or a civil law background is 
also important, because undoubtedly these factors will impact their decision making 
actions.81 
Their affiliation with or being a member of particular organisations is equally 
informative. For example, Judge Mumba, who presided over both the Furundžija and the 
Kunarac trials, is a member of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW, 
1946-present). One of the concerns of the Commission was the Yugoslavian Wars and the 
reports of systematic mass rape.82 In the Furundžija Appeals Chamber Decision, the 
Appellant alleged that Judge Mumba’s original decision promoted specific interests and 
goals of the Commission making the judgement political. As result, he argued that Judge 
Mumba should be disqualified. The Appellant claimed that Judge Mumba acted 
improperly when she advocated the ‘position that rape was a war crime, and encouraged 
the vigorous prosecution of persons charged with rape as a war crime.’83 Moreover, he 
stated that the definition of rape that emerged in the case was a reflection of the views of 
the Expert Group Meeting, which followed the UN Conference on Women held in Beijing, 
of which Judge Mumba attended.84  
Though the Appellant’s argument was dismissed by the Appeals Chamber, their 
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assertion underpins the arguments made by Wald and Swart to the effect that we must 
always consider the potential for judges to be influenced by their own legal-cultural 
background.   
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
As with the Yugoslav Wars, the genesis of the Rwandan conflict is rooted in political and 
economic unrest within the region, and an examination of the ICTR reveals similarities 
with the setting up and development of the ICTY.85 A by-product of European 
decolonisation in Africa during the mid-to-late 1950s and 1960s, the Rwandan state was 
polarised between the newly politically and numerically dominant Hutu people and less 
numerous and formerly powerful Tutsis.86 By 1990, tensions rose between the Rwandan 
Armed Forces, representing the government of Rwanda, and the rebel alliance, the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), resulting in the outbreak of civil war. 
After the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994), the Hutu majority 
government ordered the mass slaughter of the Tutsi people over a period of 100 days.87 It 
was not until the RPF gained control of the state that the genocidal campaign against the 
Tutsis ended in late 1994.88  
The UN drew strong criticism from the international community for its lack of 
effective intervention in the conflict. The United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993), in particular, was deemed a failure for not implementing 
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the Arusha Accords (1993) and ending the civil war.89 To redeem its reputation, the UNSC 
accepted the task of not only investigating these events, but also creating a similar tribunal 
to the ICTY in order to prosecute offenders and secure justice for victims.90  
The headline link between the ICTY and the ICTR is functional, not legal, in that 
the Rwandan court was also not located within the conflict-affected region. Instead, it was 
based in Arusha, Tanzania. Again, it consisted of three Trial Chambers, an Appeals 
Chamber (shared with the ICTY, which meant that it operated in The Hague), a Registry 
and the Office of the Prosecutor. Though they had previously shared the prosecutor and 
appellate judges, since 2007, the ICTY and the ICTR have had separate prosecutors as 
well as trial judges, administrative organs and budgets.91  
There are clear differences in the approach to conflict-perpetrated rape between the 
two Tribunals, rooted in a reality that when the ICTR was established, its personnel were 
conscious of, and willing to take into account, early criticisms of the ICTY when shaping 
this new tribunal. So rather than simply modelling the Tribunal upon its predecessor, ICTR 
was consciously intended to represent an improved body. This point is underlined by the 
explanations provided by several representatives at the UNSC, who advertised that in 
creating the Rwandan Tribunal, the Council was deliberately not replicating the ICTY. 
The French delegate emphasised the importance of taking into consideration the particular 
and different needs of Rwanda.92 The representative of New Zealand stressed that ‘[m]any 
important changes have been made to the framework of the Tribunal. We did not simply 
produce an add-on to the former-Yugoslavia Tribunal; the Council recognized that there 
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are important differences between the two situations.’93 Notably, the focus of the ICTR’s 
jurisdiction was intended to focus on crimes of genocide rather than war crimes, as Rwanda 
had requested.94 As such, the ICTR and ICTY were each responsible for drawing up their 
own legal rules in response to local realities. Decisions taken by one were not binding on 
the other.  
In this context, it is not easy to make direct comparisons between the two Tribunals.  
However, scholars like Rebecca Haffajee regard the Tribunal as having advanced war 
crimes prosecutions in international law.95 Like the ICTY, ICTR did establish a principle 
that ordinary soldiers and militia members who committed mass atrocities during the civil 
war were acting under the order of political and military leaders, insisting on attaching 
blame to authority figures rather than those simply acting under their orders. In turn, the 
ICTR prosecuted high-ranking officials for crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide 
and war crimes.96 This strategy meant that top officials were held accountable for acts 
attributed to them, even if not directly committed by them. Such prosecutions have been 
described as revolutionary, addressing the pervasive unwillingness of these leaders to hold 
soldiers responsible for their acts.97 Others, notably Lilian Barria and Steven Roper, are 
less convinced about the extent to which ICTR can be regarded as a more successful body 
than ICTY. They point out that in contrast to the Yugoslavian Tribunal, the Rwandan 
Tribunal’s mandate is narrow, being limited to crimes committed only during one calendar 
year, and in Rwanda instead of looking at the entirety of the conflict from 1990 until 
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1994.98 Wald is another critical commentator on the operations and thinking of the ICTR. 
In line with her comments on the ICTY, her focus on the ICTR is again on the issue of 
gender, specifically the underrepresentation of women, and the need to consider the 
cultural and legal backgrounds of legal personnel, notably judges.99 Echoing Wald, 
Grossman points out that while the number of women ad litem judges sitting at the 
Rwandan Tribunal reached 60% in 2004, by 2011 numbers plummeted to 20%,100 raising 
similar concerns to those outlined earlier in the chapter, particularly with regards to rape 
prosecutions.  
 Mirroring coverage of the Yugoslavian war, media outlets and I/NGOs reported 
on the extensive use of rape as a weapon during the Rwandan genocide when demanding 
that perpetrators be held accountable for their crimes. By 1996, the pressure to act from 
the media, channelling the evidence provided to them by those on the ground, was 
overwhelming. But the insistence on enabling justice delivery aimed at the ICTR was more 
nuanced in its detail than that pressing for action by the ICTY. Human Rights Watch, for 
example, explicitly appealed to the ICTR to integrate a gender perspective into its 
investigations by hiring more women investigators, treating rape as a serious crime and 
amending indictments to include rape charges where appropriate. Adding momentum to 
the demands for a more conscious gender dimension to the Tribunal, feminist activists 
founded the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations to ensure that the 
interests and rights of those women appearing before the ICTR were protected.101 This 
more detailed and specific set of demands made of the ICTR helps to explain why it was 
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the ICTR, rather than the ICTY, which first responded to pressure by arriving at a 
definition of rape for use within the Trial Chamber. 
Despite these calls for a more conscious gender dimension to its thinking, the 
Rwandan Tribunal did initially overlook the claims for bringing prosecutions headlining 
rape committed during the conflict. For example, Akayesu, the mayor of the Taba 
commune and one of the most powerful figures within his community at the time, was 
originally charged only with ordering, inciting, or instigating international crimes, 
ignoring the evidence that he had instigated substantial numbers of acts of rape.102 It was 
not until the trial commenced that the indictment was changed to include rape and, again, 
a woman judge was key to this development. After witnesses testified that the accused was 
present while Tutsi members of the Tabe Commune had been raped by Interahamwe, 
South African Judge Navanethem Pillay – the only woman sitting on the bench alongside 
presiding Judge Laïty Kama (Senegal) and Judge Lennart Aspegren (Sweden) – pressed 
for further information.103 Whilst Pillay pursued these details, local women’s NGOs, such 
as the Institute for Women’s Health and Rehabilitation (IWHR) as well as the Coalition, 
developed briefs for consideration by the Tribunal, which outlined the need to include rape 
among the charges against Akayesu. In providing its Judgement, the Trial Chamber 
specifically reflected on the key points raised by feminists involved in the case, including 
‘that rape should be defined in a broad and progressive manner.’104  
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As part of Akayesu’s prosecution for ordering acts of rape against the Tutsi tribe 
members, the Trial Chamber created a so-called ‘conceptual’ definition of rape.105 In other 
words, the ICTR described the broader harms associated with rape, rather than the specific 
acts, body parts and objects used in rape, something that was deemed a better echo of its 
remit to focus on genocide.106 The Trial Chamber stated that rape constitutes ‘a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive’.107 Acts ‘which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices 
not considered to be intrinsically sexual’ are included in the definition (See Appendix 1).108 
This definition is significant because it includes acts such as the ‘thrusting a piece of wood 
into the sexual organs of a woman as she lay dying’,109 a technique often used by the Hutu 
paramilitary organisation, the Interahamwes.110  
The different approaches taken by the ICTY and the ICTR when seeking to define 
rape, accompanied as it is by the evidence of the impact of individual judges on those 
approaches, underlines the difficulties associated with constructing an agreed definition of 
rape in international law. This lack of consensus from these Tribunals is particularly 
significant because of the impact they have had on the agendas of other post-conflict 
organs, which have sought to prosecute rape, including the ECCC. A brief survey of this 
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legacy dimension amply illustrates the ongoing continuation of the historical confusion 
and disagreements in international law over prosecutions for rape perpetrated in conflict 
situations.  
 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the ECCC was established in country, at Pnom Penh. Set 
up in 1997, it has only been active since 2006. The Court was created to prosecute senior 
members of the Democratic Kampuchea (the Khmer Rouge regime). These figures were 
those considered ‘most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian 
penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions 
recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 
January 1979.’111 Although a hybrid court created by the Royal Government of 
Cambodia and the UN, the ECCC remains an independent body, using Cambodian112 as 
well as international staff as part of its broader strategy to apply international standards.113  
The ECCC is of relevance to this thesis because of the explicit reference made by 
it to the work of the ICTY and the ICTR. In determining what constitutes rape, the Trial 
Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav (2010) concluded that the ICTY Kunarac 
definition provides a more accurate description than the Akayesu definition.114 It also relied 
on the jurisprudence of both the ICTY and the ICTR when categorising rape as a form of 
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torture.115 These outcomes are an indication of the value and influence of both the 
Tribunals with regards to rape prosecution.116 The ECCC’s record also reveals the extent 
of the challenges facing that Court, which is made comprehensible by reference to a wider 
cultural context and the impact of that context on legal attitudes. To date, the Court has 
only prosecuted one case of rape in the Kaing Guek Eav trial, heard by a male-dominated 
bench, including Judge Nil Nonn, (President, Cambodia), Judge Silvia Cartwright (New 
Zealand), Judge Ya Sokhan (Cambodia), Judge Jean-Marc Lavergne (France) and Judge 
Thou Mony (Cambodia).117 The accused was found guilty of rape as a crime of torture and 
given a single sentence of 35 years imprisonment.118  
In general terms, the ECCC is judged to have achieved little since its inception. To 
date, the Court has prosecuted and convicted only three individuals.119 Its lack of focus on 
crimes of rape committed during the Khmer Rouge era has been particularly criticised by 
the international community. Interestingly, given the points made about the impact of 
national culture on legal thought and action, this absence can be linked to traditional 
Cambodian domestic culture and law. In Cambodia, attitudes towards rape remain rooted 
in expectation of women’s relative subordination to men, making its prosecution complex. 
Rebecca Surtees refers to the ‘socially charged nature of the crime in Cambodian society’, 
where women themselves are likely to be blamed for providing any opportunity for rape.120 
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Though rape is criminalised under the Cambodian Criminal Code of 1956, what constitutes 
rape in the context of the ECCC remains unclear. This dimension is complicated by the 
local tradition where what would be identified in modern Western thinking as a form of 
forced marriage, works to obliterate any pre-marital sexual impropriety or offence, 
including rape.121 A further complication is that in the national code, sexual violence is 
legally identified as more of an aspect of domestic violence than an individual crime in its 
own right in Cambodian culture. This identification has, from the perspective of a locally-
based hybrid court, the effect of obscuring not only the potential for occurrence of male-
male rape, but also for males as well as females to be forced into marriage, thereby 
removing a legal basis for a rape charge to be brought.122 
While it is clear the Khmer Rouge capitalised upon this tradition by using rape and 
forced marriage as a form of social engineering,123 the ECCC had initially decided not to 
investigate forced marriage and rape. That decision worked substantially to promote a 
linkage between the Chamber’s policy and a culture-based assumption that the Khmer 
Rouge had not condoned such acts.124 The Court later changed its position following 
sustained pressure from the lawyers for the Civil Parties.125 Even then, the scope of the 
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investigation was broadened to include only forced marriage and rape within those 
marriages.126 The challenge this provides for a consensus on rape in international law is 
revealed by the comments of experts like Sarah Deibler. She argues that this development 
fails to go far enough to reflect the reality of rape in Cambodia during that era. Despite 
rape forming ‘a significant body of crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge’ and its being 
‘singled out as grounds for conviction in ECCC law’, Deibler maintains that this limited 
focus by the Court on such crimes means that the legal response has been insufficient.127 
By taking the stance that ‘only rape in the context of forced marriage can be charged as 
the crime against humanity or other inhumane acts’, she insists that the many other 
instances of rape perpetrated during the Khmer Rouge regime are condoned by being 
overlooked in this way.128  
 
The Special Court of Sierra Leone 
The workings of the SCSL also reveal the wider impact of the ICTY and the ICTR. From 
1991 until 2002, Sierra Leone was convulsed by civil war. During the conflict, the 
Revolutionary United Front, a paramilitary group headed by Foday Sankoh, used mass 
rape, sexual slavery and forced marriage, among other crimes, to incite mass terror and 
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secure control of the state’s diamond mines.129 Charles Taylor, then president of Liberia 
(1997-2003), backed the insurrection, providing weapons and training to the 
Revolutionary United Front in return for diamonds. The Civil Defense Force, a Sierra 
Leone parliamentary organisation led by Sam Hinga Norman, also committed serious 
crimes. In 1999, the UN negotiated the Lome Peace Accord between the warring groups, 
marking the end of the conflict, and the start of post-conflict peacebuilding.130 
As part of this process, in 2002, the UN at the request of the Sierra Leone 
Government established the SCSL.131 Another hybrid court, and also locally based in 
Sierra Leone until its dissolution in 2013, the SCSL was responsible for prosecuting 
alleged perpetrators of serious crimes, including rape, under international humanitarian 
law and Sierra Leonean law between 1996 and 2002.132 Originally envisioned as a key tool 
in the reconciliation and justice process, restoring the rule of law following a decade-long 
battle, the Court is not without its critics.133 Dubbed the ‘not so Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’,134 the SCSL’s narrow mandate meant fewer offenders were prosecuted. 
Commentators such as Tom Perriello and Marieke Wierda argue that ‘the numbers tried 
amount to no more than a symbolic measure of justice’.135  
The ways in which the SCSL built on the precedent established by the ICTY, the 
ICTR and also the ICC are informative about the extent of the impact of these three 
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specialist international courts. In the Prosecutor vs Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (the AFRC Accused) (2007),136 Justice Julia Sebutinde 
(Uganda, presiding), Judge Justice Richard Lussick (Samoa) and Justice Teresa Doherty 
(Northern Ireland) found each of the accused guilty of rape as a crime against humanity.137 
Throughout the Judgment, reference is made to the rape prosecutions tried by the Tribunals 
of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. When clarifying what constitutes rape, the Trial 
Chamber applied the ICTY Kunarac definition of rape.138 Two years later, in the 
Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (the RUF accused) 
(2009),139 heard by Hon. Justice Pierre Boutet (presiding, Canada), Judge Hon. Justice 
Benjamin Mutanga Itoe (Camaroon) and Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson (Sierra Leone), 
each of the accused were found guilty of rape as a crime against humanity. Like the 
previous case, the male only panel referred to the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the ICC when establishing rape as a crime in international law, and chose to use the 
first two elements of the ICC definition of the offence (Appendix 1).140 Three years on, in 
the Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay (2012)141 Justice Richard Lussick (presiding, Samoa), 
and once again Justice Doherty (Northern Ireland) sitting alongside Justice Julia Sebutinde 
(Uganda), found the accused guilty of rape as a crime against humanity (Count 4) and 
outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6), which included rape, though this charge was not 
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made explicitly clear in the Disposition.142 During the proceedings, the Trial Chamber, 
once again, referred to the earlier judgments delivered by the ICTR and the ICTY. Here, 
however, the Kunarac definition of rape was applied.143  
Like the ECCC, the decision of the SCSL panels in these cases to rely on the rape 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC establishes the powerful legacy of these 
bodies in relation to the prosecution of rape by other international specialist courts.  
 
The International Criminal Court 
The previous section mentioned the wider impact of the ICTY and the ICTR as well as 
ICC. Attention now turns to this international body, including a consideration of how these 
two Tribunals had an impact on the shape and subsequent development of the ICC. As 
mentioned at the start of this chapter, the international community had planned to create a 
permanent ICC in the early days of the UN. Advising on this matter was the International 
Law Commission (ILC, 1947-present). The UN established the ILC to monitor and 
promote the codification of developments in international criminal law and to draw up an 
appropriate criminal code.144 Though a draft code had been produced in 1954, it had been 
tabled almost immediately given the practical impossibility of achieving international 
agreement during the Cold War.  
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It was not until the early 1980s that the General Assembly revived the idea of such 
a court, and requested that the ILC continue its work on drafting the code.145 By this time, 
the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes was no longer a priority in UN member 
thinking. Following developments in travel and communication from the end of the 1970s, 
the perpetration of transnational crime by international criminal organisations had 
increased. It was the shared concern of the UNSC Members over this issue that plans to 
create an ICC were reignited. In 1991, the UNSC asked the ILC to draft a statute for the 
creation of an institution that could tackle all types of international crimes. Particular 
attention was paid to crimes of cross-border drugs and human trafficking as well as 
international commercial fraud, which were then the main concerns of the international 
community, transcending the barriers provided by the Cold War.146  
A rise in inter and intra-state conflict and its reportage following the end of the 
Cold War forced a return to the original purpose for any ICC.147 Its primary objective was, 
once again, to render future specialist international criminal tribunals like the ICTY and 
the ICTR unnecessary. In 2002, the ICC was established under the Rome Statute. The 
Court is responsible for prosecuting individuals alleged to have committed crimes against 
humanity, crimes of genocide and war crimes.148 Sitting at The Hague – viewed by the UN 
and its Western allies at least as the ‘legal capital of the world’ – the former UN Secretary-
General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, justified the UN’s choice by claiming that ‘The Hague 
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has been an international city and a centre of legal knowledge for several centuries’ and, 
as such, is an appropriate setting for the Court.149  
The global validity of such claims is questionable. From the start, widely-
consumed non-Western media outlets like Al Jazeera raised concerns. They claimed that 
‘[t]he ICC, just like the larger international legal order within which it operates, is 
Eurocentric and the world views, perspectives and standpoints it reflects and embeds are 
uncompromisingly European’.150 For such critics, this choice of location only compounded 
the ongoing problems associated with perpetuating an international legal perspective, 
which was reflective of a cultural imbalance. Described as a ‘tool of Western imperialism’, 
a number of Member States who were initially supportive of the ICC have since accused 
the Court of deliberately focusing their attentions on non-Western states, particularly those 
in Africa, to promote such imperialist values.151 It is because of these issues that some 
Member States have submitted their notice of intended withdrawal from the ICC.152 
Supporters of the Court, on the other hand, insist that such responses are indicative not of 
a lack of global jurisprudential unity, but rather of contingency and of political expedience 
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on the part of states and their political leaders trying to avoid justified prosecution.  
The strength of this defence of the ICC is open to challenge. To date, states 
including the US, Israel, Russia and China have struggled to achieve an agreed stance on 
what constitutes a crime in international law. As a result, these countries refuse to submit 
to the remit of the Court and have declined membership to ensure that they could not be 
forced to accept its decisions and judgments. For Catherine Gegout, their absence 
undermines the ICC’s ability to claim international validity for its operations. In order for 
the Court to be considered to be a legitimate institution with a global remit, she argues, 
most states on all continents (particularly the five permanent members of the UNSC) must 
be party to the ICC to indicate a belief that its work is fair and useful.153 To justify its 
existence and remit, Gegout continues, people in rich and poor regions, and within varying 
political systems, must view its work as helping to provide international peace and 
justice.154 The power of the Court is also dependent on the number of states and the 
international profile of those states that are part of this body.155 Because three out of five 
permanent members of the UNSC – the US, China and Russia – are not party to it, the 
legitimacy of the Court is immediately brought into question, despite each of these states 
progressively agreeing with the ICC’s work or parts of it in the run-up to its 
establishment.156 
Moving beyond these criticisms, the work of the ICC has, by commentators 
relevant to this thesis, including Alison Cole and Karen Engle, been identified as having 
some merit. The Rome Statute, for example, is seen by these scholars as being progressive, 
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particularly regarding the issue of gender violence.157 Owing to the work of gender justice 
advocates during the drafting of the Statute, the treaty is not only gender inclusive in its 
structures and procedures but also in its substantive law.158 The Statute provides a detailed 
list of gender crimes in both the war crimes and crimes against humanity provisions. Like 
ethnicity or race, gender is described as a ground on which a person or group may be 
persecuted. Regarding the possibility of the ICC charging and prosecuting genocidal rape, 
the definition of genocide outlined in Article 6 reflects that listed in the Genocide 
Convention.159 Conversely, the Elements of Crimes (EoC, 2002) – a document that helps 
the Court to interpret substantive offenses - notes that ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ can 
‘include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or 
inhuman or degrading treatment.’160 This provision allows for genocidal rape charges to 
be presented to the ICC.161  
The Rome Statute also provides clarification on the employment of personnel. 
State parties, for example, are required to choose judges and other members of staff with 
experience in the area of violence committed against children or women.162 The Rome 
Statute includes a non-discrimination provision, which states that ‘[t]he application and 
interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such 
as gender’.163 The treaty further calls for the ‘fair representation of female and male 
judges’.164 But the practice of the ICC does not reflect the ambitions of the Statute. In 
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2008, seven out of eighteen judges were women.165 By 2018, the number of female judges 
reduced to six.166 It is nevertheless fair to conclude that these figures do still compare 
favourably to other international tribunals and courts, whose configuration continues to be 
largely dominated by men.167  
For its sterner critics, the ICC’s achievements in practice are limited to its provision 
of a constructive-sounding rhetoric, where that oratorical commitment remains 
unsubstantiated by action. Margaret deGuzman, for example, accuses the Court of 
demonstrating a lack of will to either prosecute offenders or uphold its judgments,168 
pointing to trial outcomes such as the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (2012).169 Despite evidence that 
rape had been perpetrated by Lubanga’s troops, the Prosecutor brought no charges for 
these crimes. During the trial, which was heard by Judge Adrian Fulford (presiding, UK), 
Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica) and Judge René Blattmann (Bolivia), accounts 
of rape featured strongly, particularly in the testimony of 15 key prosecution witnesses. 
The victims’ legal representatives, mainly those representing former female children 
soldiers, also referenced these crimes.170 The Ligue pour la solidarité Congolaise (LSC), 
an NGO located in North Kivu working with more than 1,500 survivors, argues that the 
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absence of these charges represents ‘a minimisation by the Prosecutor and the ICC of the 
crimes committed against women and neglects the suffering of thousands of victims of 
armed conflicts and of victims of gender-based violence’.171 
The 2018 appeal decision172 in the Situation in the Central African Republic in the 
Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (2016)173 has proved equally 
contentious. The Trial Chamber, which consisted of Judge Sylvia Steiner, (presiding, 
Brazil), Judge Joyce Aluoch (Kenya) and Judge Kuniko Ozaki (Japan) – an all-female 
panel – originally found the accused, the former Congolese vice-president, guilty of rape 
as a crime against humanity and as a war crime for the actions of his troops. However, the 
Appeals Chamber, which was comprised of two female judges, Christine Van den 
Wyngaert (presiding, Belgium) and Sanji Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana) sitting 
alongside Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria), Howard Morrison (UK) and Piotr Hofmański 
(Poland), later acquitted Bemba of all charges (see Appendix 2).174 The Appeals Chamber 
found that the accused was ‘erroneously convicted… for specific criminal acts that were 
outside the scope of the charges as confirmed’.175 It added that ‘[t]he trial chamber erred 
in its evaluation of Bemba’s motivation and the measures that he could have taken in light 
of the limitations he faced in investigating and prosecuting crimes as a remote commander 
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sending troops to a foreign country.’176 Fiona McKay described this Judgment as a blow 
to the idea of commander or leader responsibility, because it changed the original remit of 
the ICC, which provided for such responsibility to be addressed as a criminal matter.177  
The Bemba case has attracted much negative comment on the proceedings of the 
ICC and its attitude to the prosecution of rape, particularly concerning its definition of the 
crime and its application. Attempting to provide a consensus on what constitutes rape in 
international law, the ICC had created an ICTY-ICTR hybrid definition in its EoC:178 
1) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the 
victim with any object or any other part of the body.  
2) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.179 
3) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an 
international armed conflict. 
4) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.180 
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To date, Bemba is the only individual to have been convicted and then acquitted on appeal 
for rape by the ICC, in a narrative that effectively critiques and ultimately rejects its own 
definition. It can fairly be held to amount to a measure of the ICC’s current failure – or 
inability – to prosecute effectively perpetrators of rape as a war crime, explaining why 
special international criminal tribunals continue to be established to deal with specific 
locations and conflict-perpetrated incidents of rape. The point that it is not about the 
prosecution of rape but the need to change the way that the Court operates is well 
sustained.181 
 
Post-International Criminal Court: The Special Panels of the Dili District Court, the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals 
Underlining the ICC’s perceived ineffectiveness to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes is 
the ongoing creation of ad hoc tribunals. The necessity felt by both the UNSC and the 
respective national governments to create the Special Panels of the Dili District Court 
(2002-2006, also known as the East Timor Tribunal) and the Lebanese Tribunal (2009-
present) is particularly telling. In theory, the ICC could have dealt with the abuses 
committed during these conflicts. Likewise, the Court could have taken over the residual 
functions of the ICTY and the ICTR following their closure. Instead, the UNSC established 
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT, 2010-present) to deal 
with these duties. Although rape was listed amongst the crimes within the parameters of 
these respective courts, to date, no such prosecutions have been brought. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, modern international criminal law has overall taken 
significant strides in its development. International criminal tribunals, for example, have 
evolved far beyond the earlier IMT and IMTFE models, particularly regarding the 
prosecution of rape as a war crime. Central to this change has been the establishment and 
subsequent actions of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. It seems plain that the gender 
make-up of the panels and their cultural origins has played a role in these decisions. 
Influenced by their judiciary as well as by the input of activists and I/NGOs, these bodies 
created their own definitions of rape as a war crime for their individual purposes. In turn, 
they reconceptualised the offence from a gendered property crime committed against the 
man who formally or effectively owned the woman to a gender-neutral crime committed 
against the victim in their own right. These specialist courts have established a precedent 
that has been built on by proceeding courts like the ECCC and the SCSL.   
The question remains whether the gender-neutral definitions of rape introduced by 
these bodies have changed how conflict-perpetrated rape is understood and prosecuted in 
international law in ways that makes the new will to prosecute effective. To answer this 
question, Chapter 4 analyses the definitions of rape evolved by the ICTY, the ICTR and 
the ICC. This analysis will inform the remaining chapters regarding how rape is currently 
understood as a crime in modern international law and to what extent the terms used to 







Modern Conceptualisations of Rape as a Crime in International Law 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter addressed the evolution of modern international criminal law from 
the creation of the UN in 1945 to the present day. It examined the founding of modern 
specialist international criminal tribunals as well as their response to conflict-perpetrated 
rape. As the first organs to explore how rape as a war crime should be understood and 
defined in modern international law, emphasis was placed on the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-
present), and their individual conceptualisations of the offence (Appendix 1). Moving the 
discussion forward, this chapter examines these different definitions of rape in further 
detail as well as their application by these respective specialist courts, in order determine 
whether rape has been successfully recast and prosecuted as a gender-neutral crime 
committed against an individual in their own right. Particular attention will be paid to the 
categorisation and prosecution of rape as a crime of torture, outrage upon human dignity 
and sexual violence.  
Central to the effective prosecution of a crime is not only how that offence is 
defined in law but also how that definition is understood and applied in the courts. Though 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC all framed rape as gender-neutral, trial records and 
prosecutions outcomes both suggest that traditional heteronormative understandings of 
rape as a crime continue to have an impact. It has already been mentioned that male-female 
rape, for example, is often prosecuted as rape or rape along with another type of offence, 





overlooked or prosecuted as something other than rape, for example, torture. Female-
perpetrated is largely ignored. The categorisation of rape as a form of sexual violence adds 
a further level of confusion, because the terms ‘rape’ and ‘sexual violence’ are at times 
used interchangeably, with little clarification of the reasoning behind this switching. One 
consideration for this chapter is how these different outcomes are linked to the language 
used to define rape by the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. Another is how these definitions 
are applied by the specialist international tribunals, particularly where rape is prosecuted 
under a category of international law. Attention will be paid to the background and gender 
of the judges, given their responsibilities in shaping the definitions created by these 
respective bodies, and their application. 
 
(a) The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ICTR provided the first definition of rape in 
international law in the Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998).1 In developing its 
definition of rape, the Trial Chamber2 referred to domestic definitions for guidance. It 
established that in certain national jurisdictions, rape was defined as non-consensual sexual 
intercourse.3 In the context of the Rwandan genocide, the Trial Chamber stated its belief 
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that this definition was insufficient.4 It concluded that the central elements of the offence 
could not be ‘captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts’.5 Instead, the 
so-called ‘conceptual’ approach adopted in the UN Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984,6 where the harm caused 
by an act is focused on rather than the specific acts, body parts and objects used in to 
commit such crimes, was favoured (see Appendix 1).7   
The ICTR Akayesu definition distinguished between on the one hand rape as a 
crime of genocide, crime against humanity or war crime and on the other hand domestic 
rape.8 The Trial Chamber determined that non-consent is immaterial in international 
criminal law given the oppressive and violent context in which rape is committed as an 
instrument of genocide, a crime against humanity and a war crime.9 It focused instead on 
the issue of coercion:10 
[C]oercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. 
Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain 
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official capacity’. 
7 The term ‘conceptual’ is used in the Akayesu (Trial Judgment), paras 597; 687. It was also referred to in 
the Furundžija (Trial Judgment), para 176. 
8 Valerie Oosterveld, ‘The Influence of Domestic Legal Traditions on the Gender Jurisprudence of 
International Criminal Tribunals’, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, (2013), 
2(4), 825-49, p.828. 
9 Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the 
Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR, (Antwerpen and Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), p.170; Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, ‘Defining Rape Internationally’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, (2006), 44(3), 940-
58, p.950; Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘The Recognition of Rape as an Act of Genocide – Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu’, Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor, The Hague, 27 October 2008, New 
England Journal of International and Comparative Law, (2008), 14(2), 101-10, p.102. 
10 Phillip Weiner, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in International Criminal Law’, 





circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe 
among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.11  
The term ‘invasion’ was employed to broaden the definition of rape beyond ‘sexual acts 
involving penetration’ making it inclusive and flexible.12 Such wording is also usefully 
symbolic of the different types of activities associated with war and conquest, including 
the invasion of territory. Using the language of ‘victim’, ‘person’ and ‘perpetrator’ also 
ensured that rape was clearly framed as gender-neutral.13 
Since its inception, the Akayesu definition of rape has attracted much comment 
from various experts, including Richard Ashby. Focusing on the construction of the 
definition, he points to a deficiency in the Tribunal’s methodological approach.14 When 
creating the definition, for example, the Trial Chamber did not address the conflicting 
national standards. Nor did it provide examples of national jurisdictions that had changed 
the definition of rape in their penal codes. An analysis by the ICTR of how national 
jurisdictions had revised the definition of rape and what implications this development had 
for war crimes prosecutions is notably missing from its deliberations.15 The ways in which 
interpretations have evolved and how they have been understood and applied in domestic 
case law, Anne-Marie De Brouwer explains, is also absent. Although the ICTR claimed to 
have taken account of national legal developments to broaden the definition of rape they 
named no examples.16 Chile Eboe-Osuji, a judge of the ICC, suggests that in making this 
claim, the court was referring to the concept of sexual autonomy, where any act that might 
                                                          
11 Akayesu (Trial Judgment), para 688. 
12 De Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution, p.131. 
13 Ibid, p.133. 
14 Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
15 Akayesu (Trial Judgment), paras 596; 686. Wilson points out that the ICTR notably failed so to do in a 
number of areas, including definitions of genocide, and that its grasp of both Rwandan and wider African 
history was ‘misplaced’. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials, pp.24; 39; 170-2. 





satisfy a perpetrator’s sexual needs, and have a traumatic and humiliating impact on the 
victim, in defining what constitutes rape.17 Certainly sexual autonomy of the individual 
has become the focus of rape in some, but not all national jurisdictions.18 The ICTR 
adopted a broad definition of rape presumably to integrate this new conceptualisation of 
the crime and to allow the possibility of including other types of sexual violence as the 
normative standard for defining rape.19 For Mia Swart, the Akayesu definition ‘appreciates 
that physical force is not always required: coercion may be inherent in certain 
circumstances such as armed conflict in which the victim finds him or herself.’20 
The ICTY also examined the Akayesu definition. Though the former Yugoslavian 
Tribunal initially accepted the definition as providing an accurate conceptualisation of 
rape,21 the Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (1998)22 (to be discussed 
later in the chapter) determined that the ICTR’s summarisation was insufficiently specific 
and so violated the legality principle for the purposes of undertaking rape prosecutions.23 
While the Trial Chamber in Akayesu to some extent addressed the actus reus of the crime,24 
it did not by definition address the mens rea of the crime25 – what the ICTY identified as 
                                                          
17 The Trial Chamber in Kunarac stated that ‘they understood the “sexual autonomy” of the victim as the 
“true” objective of the law against rape’. See Eboe-Osuji, International Law and Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflicts, p.147. 
18 De Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution, p.110. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Swart, Judges and Lawmaking at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, p.228. 
21 The Akayesu definition was initially upheld by the ICTY in the Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić aka 
‘Pavo’, Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo aka ‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalić (Trial Judgment), IT-96-21-T, ICTY, 16 
November 1998, paras 478-9. 
22 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija (Trial Judgment), IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY, 10 December 1998. The Trial 
Chamber reiterated this point in the Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković 
(2001), explaining that such an understanding made it too exhaustive. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, 
Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Trial Judgment), IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, 22 February 
2001, paras 174-86. 
23 Ibid, para 177; Hilmi M. Zawati, Fair Labelling and the Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes 
at the International Criminal Tribunals, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.43.  
24 ‘While rape has been defined in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual intercourse, variations 
on the act of rape may include acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices 
not considered to be intrinsically sexual.’ Akayesu (Trial Judgment), para 596 





‘the state of mind statutorily required in order to convict a particular defendant of a 
particular crime.’26 Instead, ICTR had simply stated as a basis for prosecution that ‘[l]ike 
torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, 
discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person.’27 For the ICTY, this 
qualification failed to explicitly address the intention or knowledge of the perpetrator in 
terms of what it saw as key issues, such as force, threat of force and coercion. Attempting 
to provide what it considered a clear legally robust definition of the rape, the ICTY created 
the Furundžija definition – a so-called ‘mechanical’ definition,28 which describes the 
specific acts, body parts and objects used in rape (see Appendix 1).29  
The Furundžija definition was unsurprisingly rejected by the ICTR in the 
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (2000).30 The Trial Chamber stated that the Akayesu 
definition was preferable because it encompasses all conduct addressed in the ICTY 
Furundžija definition of rape but also allows for more violations to be included.31 It 
suggested that there was a growing trend in national jurisdictions to expand the definition 
of rape.32 The Trial Chamber concluded that the Akayesu definition was most appropriate 
                                                          
26 Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/mens_rea, (accessed 
24 August 2019). 
27 Akayesu (Trial Judgment), para 597. 
28 ICTY employed this term to distinguish between its definition and the ICTR Akayesu definition. 
Furundžija (Trial Judgment), para 176. 
29 The Furundžija definition will be discussed in detail later in this Chapter. 
30 Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-96-13-T, ICTR, 27 January 2000 was 
heard by The Trial Chamber, which consisted of Judge Aspegren (presiding), Judge Kama and Judge 
Pillay (the same panel that heard the Akayesu trial). Musema was initially found guilty of rape as a crime 
against humanity (Count 7), among other crimes, and given a single sentence of life imprisonment, 
although he was found not guilty of the charge on appeal. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (Appeal 
Judgment), ICTR-96-13-A, ICTR, 16 November 2001, p.137. Heard by a male only panel: Judge Claude 
Jorda (French, presiding), Judge Lal Chand Vohrah (Malaya), Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana), 
Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia (Columbia) and Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy). See Appendix 2. 
31 Musema (Judgment and Sentence), para 226. 





because it better accommodates the ‘evolving norms of criminal justice.’33 However, no 
clarification was provided for what the ICTR understood as ‘evolving norms’.34  
Following the Musema Judgment, however, the ICTR seemingly struggled to 
accept the Akayesu definition for rape. In 2003, in the Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza,35 
the Trial Chamber stated that while the ‘mechanical style of defining rape was originally 
rejected by this Tribunal,’36 it found the comparative analysis in the ICTY Prosecutor v. 
Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (2001)37 to be persuasive.38 The 
Trial Chamber therefore adopted the Kunarac definition of rape (to be discussed later in 
the chapter),39 which removed the element of coercion, force and threat of force listed in 
the ICTY Furundžija definition and included instead the element of consent (see Appendix 
1).  
One day after the Semanza Judgment, the Trial Chamber altered its position in the 
Prosecutor v. Eliézer Niyitegeka (2003)40 and used the Akayesu definition, without 
clarifying the reasons for this choice.41 Later that year, the Trial Chamber again changed 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 The Trial Chamber included Judge Yakov Ostrovsky (presiding, Russia), Judge Lloyd G. Williams QC 
(Jamaica) and Judge Pavel Dolenc (Slovenia) – an all-male and predominantly white panel. The accused 
was found guilty for instigating rape as a crime against humanity (Count 10) and instigating torture by rape 
(Count 11) and sentenced to seven and ten years’ imprisonment respectively (see Appendix 2). Sentences 
served consecutively to the other concurrent sentences. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza (Judgment and 
Sentence), ICTR-97-20-T, ICTR, 15 May 2003, para 588. Semanza’s conviction for rape as a crime against 
humanity was upheld on appeal. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza (Appeal Judgment), ICTR-97-20-A, 
ICTR, 20 May 2005. Heard by Judge Theodor Meron (presiding, US), Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen 
(Guyana), Judge Mehmet Güney (Turkey), Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy), and Judge Inés Mónica Weinberg 
de Roca (Argentina) (the only female on the bench). See Appendix 2. 
36 Semanza (Judgment and Sentence), para 345. 
37 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Trial Judgment), IT-96-23-T & 
IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, 22 February 2001. 
38 Semanza (Judgment and Sentence), para 345. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The case was presided over by Navanethem Pillay alongside Erik Marse and Andrksia Vaz. Prosecutor 
v. Eliézer Niyitegeka (Judgement and Sentence), ICTR-96-14-T, ICTR, 16 May 2003. 
41 Ibid, para 456. The accused was found Guilty Of Crimes Against Humanity Other Inhumane Acts 
(Count 8) (which included acts of ‘sexual violence’, see paras 467; 480) and Not Guilty Of Rape As A 
Crime Against Humanity (Count 7); Not Guilty of Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Count 9); Not Guilty of Serious Violations of Article 3 





its stance in the Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli.42 It found that ‘[g]iven the evolution of 
the law in this area, culminating in the endorsement of the Furundžija/Kunarac approach 
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber,’ it supported the application of the Kunarac definition.43 
This standpoint was later echoed in the Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda (2004).44 
It has already been noted previously in the thesis that the profile of the different sitting 
judges influenced both definitions and trial outcomes, something which will be revisited 
later in this chapter in more detail.  
In 2005, for example, the ICTR revisited its choice in the Prosecutor v. Mikaeli 
Muhimana.45 The Trial Chamber determined: 
[T]he Akayesu definition and the Kunarac elements are not incompatible or 
substantially different in their application. Whereas Akayesu referred broadly to 
a ‘physical invasion of a sexual nature’, Kunarac went on to articulate the 
parameters of what would constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature 
                                                          
The ICTR later clarified that Counts 9 and 10 related to rape charges in the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution 
of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Office of the Prosecutor for 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (Arusha: ICTR, 2014), Appendix B. 
42 Heard by Judge William H. Sekule (presiding, Tanzania), Judge Winston C. Matanzima Maqutu 
(Lesboth) and Judge Arlette Ramaroson (Madagascar), the only female panellist. Prosecutor v. Juvénal 
Kajelijeli (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-98-44A-T, ICTR, 1 December 2003. Kajelijeli was found not 
guilty of rape as a crime against humanity (Count 7). See Appendix 2. 
43 Ibid, para 915. 
44 Again heard by Sekule (presiding), Maqutu and Ramaroson. Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda 
(Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-99-54A-T, ICTR, 22 January 2004, para 709. The accused was found Not 
Guilty Of Rape As A Crime Against Humanity (Count 6) and Outrage On Personal Dignity as Serious 
Violations Of Article 3 Common To The Geneva Conventions And Of Additional Protocol II (Count 8) 
among other crimes. See Appendix 2. 
45 Presided by Judge Khalida Rashid Khan (Pakistan), the only female on the panel, alongside Judge Lee 
Gacuiga Muthoga (Kenya) and Judge Emile Francis Short (Ghana), Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana 
(Trial Judgment), ICTR-95-1 B-T 550-1, ICTR, 28 April 2005. The accused was found Guilty Of Rape As 
A Crime Against Humanity (Count 3) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Mikaeli 
Muhimana (Appeal Judgement), ICTR-95-1B-A, ICTR, 21 May 2007. The Appeal Chamber reversed the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that he bears criminal responsibility for the rapes of Goretti Mukashyaka and 
Languida Kamukina; affirmed unanimously his conviction for rape as a crime against humanity (Count 3) 
in all other respects; and affirmed unanimously his sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of his life 
entered for that conviction. Heard by an all-male panel, consisting of Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy, presiding), 
Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana), Judge Mehmet Güney (Turkey), Judge Liu Daqun (China) and 





amounting to rape. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Chamber endorses 
the conceptual definition of rape established in Akayesu, which encompasses 
the elements set out in Kunarac.46 
Though the Akayesu definition was applied in this case it is not because the Trial Chamber 
condemned the Kunarac definition. Rather, it determined that the respective definitions 
were complimentary. The Trial Chamber simply preferred the Akayesu definition in this 
instance.   
Once more, in 2006, the Trial Chamber reconsidered the Akayesu definition in the 
Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi,47 and determined that the Kunarac definition was to be 
applied in this case.48 The Kunarac definition was subsequently applied in the Prosecutor 
v. Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva 
(2008),49 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho (2009),50 and Prosecutor v. Augustin 
Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Bizimungu, François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, and Innocent 
                                                          
46 Muhimana (Trial Judgment), paras 550-1.  
47 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-00-55A-T, ICTR, 12 September 2006. 
48 Ibid, para 522. Not Guilty of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 4). Heard by Judge Asoka de 
Silva (Sri Lanka, presiding), alongside two female judges - Flavia Lattanzi (Italian) and Florence Rita 
Arrey (Cameroon). 
49 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Gratien Kabiligi, Aloys Ntabakuze and Anatole Nsengiyumva 
(Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-98-41-T, ICTR, 18 December 2008. Bagosora was found Guilty Of Rape 
as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 7) among other crimes. He was given a single sentence of life 
imprisonment. Kabiligi found Not Guilty Of Rape As A Crime Against Humanity (Count 6); Ntabakuze 
found Not Guilty Of Rape As A Crimes Against Humanity (Count 6); Nsengiyumva found Not Guilty Of 
Rape As A Crimes Against Humanity (Count 7), para 2199. Heard by an all-male panel, Judge Erik Møse 
(Norway, presiding), Judge Jai Ram Reddy (Fiji) and Judge Sergei Alekseevich Egorov (Russian 
Federation). Bagosora’s conviction for rape was affirmed on appeal - Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora 
and Anatole Nsengiyumva (Appeal Judgment), ICTR-98-41-A, ICTR, 14 December 2011. Heard again by 
an all-male panel, Judge Theodor Meron (US, presiding), Judge Patrick Robinson (Jamaica), Judge 
Mehmet Güney (Turkey), Judge Fausto Pocar (Italy) and Judge Liu Daqun (China).  
50 Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-97-31-T, ICTR, 14 July 2009, para 
791-2. 812; 826. Guilty of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 4); Guilty of Serious Violations of 
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (Rape) (Count 6). Given a single 
sentence life imprisonment. Heard by Heard by Judge Erik Møse (Norway, presiding), Judge Sergei 
Alekseevich Egorov (Russian Federation) and Judge Florence Rita Arrey (Cameroon), the only female 
sitting on the panel. For the appeal judgment, see Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho (Appeal Judgment), 
ICTR-97-31-A, ICTR, 1 April 2011. Heard by an all-male panel, Judge Carmel Agius (Malta, presiding), 





Sagahutu (2011).51 In the ground-breaking Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène 
Shalom Ntahobali, Sylvain Nsabimana, Alphonse Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi and Elie 
Ndayambaje (2011),52 where the ICTR for the first time found a woman guilty of rape for 
using her political position to commission acts of rape, the Kunarac definition was also 
applied without clarification.53 This definition was later used in 2012, in the Prosecutor v. 
Édouard Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse54 and the Prosecutor v. Augustin 
Ngirabatware.55 
                                                          
51 Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Bizimungu, François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye, and 
Innocent Sagahutu (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-00-56-T, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para 2121; 2162; 2265 
Augustin Bizimungu Guilty of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 6); Guilty of Rape as a 
Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Count 8), and 
sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye Not Guilty of Rape as a Crime 
Against Humanity (Count 6): Not Guilty of Rape as a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Count 8). Innocent Sagahutu Not Guilty of Rape as a Crime 
Against Humanity (Count 6); Not Guilty of Rape as a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Count 8). Heard by Judge Asoka de Silva (Sri Lanka, 
presiding), Judge Seon Ki Park (South Korea) and Judge Taghrid Hikmet (Jordan), the only female on the 
panel. For Appeal Judgment, see Prosecutor v. Augustin Bizimungu (Appeal Judgment), ICTR-00-56B-A, 
ICTR, 30 June 2014. Heard by Judge Theodor Meron (US, presiding), Judge Liu Daqun (China), Judge 
Carmel Agius (Malta), Judge Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov (Russia), and Judge Khalida Rashid Khan 
(Pakistan), the only female on the panel.  
52 Heard by Judge Sekule (presiding, Tanzania), alongside two female judges, Ramaroson (Madagascar) 
and Solomy Balungi Bossa (Uganda). Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène Shalom Ntahobali, 
Sylvain Nsabimana, Alphonse Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi and Elie Ndayambaje, (Judgment and 
Sentence), ICTR-98-42-T, 24 June 2011, paras 6177-86; 6271. The ICTR charged Nyiramasuhuko, former 
Minster of Family and Women’s Development for Rwanda, for using her political position to commission 
acts of rape as a violation of human dignity. Nyiramasuhuko was the first woman charged and prosecuted 
for rape as a crime against humanity (Count 7) and as Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the 
Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II Thereto (Outrages upon Personal Dignity) (Count 11). 
She was later found guilty and given a single sentence of life imprisonment. For his role, Nyiramasuhuko’s 
son, Ntahobali, was also charged with rape as a crime against humanity (Count 7) and as Serious 
Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II Thereto 
(Outrages upon Personal Dignity) (Count 11), and given a single sentence of life imprisonment. See also 
Alona Hagay-Frey, Sex and Gender Crimes in the New International Law: Past, Present, Future, (Lieden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), p.100.  
53 Nyiramasuhuko et al. (Judgment and Sentence), para 6075. 
54 Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-98-44-T, 
ICTR, 2 February 2012, para 1676. Karemera Guilty of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 5) – 
single sentence of life imprisonment; Ngirumpatse Guilty of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 5) 
– single sentence of life imprisonment, paras 1714-5. Heard by Judge Dennis C.M. Byron (St Kitts and 
Nevis, presiding), Judge Gberdao Gustave Kam (Burkina Faso) and Judge Vagn Joensen (Denmark). For 
Appeal Judgment see, Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera and Matthieu Ngirumpatse (Appeal Judgment), 
ICTR-98-44-A, ICTR, 29 September 2014. Heard by Judge Theodor Meron (US, presiding), Judge Fausto 
Pocar (Italy), Judge Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov (Russia), Judge Koffi Kumelio A. Afande (Togo) and 
Judge Arlette Ramaroson (Madagascar), the only female on the panel. 
55 Prosecutor v. Augustin Ngirabatware (Judgment and Sentence), ICTR-99-54, ICTR, 20 December 2012, 
para 1381. Guilty of Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 6) single sentence of 35 years’ 





Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, the ICTR did establish a firm position 
regarding the categorisation of rape notably in that the Tribunal found that rape is a form 
of sexual violence. Clarifying what it considers to be ‘sexual violence’ in the absence of a 
statutory definition in international law, the Akayesu Trial Chamber described the offence 
as, ‘as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances 
which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body 
and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.’56 The 
Tribunal also established that rape may constitute torture57 as well as an outrage upon 
human dignity.58  
Despite these findings, ICTR rarely and inconsistently prosecuted rape on such 
grounds. For example, of the cases discussed above, only one individual was prosecuted 
and convicted by the ICTR for rape and rape as an act of torture.59 Though rape was 
occasionally charged and prosecuted as constituting an outrage upon human dignity, the 
success rate was not encouraging. Convictions were few.60 It is difficult to discern with 
                                                          
Mparany Rajohnson (Madagascar) and Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa (Uganda), the only female on the 
panel. 
56 Akayesu (Trial Judgment), para 688; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, Dragoljub Prcać, Milojica Kos, 
Mlađo Radić and Zoran Žigić (Trial Judgment), IT-98-30/1-T, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para 180. See 
also Patricia Viseur Sellers, ‘The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict: The Importance of Human 
Rights as Means of Interpretation’, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, (2012), 1-41: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/Paper_Prosecution_of_Sexual_Violence.pdf, 
(accessed 27 August 2019), p.5; fn 5. In contrast, the ICC did not refer to any specific acts in its definition 
of sexual violence. Instead, it simply referenced acts of a sexual nature. See ICC, Elements of Crimes, 
2011, Article 7 (1) (g)-6, Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)-6, Article 8 (2) (e) (vi)-6. 
57 Semanza (Trial Judgement), para 485, (upheld on appeal). 
58 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Best Practices Manual for 
the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions, Appendix B. 
59 Ibid; Semanza (Judgment and Sentence), para 481-5; 553. 
60 For example, though Niyitegeka was found guilty of Guilty of crimes against humanity other inhumane 
acts, including ‘sexual violence’(Count 8), he was found not guilty of (among other crimes) rape as a 
violation of common Article 3, outrages upon personal dignity (Count 10); Kamuhanda, was found not 
guilty of Rape, outrage upon personal dignity as a serious violation of common Article 3 (Count 8) as well 
as Rape as a crime against humanity (Count 6), para 745; Nyiramasuhuko et al., (Judgment and Sentence), 
Nyiramasuhuko was found guilty of rape as a crime against humanity (Count 7) and as Serious Violations 
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II Thereto (Outrages upon 
Personal Dignity, rape and indecent assault) (Count 11). Ntahobali, was also charged with rape as a crime 
against humanity (Count 7) and as Serious Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions 
and of Additional Protocol II Thereto (Outrages upon Personal Dignity, rape and indecent assault) (Count 





certainty the rationale behind the Tribunal’s decision to prosecute so few cases of rape as 
a form of torture or as an outrage of personal dignity. The use of the term ‘sexual violence’ 
to describe instances of rape adds another layer of confusion as the terms are used, at times, 
interchangeably, which leads one to question the significance of this categorisation. In 
Niyitegeka, for example, an act of rape committed on the body of a deceased woman was 
described as sexual violence in the Judgment, not rape.61 The wider significance of 
describing rape as a form of sexual violence in Niyitegeka remains unclear currently. In 
Renzaho, rape was subsumed under the heading of sexual violence.62 In other cases, rape 
was distinguished from other forms of sexual violence.63 
In contrast, no incidents of male-male rape were prosecuted by the Tribunal, 
despite the prevalence of such acts during the Rwandan Genocide.64 This absence could 
be linked to local attitudes towards same sex intercourse and the Tribunal’s sensitivity 
towards such viewpoints. Though homosexuality is not criminalised in Rwanda, it remains 
a taboo.65 Suspected members of the LGBTQI community are often arrested under public 
order and moral clauses in the Penal Code.66 As a result, ‘gay men do not dare publicly 
reveal their sexual orientation because of the stigma associated with homosexuality’.67 
Indeed, while female rape victims are often stigmatised, it is more likely that their case 
                                                          
Law: Past, Present, Future, (Lieden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), p.100. The Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICTR clarified the charges and prosecution results in each of these cases in the Best 
Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict 
Regions. 
61 Niyitegeka (Trial Judgment), paras 287; 477. 
62 Renzaho (Trial Judgment), section (xiv); paras 25-6. 
63 In Niyitegeka the crimes identified as rape and sexual violence by the Tribunal were separated. See 
Niyitegeka (Trial Judgment). 
64 Richard J. Goldstone, ‘Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime,’ Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law, (2002), 34(3), 277-86, p.277. 
65 Brian Crawford, Rwanda - Culture Smart!: The Essential Guide to Customs & Culture, (London: 
Kuperard, 2019), p.56. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Rwanda: Situation of sexual minorities and 
treatment of this group by society and the authorities; legislation, state protection and support services 





will be investigated than one involving a gay man.68 These attitudes towards homosexual 
men might explain the ICTR’s lack of will to not only explore allegations of male-male 
rape, but for such victims to come forward. 
Another possible explanation could be linked to the judiciary. Indeed, a number of 
the ICTR judges come from states where homosexuality is illegal, including Senegal, 
Jamaica, Tanzania, Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda.69 Other judges come from 
countries where homosexuality is, like in Rwanda, held as a taboo.70 In light of the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, it is quite reasonable to assume that their 
background may have influenced their decision to overlook such incidents.  
On balance, while the ICTR made significant gains in the prosecution of rape as a 
crime in international law, there are visible inconsistencies in its prosecution strategies and 
outcomes, particularly with respect to its apparent reluctance to prosecute rape as a form 
of torture or outrage upon human dignity. 
 
(b) The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  
Turning to the ICTY, in 1998, following the ICTR’s creation of the Akayesu definition of 
rape, the ICTY introduced the Furundžija definition (Appendix 1).71 The Tribunal 
concluded that in order to create a definition of rape that would be accurate and legally 
robust in international law, certain principles of criminal law common to ‘the major legal 
systems of the world’ needed to be examined.72 The Trial Chamber established that of the 
                                                          
68 For a broad discussion of homosexuality and male-male rape, see Michael Scarce, Male on Male Rape: 
The Hidden Toll of Stigma and Shame, (New York, NY: Perseus Books, 1997); Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
‘Male/Male Rape and the “Taint” of Homosexuality’, Human Rights Quarterly, (2005), 27(4), 1274-306. 
69 Human Dignity Trust: https://www.humandignitytrust.org/lgbt-the-law/map-of-criminalisation/, 
(accessed 17 August 2020). 
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penal codes surveyed, the majority of national jurisdictions consider rape to be ‘the 
forcible sexual penetration of the human body by the penis or the forcible insertion of any 
other object into either the vagina or the anus’.73 
In developing the definition, the Trial Chamber surveyed eighteen different penal 
codes of rape, including Zambia, Italy, and England and Wales – the respective nation 
states of those judges hearing the case: Judge Florence Ndepele Mwachande Mumba 
(presiding), the only female sitting on the panel, alongside Judge Richard May and Judge 
Antonio Cassese. No explanation is given for why the codes of these particular states 
were chosen by the ICTY as opposed to others. Whether those codes were analysed in 
terms of national case law application remains unclear.74 Though the Trial Chamber in 
Furundžija addressed the actus rea of rape,75 the mens rea was only identified in terms 
of clarifying the charges of aiding and abetting rape, not rape in general.76  
The Furundžija definition has also been criticised for including the elements of 
force, threat of force and coercion.77 The Trial Chamber stated that all jurisdictions 
surveyed ‘require an element of force, coercion, threat, or acting without the consent of 
the victim: force is given a broad interpretation and includes rendering the victim 
helpless.’78 This framework was considered too vague by its critics, because it leaves 
unclear what the ICTY considers to constitute force, threat of force or coercion.  
                                                          
73 Ibid, para 181. 
74 The ICTY examined the definitions of rape found in the case law and penal codes of Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, China, England and Wales, France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, South Africa, Uganda 
and Zambia; see Furundžija (Trial Judgment), fns 207-14. It provides no justification or explanation for its 
selection. See Oosterveld, ‘Influence of Domestic Legal Traditions’, pp.828-30. 
75 Furundžija (Trial Judgment), para 180, later expressed in the Furundžija definition of rape, para 185. 
76 Ibid, paras 236-49. 
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Responding to such criticisms, in Kunarac79 the judges on the Bench (Judge 
Mumba, presiding alongside Judge Pocar, Italy and Judge Hunt, Australia) re-examined 
the national criminal codes previously considered in developing the Furundžija Judgment 
and a further twenty codes, this time including Australia, reflecting the role of Judge 
Hunt.80 The Kunarac Trial Chamber did note that other factors could result in an act of 
sexual penetration being adjudged as a crime of rape.81 The Trial Chamber, for example, 
found that in domestic law, the fundamental principle was often not force, threat of force 
or coercion. Rather, ‘absence of consent or voluntary participation’82 (a defilement of 
sexual autonomy)83 was required: 
[T]he Furundžija definition, although appropriate to the circumstances of that 
case, is in one respect more narrowly stated than is required by international 
law. In stating that the relevant act of sexual penetration will constitute rape 
only if accompanied by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or 
a third person, the Furundžija definition does not refer to other factors which 
would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-voluntary on 
the part of the victim, which… is in the opinion of this Trial Chamber the 
accurate scope of this aspect of the definition in international law.84  
                                                          
79 Kunarac, Kovač, and Vuković were charged for their roles in the commission of crimes against the 
Bosnian Muslim civilians between 1992 and 1993. Kunarac was sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment for 
crimes against humanity (torture, rape, enslavement), and war crimes (torture and rape). Kovač was 
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for war crimes of rape and outrages upon personal dignity, and 
crimes against humanity of enslavement and rape. Vuković was found guilty of torture and rape as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. Kunarac (Trial 
Judgment). 
80 The additional penal codes within the following states were also examined: Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Korea (region not specified), New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States 
and Uruguay. Ibid, paras 443-4; 447-51; 453-56. See Oosterveld, ‘Influence of Domestic Legal 
Traditions’, p.831. 
81 Kunarac (Trial Judgment), paras 438; 457. 
82 Ibid, para 440. 
83 Ibid, para 457. 





The Trial Chamber also reflected that non-consent is a central element of the mens rea of 
the crime: ‘the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs 
without the consent of the victim.’85 The Trial Chamber therefore removed the element of 
force, threat of force or coercion and added the element of non-consent: ‘where such sexual 
penetration occurs without the consent of the victim’.86 Providing further clarification, the 
Trial Chamber stated that consent must be ‘given voluntarily as a result of the victim’s free 
will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances’.87  
Pursuant to the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE, 1994),88 which 
provide detailed rules for the Tribunal, consent shall not be allowed as a defence in cases 
of sexual assault if the victim: 
(a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, 
duress, detention or psychological oppression;  
or  
(b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so 
subjected, threatened or put in fear.89 
The inclusion of the element of consent in the ICTY Kunarac definition has provoked 
much criticism from experts such as Valerie Oosterveld, pointing out that a focus on non-
consent is the core or central concern of many of domestic legislators.90 For Kirsten Boon, 
consent and any issues relating to consent are invalid in war crimes prosecutions. She 
explains that crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are 
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International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.50, 8 July 2015. 
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fundamentally coercive. In armed conflict, it is legally irrelevant to question whether an 
individual has consented to a transaction under coercion, because acts of force are inherent 
to conflict and undermine principles of human dignity.91 It is redundant to include in a 
definition of rape an element that will be automatically proven once the jurisdiction for a 
prosecution has been agreed as being a crime of genocide or a crime against humanity.92 
The all-male panel in the Kunarac Appeal (2002)93 observed that ‘the circumstances 
giving rise to the instant appeal and that prevail in most cases charged as either war crimes 
or crimes against humanity will be almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent 
will not be possible.’94 It removes the potential for the accused to provide themselves with 
a possible means of defence.95 Excluding consent, it has been noted on the other hand, may 
result in an ‘over-inclusion of victims’ and a neglect of the defendants’ rights.96  
Another challenge is that the ICTY omitted to include the age that an individual 
can legally consent to sexual intercourse. This lack of clarification on age of consent is a 
major problem for an agreed international jurisprudence, because age of consent to sex 
differs widely between states.97 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 198998 
previously attempted to address this issue. Under Article 1 of the Convention, ‘a child 
                                                          
91 Kristen Boon, ‘Rape and Forced Pregnancy under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy and 
Consent’, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, (2001), 32, 625-75, pp.654-5. 
92 Ibid; Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson, ‘Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under International 
Criminal Law’, American Journal of International Law, (2007), 101(1), 121-40, p.128. 
93 Members were Judge Claude Jorda, (presiding, France), Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen (Guyana), 
Judge Wolfgang Schomburg (Germany), Judge Mehmet Güney (Turkey), and Judge Theodor Meron (US). 
Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Appeal Judgment), IT-96-23 & IT-
96-23/1-A, ICTY, 12 June 2002. 
94 Ibid, para 130. 
95 For issues relating to consent as a form of defence, see Dana Berliner, ‘Rethinking the Reasonable Belief 
Defense to Rape’, Yale Law Journal, (1991), 100(8), 2687-706, p.2689. 
96 Oosterveld, ‘Influence of Domestic Legal Traditions’, p.832. 
97 Even within national jurisdictions, the age of consent issue has been, historically, and remains a 
challenging issue. See Kim Stevenson, ‘Not Just the Ideas of a Few Enthusiasts’: Early Twentieth Century 
Legal Activism and Reformation of the Age of Sexual Consent’, Cultural and Social History, (2017), 
14(2), 219-36; Kim Stevenson, Anne Davies and Michael Gunn, Blackstone’s Guide To The Sexual 
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means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier’.99 This provision permits ambiguity. Whilst Article 
34 stipulates that states are responsible for protecting ‘the child from all forms of sexual 
exploitation and abuse’,100 Article 1 negates the force of this commitment. Moreover, 
states such as Somalia, South Sudan and the US have yet to ratify the Convention. Despite 
this lack of clarity and agreement regarding age of consent to sex, there is no identifiable 
move to establish a clear standard.101 This absence makes it difficult to determine whether 
and when an individual is lawfully capable of consenting to sex. Alternatively, though this 
is never explicitly stated, it may well be that the ICTY Trial Chamber took note of the 
local legal age of consent but, to avoid further controversy, chose not to acknowledge this 
dimension. 
The ICTY has also been criticised for adopting the term ‘penetration’102 rather than 
‘invasion’, even though the term ‘invasion’ has only been thus far used to broaden the 
definition of rape beyond ‘sexual acts involving penetration’.103 The Tribunal aimed to 
provide a gender-neutral definition of rape.104 It therefore excluded reference to specific 
genders performing specific acts. Conversely, it aimed to incorporate language which 
closely reflects the terminology used in national definitions.105 The Furundžija Trial 
Chamber found that, ‘[t]he laws of several jurisdictions state that the actus reus of rape 
                                                          
99 Ibid, Article 1. 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sonja Grover, Humanity’s Children. ICC Jurisprudence and 
the Failure to Address the Genocidal Forcible Transfer of Children, (Berlin: Springer, 2012), pp.123-30. 
102 Furundžija (Trial Judgment), para 185; Kunarac (Trial Judgment), para 460. 
103 For a discussion on penetration, see De Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution, pp.115; 131. 
The Akayesu definition used the term ‘invasion’ instead of penetration. Akayesu (Trial Judgment), paras 
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consists of the penetration, however slight, of the female sexual organ by the male sexual 
organ’,106 which was later upheld in the Kunarac case.107 Nancy Farwell argues that the 
term ‘penetration’ reintroduces the traditional idea of rape as a crime of honour in 
international law.108 As Gay McDougall observes, ‘the historic focus on the act of 
penetration largely derives from a male preoccupation with assuring women’s chastity and 
ascertaining paternity of children’.109 This understanding lessens the seriousness of the 
offence.110  
Returning to the issue of penetration, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Furundžija stated 
that ‘the forced penetration of the mouth by the male sexual organ constitutes a most 
humiliating and degrading attack upon human dignity.’111 It determined that as an 
‘extremely serious sexual outrage’, ‘forced oral penetration should be classified as rape’.112 
Some experts criticise the Tribunal for failing to address other types of sexual penetration, 
including penetration of a vagina with a tongue or finger. Anne-Marie de Brouwer points 
out that several national jurisdictions include other types of forced oral sex in their 
                                                          
106 Ibid, para 180, (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber referenced the following codes: Section 375 of the 
Pakistani Penal Code 1995; Article 375 of the Indian Penal Code; The Law of South Africa, W.A. Joubert 
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Hastings Women’s Law Journal, (1994), 5(2), 243-66, p.249. 
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slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict: final report / submitted by Gay J. McDougall, 
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definitions of rape.113 Taking this observation further, the Furundžija Trial Chamber 
discerned that at national level, there is a trend to include other types of sexual offences, 
provided ‘they meet certain requirements, chiefly that of forced physical penetration.’114 
Yet both of the ICTY definitions preclude forced oral penetration with an object or body 
part, other than the penis,115 despite evidence of such acts taking place during the 
conflict.116 Again, this lack works to reinforce the male-perpetrator-female-victim 
stereotype. 
Others argue that too much emphasis on penetrative acts reinforces the idea that 
other acts involving sexual violence, but not penetration, are inherently less harmful.117 It 
makes it more difficult for rape victims to construct their case. For example, they may be 
required to discuss the crime in anatomical terms. Often either such language usage will 
not be within victim’s terminological knowledge or if the victim is equipped with this 
knowledge, they cannot display it in a ‘respectable’ way.118 Employment of the term 
‘invasion’ might work to explain what had happened to the victim in a way that satisfies 
the courts and be less damaging victims by emphasising the link to conflict.119 Yet it could 
also signal a departure from language that is traditionally associated heteronormative 
incidents of rape. 
                                                          
113 De Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution, p.115. 
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Moving beyond definitional concerns, the ICTY sought to address the broader 
categorisation of rape for its own prosecution purposes. In line with the precedent 
established by the ICTR, the Tribunal found that rape is a type of sexual violence and that 
the Akayesu definition of sexual violence was applicable.120  Also like the ICTR, the ICTY 
sometimes used rape and sexual violence interchangeably without accounting for this.121 
The Yugoslavian Tribunal also concluded that rape can constitute an outrage upon human 
dignity122 and a form of torture.123 Yet, like the Rwandan Tribunal, it rarely charged and 
prosecuted male-female rape on either of these grounds.124    
In contrast, the role of women as perpetrators was not recognised in a single 
prosecution, either under a charge of rape or any other cloaking prosecution device. In the 
Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić (2003),125 for example, the all-male Trial Chamber126 
established that Plavšić, former president of Republika Srpska, supported acts of rape 
amongst other crimes committed by Serbian forces against Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian 
Croat and other non-Serbs.127 Plavšić was charged only with crimes of genocide and 
                                                          
120 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka, Dragoljub Prcać, Milojica Kos, Mlađo Radić and Zoran Žigić (Trial 
Judgment), IT-98-30/1-T, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para 180. See also Patricia Viseur Sellers, ‘The 
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Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, (2012), 1-41: 
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Vigneswaran, ‘Annex B: Charges and Outcomes in ICTY Cases Involving Sexual Violence’, in Baron 
Serge Brammertz and Michelle Jarvis (eds), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 429-82; Oosterveld, ‘Sexual Violence Directed Against Men and 
Boys’, p.115. 
125 Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment), IT-00-39&40/1-S, ICTY, 27 February 2003.  
126 It consisted of Judge May (presiding), Judge Patrick Robinson (Jamaica) and Judge O-Gon Kwon 
(South Korea). 
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crimes against humanity, which took no account of the evidence indicating her complicity 
in crimes of rape.128 These charges were eventually dropped when she pleaded guilty to 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds as a crime against humanity. Plavšić 
was sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment.129 
Male-male rape was similarly either overlooked or described as something else 
other than rape, for example, torture. In the Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić aka ‘Pavo’, 
Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo aka ‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalić (1998),130 Mucić, Delić and Delalić 
were charged with acts of cruel and inhuman treatment for forced fellatio between two 
imprisoned brothers, rather than rape (see Appendix 2).131 Judge Adolphus G. Karibi-
Whyte, (presiding, Nigeria), Judge Saad Saood Jan (Pakistan) and Judge Elizabeth Odio 
Benito (Costa Rica), the only female on the panel, concluded that this offence ‘could 
constitute rape for which liability could have been found if pleaded in the appropriate 
manner’.132 Similarly, Police Chief Todorović was charged with rape as a crime against 
humanity,133 for forcing male detainees to perform oral sex on each other,134 and for forcing 
a detainee to bite another detainee’s penis.135 Heard by an all-male panel, including Judge 
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131 Ibid, paras 26; 1060-2; 1064-6. Though Mucić was initially found guilty of these charges, Delić and 
Delalić were not. Mucić’s charge for inhuman treatment was reversed on appeal. The cruel treatment 
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Landžo aka ‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalić (Appeal Judgment), IT-96-21-A, ICTY, 20 February 2001. 
132 Mucić et al. (Trial Judgment), para 1066, (emphasis added).   
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Patrick Robinson (presiding, Jamaica), Judge May and Judge Mohamed Fassi Fihri 
(Morrocco), these acts were later described as sexual assaults136 and charged a form of 
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds following a plea agreement from 
Todorović.137 This Judgment was referred to in the Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić, Miroslav 
Tadić and Simo Zarić (2003).138 The Trial Chamber, which consisted of two women 
judges, Mumba, (presiding) and Sharon A. Williams (Canada), and Judge Per-Johan 
Lindholm (Finland), described the anal rape of a detainee with an object as well as 
instances of forced oral sex between male detainees, and by detainees on Todorović as a 
form of sexual assault139 amounting to torture.140 In the Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić aka 
‘Tuta’, Vinko Martinović aka ‘Stela’ (2003),141 heard by Judge Liu Daqun (presiding, 
China) alongside two female judges, Maureen Clark (Republic of Ireland) and Fatoumata 
Diarra (Mali), forced oral sex between a male detainee and a soldier was not even described 
or charged as rape.142 It appears only as evidence to support prosecution of other crimes 
(see Appendix 2).  
Yet in the Prosecutor v. Ranko Češić (2004),143 the exclusively male bench made 
up of Judge Alphons Orie (presiding, the Netherlands), Judge Daqun and Judge Amin El 
Mahdi (Egypt) found the defendant guilty of rape and humiliating and degrading treatment 
for forcing144 two Muslim brothers to perform fellatio on one another in front of others.145 
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This apparent advancement in male-male rape prosecutions by the ICTY did not establish 
a definitive position. In the Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik (2006),146 another all-male 
bench consisting of Judge Orie (presiding), Judge Joaquín Martín Canivell (Spain) and 
Judge Claude Hanoteau (France) heard that Croat and Muslim male detainees were forced 
to perform sexual acts with one another in the presence of fellow detainees.147 No further 
information was provided for the types of sexual offences committed. These acts were 
broadly referred to as types of sexual violence and categorised as persecution through cruel 
or inhumane treatment.148 However, Judge Pocar (presiding), Judge Shahabuddeen, Judge 
Güney, Judge Meron and Judge Andrésia Vaz (Senegal) – the only female on the panel – 
reversed these charges on appeal.149 Moreover, in the Prosecutor v. Milan Martić 
(2007),150 heard by Judge Bakone Justice Moloto (presiding, South Africa), Judge Frank 
Höpfel (Austria) and Judge Janet Nosworthy (Jamaica), again the only woman sitting on 
the bench, evidence of male-male rape was entered only as a footnote (see Appendix 2).151 
Significantly, in the Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin (2004)152 – heard by Judge Carmel 
Agius (presiding, Malta) alongside two female judges, Ivana Janu (Czech Republic) and 
Chikako Taya (Japan) – the Trial Chamber considered evidence of a male being forced to 
rape a female prisoner, but determined that only the female was violated.153 
The judgment commentary and sentencing in these cases fail to explain why each 
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act was charged differently. In Mucić et al.,154 Mucić, pleaded not guilty and was sentenced 
to nine years’ imprisonment.155 Though seven years of the sentence was imposed for acts 
of cruel and inhumane treatment,156 the Judgment did not indicate what portion of the 
sentence was given for the crime of forced fellatio. The charge for inhuman treatment was 
later reversed on appeal, but the cruel treatment conviction was upheld (Appendix 2). The 
Simić et al. Judgment is equally vague. Simić pleaded guilty and received seventeen years’ 
imprisonment.157 Tadić and Zarić both pleaded not guilty and received eight and six years’ 
imprisonment, respectively.158 In Češić and Todorović, the defendants pleaded guilty159 
and received eighteen and ten years’ imprisonment each.160 Krajišnik pleaded not guilty 
and was sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment.161  
In all of the cases cited here, a range of other charges (including murder and 
torture)162 were listed in the sentencing. The sentence given for each offence is therefore 
indistinguishable. In some of the judgments, emphasis was not placed on the seriousness 
of the charges, but on mitigating factors and the indication of remorse.163 The sentencing 
could be linked to the rank of those individuals being prosecuted and the level of 
expectation to maintain discipline and honour amongst troops. Without clarification from 
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the courts, this possible explanation remains unsubstantiated. Though the details given on 
the composition of the judiciary in individual cases suggest that this could have influenced 
the outcome in each of these cases, measuring this dimension is equally challenging.   
Regardless, the Tribunal’s approach to male-male rape underlines wider problems 
regarding how such acts are understood and categorised in international law. By failing to 
prosecute male-male rape as rape, the sexual element of the crime is obscured as are other 
implicit assumptions about rape and responsibility.164 It reinforces the idea that rape as a 
sexual offence only affects women.165  
 
(c) The International Criminal Court 
As part of the ICC’s establishment in 2002, the Rome Statute listed the crimes, which the 
ICC should have jurisdiction over and provided clarification for what constitutes each of 
these crimes in its Elements of Crimes (EoC, 2002).166 The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE, 2002)167 were introduced to provide detailed rules for the Court.168 In 
evolving the EoC definition of rape (see Appendix 1),169 the ICC aimed to provide an 
approach which incorporated (assumed) domestic norms and international considerations 
and specificities.170 It referred to the Akayesu and Furundžija definitions of rape as well as 
national laws.171  
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Though the Court attempted to amalgamate all three areas of law and practice in 
order to achieve the best possible working definition, the EoC definition most resembles 
the Furundžija mechanical definition.172 Unlike the Furundžija definition, the EoC 
employed the term ‘invasion’173 in order to reinforce rape as gender-neutral.174 Despite its 
inclusive intentions, some critics argue that the term is redundant in this context, because 
the acts described in the EoC require ‘penetration of body parts by other body parts or 
objects’.175  
The EoC has also been criticised for introducing the element of consent as a form 
of defence.176 The definition of consent is provided in Rule 70 of the RPE, which states 
that in incidents involving sexual violence, including rape:  
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive 
environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine 
consent;177 
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim 
where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;  
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance 
by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence;  
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(d) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or 
witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or 
subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.178 
While Rule 70 seeks to provide a general standard for consent it avoids, as had the ICTY 
in Kunarac, to mention any age dimension to the concept of consent or its lack. It 
establishes only that ‘no inference of consent may be drawn from a lack of resistance or 
silence’, thereby avoiding the challenge involved in achieving an international consensus 
on age.179 The EoC reinforces this vagueness in the understanding of non-consent under 
coercive circumstances.180 On the one hand, Rule 70 prevents the use of consent as a form 
of defence when the victim is incapable of providing ‘genuine consent’ but it omits to 
clarify what amounts to consent that can be considered ‘genuine’.181 Only once it was 
established that the victim was capable of legally consenting, would consideration then be 
given to whether force, threats, or coercion prohibited the victim from exercising free will 
(though no clarification is provided regarding what constitutes force, threats, or coercion). 
In the event that these methods were used to secure consent, Rule 70 states that consent 
given is invalid. However, this statement is undermined by lack of precision over what 
constitutes capacity to give ‘genuine consent’ and lack of clarity on how this can be 
expressed in comprehensible terms. 
Though the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) of the ICC failed to expand 
on what is meant by the term ‘genuine consent’, the EoC provided clarification in its 
footnotes: ‘[i]t is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if 
affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity.’182 This description is challenging 
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because it remains unclear what the Court meant by the terms ‘natural’ and ‘induced’ 
incapacity or how these incapacities are understood and measured. Other barriers to 
providing ‘genuine consent’, such as different languages between the accused and alleged 
victims remain undiscussed. 
The EoC definition of enforced sterilisation,183 a form of sexual violence, 
introduced a second separate definition of ‘genuine consent’. It states that ‘“genuine 
consent” does not include consent obtained through deception.’184 In armed conflict, rape 
often occurs because of deception. During WWII, brothels were created in Nazi 
concentration camps. Women detainees were encouraged to participate in forced sexual 
labour under the fiction that they would be released after six months.185 At the same time, 
the Imperial Japanese Army established brothels, referred to as comfort stations, in 
occupied territories. Women and girls, known as ‘comfort women’, were subsequently 
sexually enslaved and raped in these stations. These victims were often deceived with the 
promise of employment prospects.186 During the Yugoslav conflict, rape camps were 
established, and women were fraudulently detained within them.187 The ICTY Kunarac 
Trial Chamber addressed the issue of deception as an element of rape. Under the heading 
‘Specific circumstances which go to the vulnerability or deception of the victim’,188 it 
established that a number of national jurisdictions state that consensual sexual intercourse 
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is invalid if the victim was ‘induced into the act by surprise or misrepresentation.’189 It 
remains unclear why deception was excluded as an issue in determining genuine consent 
from the EoC definition of rape and the RPE definition of consent. 
Theoretically the EoC definition of rape and the RPE definition of consent 
represents a methodical approach to determining cases of rape in international law. In 
practice, this response is inadequate given the contexts in which rape occurs in armed 
conflict.190 Though consent has traditionally been considered crucial for preserving sexual 
autonomy, its usefulness in the criminalisation of rape in international law is less clear.191 
The central issue is how consent and individual agency and autonomy are measured in 
armed conflict.192 Critics argue that the ICC provisions do not sufficiently reflect the 
impact that the environment of armed conflict has on a person’s ability to legally consent 
and mobilise individual agency and autonomy.193  
The EoC definition of rape was developed with the aim of achieving a balance, 
which took note of the contextual differences between the ICTY and the ICTR definitions 
of rape, alongside an implicit acknowledgment of lessons taken on board from national 
legislation.194 However, the ICC has, to date, only applied the definition in the Situation 
in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo (2016).195 Interestingly for this thesis, the Pre-Trial Chamber did not affirm the 
                                                          
189 The ICTY in the Furundžija case did not address the issue of deception as an element of rape. See, 
Kunarac Trial Judgment, paras 446, (emphasis added) see also paras 447-52.  
190 Boon, ‘Rape and Forced Pregnancy’, p.653. 
191 Ibid, p.655. 
192 Ibid. In addition, Adrienne Kalosich, ‘Consent to Genocide? The ICTY’s Improper Use of the Consent 
Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foča’, Women’s Rights Law Reporter, (2003), 4(2), 121-36, 
pp.121-2; Noelle Quénivet, Sexual Offences in Armed Conflict and International Law, (Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2005). 
193 See for example, Fiona Tate, ‘Impunity, Peacekeepers, Gender and Sexual Violence in Post-Conflict 
Landscapes: A Challenge for the International Human Rights Agenda’, Law, Crime and History, (2015), 
5(2), 69-96, p.87. 
194 Oosterveld, ‘Influence of Domestic Legal Traditions’, p.836. 
195 Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 





charge of rape as a form torture or rape as an outrage upon human dignity.196 The Chamber 
simply asserted that: 
in the context of the count of torture as a crime against humanity, the Chamber 
notes that also in the context of outrages upon personal dignity the Prosecutor 
presented the same conduct, related mainly to acts of rape... In the opinion of 
the Chamber, most of the facts presented by the Prosecutor at the Hearing reflect 
in essence the constitutive elements of force or coercion in the crime of rape, 
characterising this conduct, in the first place, as an act of rape. In the opinion of 
the Chamber, the essence of the violation of the law underlying these facts is 
fully encompassed in the count of rape.197 
Though the all-female bench consisting of Judge Sylvia Steiner (presiding, Brazil), 
Judge Joyce Aluoch (Kenya) and Judge Kuniko Ozaki (Japan) initially found Bemba, the 
former Congolese vice-president, guilty of committing mass murder and rape in the 
Central African Republic (CAR) for the actions of his troops, he was later acquitted of all 
charges by Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (presiding, Belgium), Judge Sanji 
Mmasenono Monageng (Botswana) – the only two females on the bench – alongside Judge 
Chile Eboe-Osuji (Nigeria), Judge Howard Morrison (UK) and Judge Piotr Hofmański 
(Poland).198 Because Bemba so far is the only rape case to be heard by ICC, the EoC 
definition of rape as well as its broader categorisation as an outrage upon human dignity 
and torture has not been extensively tested in ICC judgments.199  
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It is important to note that the EoC and the RPE are not legally binding on either 
the ICC, being rules of guidance only, nor are they binding on other UN courts and 
tribunals.200 While it can be argued that, the EoC on rape does present ‘a detailed overview 
of the elements’ involved in rape for use in prosecutions,201 it still does not provide a 
conclusive response to the many challenges facing international law in defining rape. 
These include the issue of consent, the problems associated with the language of invasion 
versus penetration or the challenges associated with a mechanical-conceptual definition.202 
Challenges relating to its categorisation as an offence also remain unresolved.  
 
(d) Comparative Analysis: The ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC 
Overall, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC definitions of rape each present a number of 
challenges when attempting to identify what constitutes conflict-perpetrated rape. On the 
one hand, the Akayesu conceptual definition can be described as too vague. On the other, 
the language of ‘penetration’ captured in the Furundžija and Kunarac definitions 
reintroduces the traditional idea of rape as a crime of honour in international law.203 The 
element of consent incorporated into the ICC and Kunarac definitions also raises concern.  
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One constant advance shared between each of these definitions is the framing of 
rape as gender-neutral. Despite this development, rape continues to be prosecuted as a 
crime primarily committed by men against women. The ICTR, for example, failed to 
prosecute any acts of male-male rape. Though the ICTY prosecuted some instances of 
male-male rape, such offences were often categorised as something else other than rape, 
for example, torture. Female-perpetrated rape committed against either gender, on the 
other hand, was largely side-lined by these bodies.204 In contrast, male-female rape was 
often prosecuted as only rape or, sometimes, as rape and another type of headline offence, 
such as an outrage upon human dignity and torture. The categorisation of rape as a form 
of sexual violence has been shown to present yet another challenge. At times, each of these 
tribunals have used the terms ‘rape’ and ‘sexual violence’ interchangeably. The 
significance of this swapping of terminology warrants further investigation. 
Overall, the reason for these inconsistencies is unclear. One possible explanation 
may be linked to the definitions. It is also highly likely that the individual judges played a 
significant role in these prosecution approaches. Their own gender and cultural biases are 
potential influencing factors when exploring the decisions in several of the cases discussed. 
In this context, it is equally plausible that cultural assumptions linked to the terms used to 
categorise rape impacted prosecution strategies and outcomes. This dimension will be 
focused on in Chapters 5-7.  
 
Conclusion 
On the surface, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC changed the legal structuring of conflict-
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perpetrated rape as a crime in international law. They provided individual gender-neutral 
definitions of the crime, framing it as a serious offence in its own right. Yet each of the 
bodies prosecuted rape in a way that perpetuated traditional gendered (essentially 
heteronormative) understandings of the crime. In the cases discussed, male-female rape 
was often prosecuted as rape or, occasionally, rape and another headline offence, such as 
torture or an outrage upon human dignity, while male-male rape was often ignored or 
prosecuted as another type of offence instead of rape, for example, torture. Female-
perpetrated rape, on the other hand, was largely overlooked. 
One potential explanation for this trend is the way in which experts interpreted the 
language used in these definitions. For example, reference to the term ‘penetration’ in the 
ICTY and the ICC definitions reinforces traditional notions of rape as a crime perpetrated 
by the man. The judiciary too may be influenced by their own cultural and gendered biases. 
The terms used to categorise rape seem also to continue to play a role. Building on the 
evidence presented so far, the next chapter examines one of the terms used to categorise 
rape in international law – sexual violence. The term ‘gender-based violence’ will be 












The previous chapter examined the evolution of the different gender-neutral definitions of 
conflict-perpetrated rape created by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 
1994-2014) and the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-present). It established that 
the prosecution practices of these bodies did not properly reflect the gender-neutral 
dimension to these definitions. For example, male-female rape was typically prosecuted 
as rape or, sometimes, rape and another type of offence, such as an outrage upon human 
dignity or a crime of torture. Male-male rape, on the other hand, was routinely ignored or 
prosecuted as something other than rape, for example, torture. Female-perpetrated rape 
was largely overlooked. An added complication appears in the general categorisation of 
rape as a form of sexual violence. Rape and sexual violence are, at times, used 
interchangeably without explanation in both the scholarship and the courts. The 
significance of such swapping is unclear, which leads one to question the value of 
categorising rape as a form of sexual violence. Attempting to provide clarification, this 
chapter explores the term ‘sexual violence’, in order to determine its usefulness as part of 
a lexicon of rape in modern international law. As a potential alternative to this 
categorisation, the concept of gender-based violence will be examined in this chapter.  
Central to this discussion will be the work of Michel Foucault and the reactions to 
his conceptualisation of rape and sexual violence generally. The ongoing theoretical 
challenges that his thinking presents to feminist theories, especially in relation to 




sexuality and gender underline. In particular, his assertions regarding the categorisation of 
rape as a form of sexual violence continue to provoke responses indicating his thinking 
still incites contention amongst feminists and supporters of his work.1 His claims and the 
response to these will provide the focus for this chapter. 
 
Sexual Violence 
During the 1970s, when Western cultural attitudes towards sexuality and individual choice 
were being redefined, a French commission was tasked with reforming the French penal 
code.2 As part of their research, they asked Foucault, seen as an established expert on such 
topics, questions relating to legislation on sexual crimes. Addressing these questions 
during a roundtable discussion concerning his book Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
argued that sexuality should be liberated from a disciplinary discourse and, in turn, that 
rape be desexualised as a form of criminal violence. He advocated that sexuality should 
not ‘be the object of punishment’ of rape.3 Rather, it should be prosecuted on the same 
grounds as any other act of violence.4 His perspective was that rape is simply another act 
of aggression.5 He identified no difference ‘between sticking one’s fist into someone’s 
face or one’s penis into their sex [organ]’.6 To imply that rape constitutes a more serious 
act of violence than punching an individual in the face suggests that ‘sexuality as such, in 
the body, has a preponderant place, the sexual organ isn’t like a hand, hair, or a nose’, he 
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argued.7 Foucault concluded that rape ‘isn’t a matter of sexuality’. 8  Only the element of 
physical violence should ‘be punished, without bringing in the fact that sexuality was 
involved.’9 Categorising rape only as a crime of violence would, he believed, ‘free 
women’s bodies from the defining elements which produce them as pre-victims.’10  
These and subsequent comments by Foucault have shaped much of the continuing 
debate regarding the categorisation or labelling of rape as a form of sexual violence. The 
discussions are complex. Some feminist activists such as Susan Brownmiller and equity 
feminist Christina Hoff Sommers also argue for the desexualisation of rape, albeit from a 
different standpoint to Foucault.11 Others, such as feminist philosopher Ann Cahill, are 
critical of the violence only framework. In 2001, drawing on Foucault’s analysis, she 
argues that by focusing on the penile perpetration, men are framed as central to the 
phenomenon of rape.12 Foucault therefore forgets to analyse the bodies of the female 
victims, which are the expressions of any given power dialogue.13 Rape, she continues, 
plays an important role in the discourse that frames women as both socially inferior and 
expendable, and her body as weak and violable.14 For her, it is these issues that form the 
female’s experience of rape and that must be taken seriously in law.15 In failing to 
demonstrate a clear understanding of how gender, power, forces, and the law are 
interconnected, Foucault is seemingly concerned, albeit implicitly, only with liberating the 
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sexuality of men.16 He omits to ask about the cultural and personal significance of being 
raped as a woman.17  
Taking up this omission in the late 1980s, Italian born American gender theorist  
Teresa De Lauretis claimed that in terms of Foucault’s theoretical analysis, his proposal 
could be understood as an attempt to counteract the ‘technology of sex’, which requires 
the social body, and all its individuals, to be placed under surveillance.18 Worse, that it 
looks to break the established bond between crime and sexuality through this will to 
liberate sexual behaviours from punishment, and free the sexual sphere from state 
intervention. For De Lauretis, this form of resistance on behalf of imprisoned men who are 
or subject to be charged with rape, worked to increase and legitimise women’s sexual 
oppression by failing to prioritise their experience as victims.19 In other words, by 
recognising only the element of force as the criminal factor, not the sexual component, 
men’s freedom not to be chastised for sexual misconduct or have their sexuality repressed 
is prioritised over securing justice for women. Given the traditional cultural constraints 
placed upon female sexuality, this superseding of women’s potential will to see men 
punished for their sexual incontinence reinforces their relative powerlessness.20  
The challenge for this thesis lies in the need to critique this argument in relation to 
conflict-perpetrated rape. Certainly, those feminists who dismiss Foucault’s violence-only 
framework can be criticised for perpetuating the idea that women are passive victims, and 
that rape is the most harmful act that can be committed against them. Such a perspective 
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arguably encourages the use of rape as a weapon in armed conflict because of the damaging 
impact it is held to have on victims as well as on their families and community.   
Returning to the broader debate, what is seen as central to the discontent over 
Foucault’s stance is his comparison between genitalia and other body parts. Holly 
Henderson in 2007 challenged his conclusions regarding the significance of human 
physicality, pointing out that communities tend to view hands and hair as socially different 
to genitalia. Because of these differences rape, she argues, is not just an attack against the 
body: it is an attack on the sexualised, gendered body, making it more significant than non-
sexualised forms of battery.21 Sex organs, unlike other body parts, are imbued with a 
sexual, social meaning. Back in 1988, Winifred Woodhull maintained that if we are to 
fully understand rape as a phenomenon, we must explore how the penis is understood and 
described under certain circumstances as a masculine weapon, and how the female vagina, 
in response, is held and exploited as a site of vulnerability.22 Failing to engage with the 
social connotations ascribed to the genitals not only ignores the victim’s experience, but 
fails to consider the political and social contexts in which rape was used.23  
Foucault’s perspective is not without flaws, but neither are the various stances 
adopted by his critics. Those like Woodhull and Henderson who continue to reject 
Foucault’s argument about desexualising violence fail to acknowledge how an 
oversexualising of particular body parts ignores the violation of or use of other body parts 
in rape.24 Here, Cahill adds another perspective. If, as Foucault concluded, it is ‘upon the 
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basis of the social construction of the sexual body’ that the genitalia and associated 
sexuality are held to be central to an individual’s identity, then there is an ‘ethical 
imperative’ towards desexualisation of rape.25  
Despite her reservations about the degree of emphasis placed on certain parts of 
the sexualised body as part of her resistance to the objectification of women, Cahill still 
insists that rape must be distinguished from other types of battery because the body plays 
a pivotal role in the construction of the feminine identity.26 Her philosophical position is 
that rape is different to a punch in the arm because the danger of being harmed by the penis 
is at the basis of feminine bodily comportment, which requires female behaviour that 
serves to protect their bodies from a sexualised attack.27 It places the burden on women to 
conduct and dress in ways that are identified as non-provocative.  
Invoking the work of feminist political theorists, especially Iris Young, and fellow 
philosopher and gender expert Sandra Bartky, Cahill has continued to reflect not just upon 
rape but also on the wider contextualisation of the feminine, including bodily 
comportment. She describes women as continuing to be marked by fear of bodily desires 
and harm where they are under cultural pressure to perceive their bodies as being 
responsible for making these dangers possible.28 Such pressure conveys a message that 
should an individual woman act or appear in a way that moves her beyond the prescribed 
safe zone for her, harm of some kind, up to and including rape, should be expected as the 
likely consequence.29 This idea, she argues, serves to institutionalise the notion that rape 
is a basic element of the female experience as a general phenomenon, by using physical 
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objectification as the channel for warning potential female transgressors. For Cahill, it is 
at the heart of the ‘social means of sexual differentiation’ in that it ensures that similar 
conduct such as travelling alone, at night, or in a particular locale, has radically different 
meanings and effects for men and women.30 This viewpoint, she insists, justifies sustaining 
a perspective that female rape should be approached differently so that its meanings can 
be voiced and heard as part of the construction of the feminine. The feminine body is, then, 
not only culpable for any harm committed upon it but is, as Cahill puts it, a ‘pre-victim’.31 
Such feminine behaviour is linked, she contends, to the issue of social sexing. Whilst ‘boys 
serve a veritable apprenticeship in violence, developing their aggressiveness’,32 girls give 
up such aggressive endeavours and develop feminine traits such as passivity and 
victimhood.33 Until that changes, the Foucauldian approach cannot work. 
For feminists like Cahill, then, Foucault’s analysis fails to engage with the complex 
social reality which is not only central to the subordination of women to men, but 
reinforces rape as merely a violent form of heteronormative socialisation.34 Reinforcing 
her point, Cahill writes:  
[W]omen who experience rape and the threat of rape on a daily basis, and whose 
very bodily behaviour and beings are in part formed by the presence of the threat 
of rape, will not be liberated in any sense by a redefinition of rape which 
excludes its constitutive and oppressive effects upon their existence.35 
Cahill concludes that the level or type of physical and mental harm endured is very 
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different when a hand or hair has been assaulted, as opposed to the genitalia.  
For Foucault, on the other hand, as his subsequent responses to initial feminist 
criticism made plain, it is women who need to change their stance. They are choosing to 
remain imprisoned in traditional attitudes. His theories of power suggest the potential for 
the individual to ‘effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, [and] conduct’.36 Foucault argues that 
traditional political and gender hierarchies are sustained by the docile body – the 
acceptance of the physical weakness produced by mental subordination in line with 
traditional thinking. 
Hostility towards Foucault’s violence only model remains largely unabated 
amongst many feminist scholars. From De Lauretis and Woodhull, via Cahill to more 
recent commentators such as Maja Korac, there is agreement that if rape were described 
solely as a crime of violence, then the sexually aggressive behaviour inherent to the 
offence, typically perpetrated by men, would become legally irrelevant.37 This 
categorisation, Korac insists, works to diminish its seriousness, including in the context of 
conflict-perpetrated rape.38 To emphasise her ongoing support for this perspective, Cahill 
compares rape to sexual harassment. If sexual harassment were categorised solely as a 
form of professional harassment, with the sexual element deemed immaterial, crucial 
elements or aspects of behaviour would be rendered invisible, she argues.39 For her: 
The behaviour itself could not be understood in terms of exercising privileges 
that have been traditionally and unfairly extended to men at the expense of 
women. In a similar way, defining and therefore approaching rape as if sex 
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were irrelevant would render impossible a consideration of rape’s privileged 
role in the power discourse which is sexual hierarchy.40 
In other words, for the sake of equity, the sexual dimension to rape has to be preserved; to 
not would diminish its impact on the wider struggle to achieve equality between women 
and men. 
One problem with these arguments, as the case study Cahill invokes underlines, is 
that there is a failure to take into consideration instances of male-male and female-
perpetrated rape. An evaluation of how other crimes committed against women, whereby 
the same power dynamics are present, but do not include reference to the sexual dimension 
is also absent. It ignores, for example, the harm caused to women who are battered, but are 
not raped or that resulting from a male employer bullying or manipulating a female 
employee.41  
A vigorous comeback to Foucauldian arguments that removing the sexual element 
would enable implicit assumptions relating to culpability and the bodily comportment 
expectations of female sexuality to be eradicated came from Monique Plaza, a French 
feminist.42 Writing in 2005, she argues that Foucault frames women as wanting to make 
rape as ‘something other than aggression’ for their own advantage, a stance they identify 
as both pansexualist and equally repressive.43 For Cahill, continuing the debate later into 
the twenty-first century, the issue remains that ‘recognizing the role of such discourses in 
an overarching and markedly un-natural sexual hierarchy’, amounts to making claims for 
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a ‘“natural” women’s sexuality’ which enjoys dominance.44 Such arguments need to be 
dismissed, she believes, so that sexuality and sexual acts can instead be formally 
recognised as socially constructed, in terms of both impact and consequences. The role 
played by such perspectives form part of ‘a larger system of sexual hierarchy’, which is 
intrinsically oppressive of women also needs to be acknowledged.45 She maintains that 
failure to ‘include sex in the legal definition of rape makes precisely this recognition 
impossible.’46  
For Cahill, another problem with Foucauldian theory lies in its focus on the 
traditional cultural and legal understanding of rape as constituting penile-vaginal 
penetration. She points out that even in states where the focus remains on the vagina, it is 
broadly accepted that rape can be committed with numerous tools.47 Since Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of rape focuses on the penis, it does not enable a consideration of the 
different ways in which a woman can be sexually violated.48 This approach reintroduces 
the traditional idea of rape as a crime of honour.49 As Gay McDougall observes, ‘the 
historic focus on the act of penetration largely derives from a male preoccupation with 
assuring women’s chastity and ascertaining paternity of children’, in order to preserve the 
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primary value of the masculine bloodline.50 This understanding undermines the 
characterisation of rape as a crime ‘connected to a broader pattern of violent conduct’, 
lessening the seriousness of the offence.51  
Whilst some pro-sexual violence labelists acknowledge that rape is not limited to 
penile-vaginal penetration, their analysis is equally insufficient, focusing primarily on 
instances of male-female rape. Cahill, for example, insists that while men can be raped, 
they are not subject to the same persistent risk of rape that women are.52 Nor are they raped 
at the same rate as women.53 Cahill perceives rape as a tool used by men to control 
women.54 Plaza similarly writes: 
Rape is an oppressive act exercised by a (social) man against a (social) woman, 
which can be carried out by the introduction of a bottle held by a man into the 
anus of a woman [without consent]; in this case rape is not sexual, or rather it is 
not genital. It is very sexual in the sense that it is frequently a sexual activity, 
but above all in the sense that it opposes men and women: it is social sexing 
which underlines rape.55 
Though the arguments presented thus far have raised some important points, they 
have not sufficiently explained for this thesis why an assault on the vagina has to be seen 
legally, as well as culturally, more significant than an assault on non-sexual body parts. 
Rather, such arguments appear be circular: why is rape different from battery? Rape 
possesses a distinctive gender element. Why does it have a particular gender element? 
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Because rape differs from battery. It remains unclear why rape should be distinct from 
these offences as opposed to forming part of them. 
Several experts have, from the start, been critical both of Foucault’s arguments as 
well as the circularity of the thinking of feminist scholars like De Laurentis and Woodhull. 
Seeking to move the debate on as early as the late 1980s by providing a different 
perspective on why it is important to retain the sexual dimension was American legal 
scholar and radical feminist Catharine MacKinnon. She argued that it is not the use of 
violence which surrounds acts of rape (for example, the use of actual or implied force, 
including an object or weapon) that gives it its character. Rather, it is the heterosexual 
element.56 She explained that in political, social and legal arenas, a certain level of coercion 
or force is anticipated, even taken for granted, as accompanying ‘normal’ heterosexual sex. 
It is acceptable for ‘rough’ consensual sex to occur within a male-female (as well as male-
male or female-female) relationship, so long as significant physical harm amounting to 
grievous bodily harm does not result. The presence of either mental or physical force does 
not therefore automatically indicate rape.57  
MacKinnon’s case continues to be that women often find it hard to differentiate 
rape from everyday heterosexual sex, because they culturally assimilate the idea that 
experiences of rape are intrinsically similar to those of normal heterosexual intercourse.58 
The act of ‘[r]ape is violent insofar as it is located along a continuum of heterosexual 
experience, which is itself saturated by coercion and force.’59 Her argument is that 
removing the sexual element of the crime ‘allows one to be against it without raising any 
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questions about the extent to which the institution of heterosexuality has defined force as 
a normal part of’ heterosexual relations.60 She notes that ‘rape is not less sexual’ for 
involving violence ‘[t]o the extent that coercion has become integral to male sexuality, 
rape may even be sexual to the degree that, and because, it is violent’.61 In the context of 
rape in international law, however, interventions by scholars like MacKinnon have not 
managed to shift the grounds for debate, partly because the issue of violence is essentially 
redundant alongside the issue of consent in war. 
Brownmiller’s work continues to be invoked within the debates. Against Our Will 
(1970) first added a further dimension to the debates and continues to be referenced along 
with her more recent contributions. In responding to claims, explicit and implicit, that men 
are at the mercy of their sexual needs and that women who provoke the sexual stimulation 
of men are responsible for their assault, Brownmiller provides an alternative perspective. 
She removes the sexual dimension to the act by arguing that rather than being motivated 
by sexual gratification or stimulation, rape needs to be identified as linked to the male will 
to dominate, possess and degrade. In other words, rape is a crime not of sexual lust, but 
instead arises out of a will to use violence to enforce masculine power.  
Brownmiller took her point further when she challenged the tradition that the 
sexual element of rape needed to be understood as being part of a natural, biological 
system. She explained that accepting as ‘natural’ behaviour both aggressive sexual male 
behaviour and passive sexual female behaviour, makes the sexual descriptor both 
redundant and damaging. For her, characterising rape as a form of sexual violence is 
harmful because it fails to recognise the true nature of the harm inflicted.62 Rape, she 
argues, must be understood as a deliberate, violent and hostile act of possession and 
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degradation by men, intended to not only to intimidate and incite fear amongst women, 
but to deny them a full sense of personhood. Her argument remains that even in individual 
cases of rape, ‘the meaning of rape is never individual’.63 It is intended to work as a 
reminder for both the perpetrator and the victim that social membership of either one of 
these sexes is the defining aspect of their identity. Brownmiller’s stance is therefore that 
rape should be described primarily as a form of violence, so that it is clearly understood as 
an act of aggression. As part of her argument, she also draws a correlation with male 
political motivations to dominate women. She insists that rape is used as a weapon in 
patriarchal society against women in order to control and dominate them. Brownmiller 
maintains that rape is ‘nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by 
which all men keep all women in a state of fear.’64  
This perspective continues to be met with criticism from others amongst her fellow 
feminists. Cahill, notably, argues that her ‘model of rape places women strictly over and 
against the political and social structures that underscore the phenomenon of rape, or at the 
very least understands women as merely objectified by them.’65 Ironically, in her attempt 
to undermine the misconception that women provoke rape, Cahill suggests that 
Brownmiller’s argument ‘paradoxically threatens the possibility of any female agency.’66 
For Cahill, another problem is that Brownmiller does not adequately take into account the 
complex relationship between sexuality and politics. By claiming rape is primarily about 
power, and therefore constitutes a political and not sexual act, she sees Brownmiller as 
having set up an invalid distinction between the two. For Cahill, this divergence ignores 
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the political dimension to the sexual, and consequently undermines the validity of 
Brownmiller’s perspective and the scholarship which has followed on from her arguments. 
Cahill points to what she sees as a key criticism of the thinking building on Brownmiller’s 
perspective, that it tends to encourage the eradication of rape as a specific legal ‘category 
of rape in favour of including it under the definition of “assault”’, putting it broadly in line 
with Foucauldian thought.67 This framing has the effect of ignoring the fact that 
Brownmiller herself identified rape as constituting a distinct crime, one sitting between 
assault and robbery:68  
When rape is placed where it truly belongs, within the context of modern 
criminal violence, and not within the purview of ancient masculine codes, the 
crime retains its unique dimensions, falling midway between robbery and 
assault. It is, one act, both blow to the body and a blow to the mind, and a 
‘taking’ of sex through the use or threat of force. Yet the differences between 
rape and an assault or a robbery are as distinctive as the obvious similarities.69  
For Cahill, Brownmiller’s interpretation of rape only becomes viable if it recognises that 
there is, above all, a sexual dimension.70 Her point is that if rape is a weapon of patriarchy, 
as Brownmiller claims, ‘then a law that renders such sex-specific claims inaudible will not 
be able to take account of that very characteristic’.71 She concludes that we cannot have it 
both ways; rape is either another crime of violence, ‘with no specific relation to the sexes 
and sexual relations,’ or it is part ‘of a larger system of sexual domination, in which case 
sex remains as a significant element’.72 In other words, Brownmiller’s approach shares the 
drawbacks inherent in the Foucauldian approach, because similarly, it restricts rape ‘only 
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to a set of meanings that have currency in a masculinist field’, and so being ‘incapable of 
accurately describing’ the real nature of women’s experiences of rape.73  
In this context, the historical roots of modern cultural understandings of conflict-
perpetrated rape, and the language employed to emphasise the significance of 
hypermasculinity and gender essentialist stereotypes, can usefully be recalled. So doing 
does work to undermine Foucault’s claim that there is a valid jurisprudential need to 
remove the sexual link, in that to do so removes the legal significance conveyed by 
classification of rape as a serious crime because of its sexual nature. It also, though, works 
to reveal the miscomprehension between Cahill and her adherents and those looking to 
Brownmiller. For the former, it simply works to entrench masculine privilege by 
downgrading the nature of the offence. For example, in the legend of the rape of the Sabine 
Women, for example, Roman men abducted and forcibly impregnated women and girls 
from neighbouring cities to create families of their own. This episode was later held to 
make a fruitful contribution to the founding mythology of Rome and a trope invoked in 
later exercises of conquest and colonisation.74 In an uncomfortable modern echo of 
historical colonisation enterprises, wars involving conquest agendas over other ethnicities 
have also resorted to mass rape enterprises. In WWII, for example, the Imperial Japanese 
Army also prioritised male needs when it established so-called ‘comfort stations’ in 
occupied territories where local women and girls were forced to have sex with Japanese 
soldiers.75 Rape camps and forced brothels were established during the Bosnian conflict, 
equally indicating a similar emphasis on male privilege.76 Reports have established that, 
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as an ongoing phenomenon, UN peacekeepers77 and members of (international) non-
governmental organisations (I/NGO)78 have raped civilians during deployment. What are 
these acts if not specifically sexual harms? These accounts cannot be seen as automatically 
invalidating Brownmiller’s arguments about rape as a demonstration of power. She does, 
after all, insist that rape needs to be identified as a distinct offence, and certainly her 
emphasis on rape as an expression of masculine dominance fits well with the history of 
colonisation and conquest with its narratives of masculine power.  
The lack of an easy resolution in the perspectives put forward by Cahill and 
Brownmiller continues over to inflect where the emphasis should be placed, especially in 
shaping law, when seeking to understand the relationship between hypermasculinity and 
the perpetration of rape. As noted earlier in this thesis, within patriarchal societies where 
hegemonic masculinity prevails, men are taught that masculinity is associated with a right 
to power.79 Using violence to obtain or maintain the power of an individual or group within 
a society is considered acceptable.80 In the context of conflict-related territories, these 
traditional masculine behaviours or traits are typically exaggerated.81 Rape is often 
considered a natural choice of tool to dominate and exert control in war. The argument 
rests in whether an exclusion of the sexual component from rape prosecutions potentially 
allows the issues associated with a hegemonic masculinity to remain unchallenged and so, 
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to continue to be embedded in social norms as inevitable practices and rituals. 
Similar comments apply to male-male rape. Culturally, heterosexuality is 
considered integral to masculinity and a requirement of manliness.82 Homosexuality is 
regarded as a challenge to traditional masculinity in many cultures to the extent that it is 
either illegal or considered deviant in many states.83 Rape is often interpreted as being used 
as a tactic during conflict to ‘homosexualise’ and so demoralise the enemy.84 The question 
is whether removing the sexual component to prosecutions for male-male rape could 
render such issues invisible, legally if not culturally.  
From a conceptual perspective then, it is clear that the majority of those in the field 
of feminist scholarship agree that there is a sexual dimension to rape. Whether that 
dimension should be prioritised in defining the offence, certainly in the case of conflict-
perpetrated rape, is less clear. The question remains whether understanding rape as a form 
of sexual violence is more of a help than a hindrance when framing rape as a crime in 
international law. There are clear parallels between the rape of men and the rape of women, 
as they are both linked to concepts of masculine power and right to dominance.85 One 
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challenge to efforts to prioritise the sexual dimension when framing a criminal charge of 
rape comes when considering female-perpetrated rape. This type of rape is seen as a 
contradiction in terms when adopting a gendered perspective, because it opens up the 
possibility for rape to be perpetrated both by and against either gender, undermining both 
the Cahill and the Brownmiller interpretations which rely on the threat of rape as a form 
of expression of masculine power. Equally, dropping men as victims into the existing 
sexual violence framework without considering the male experience in separate terms 
works, both practically and paradoxically, to reinforce patriarchal-based gender 
constructions to the disadvantage of those males.  
As this latter point underlines, it is equally important to take into consideration the 
impact that categorising rape as a form of sexual violence has on victims. Currently, rape 
carries an enduring stigma. Survivors often, as a result, do not wish to be labelled as 
victims of sexual violence.86 Yet many theorists and jurists continue to argue that, in line 
with the jurisprudence for all crime, it is important to recognise the specific offence that 
has been committed in order to launch a prosecution.87 Acknowledging both the sexual 
and violent elements of the crime of rape are important considerations from a theoretical 
and practical point of view, the chapter moves to consider whether the term ‘gender-based 
violence’ can either provide a useful alternative to ‘sexual violence’ or whether these two 
can be used simultaneously without resulting in confusion.  
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Theoretically, the concept of gender-based violence usefully describes rape as a crime in 
international law without the pejorative associations with a gendered victim stigmatisation. 
It should work to capture the reality that rape is perpetrated by and against either gender 
because of their gender, thereby invoking the differential associated harms rape is held to 
have on the victim. The term can also be used to explain the ongoing impact that traditional 
gender constructs (including hypermasculine culture) have on conflict-perpetrated rape. 
The critical role that power and patriarchy plays in the framing of understandings of rape, 
including recognition of the physical consequences for victims (pregnancy, spread of 
disease etc.) is captured under this model.  
The challenge remains with its current practical application. Over the years, various 
policies have been introduced, notably by the UN, to frame the process for addressing rape 
as a form of gender-based violence. The documents enshrining such policies should, in 
theory, provide a gender inclusive understanding of rape, among other crimes. Yet, such 
instruments are typically used only to describe violence perpetrated by men against women 
in international law.88 As touched upon in the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) 2001 conference, Inter-Agency Lessons Learned, gender-based violence is 
understood as being ‘predominantly men’s violence towards women’.89 The European 
Institute for Gender Equality states:  
‘Gender-based violence’ and ‘violence against women’ are terms that are often 
used interchangeably as most gender-based violence is inflicted by men on 
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women and girls. However, it is important to retain the ‘gender-based’ aspect 
of the concept as this highlights the fact that violence against women is an 
expression of power inequalities between women and men.90 
Various articles and bodies have since been introduced which address the need to combat 
gender-based violence against women. Another international intervention, the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979), describes gender-
based violence as ‘violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or 
that affects women disproportionately.’91 As well as UN Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCRs), similar documentation from the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women 1994,92 the Council 
of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, provide similar provisions. In contrast, male victims, 
to date, are explicitly mentioned in only one of the numerous UNSCRs.93 
For scholars such as Gabrielle Ferrales and Suzy Maves McElrath, the absence of 
a clear definition of ‘gender-based violence’ from the international community has meant 
that rape has continued to be misinterpreted as a crime committed against women only, 
excluding male victims.94 Reporting in 2014, Chloé Lewis refers to a ‘repress-entation of 
the “Male Victim Subject”’, when arguing for the need to ‘make explicit reference to men 
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and boys’ within the discussions of sexual violence and victims.95 For others influenced 
by Brownmiller’s work, like clinician Jessica Turchik, the discussion needs to focus on 
the lack of gender inclusiveness in law, which they see as linked to how the concepts of 
gender and femininity relate to each other.96 As noted, for example, by Lucinda Finley in 
1990, the way language is used in law and wider society is flawed because it frames males 
as complete beings, while females are considered the ‘other’. The term ‘man’ has been 
traditionally understood as the ‘linguistic stand-in for “generically human”’, as in mankind 
rather than humanity.97 Women, instead, have been identified as being inherently 
dependent on and deficient to men, with different, and unequal rights. Various woman’s 
rights bodies and experts have campaigned to address this issue of gender equality. 
Because of this insistence, the term ‘gender’ is not used neutrally. Instead, it is regularly 
employed as ‘a shorthand for “women”’ in international law.98   
Reflecting in 2003, in the context of the former Yugoslavian and Rwandan 
Tribunals at work, Amani El Jack found little had changed in the use of this construct. He 
also found that the term ‘gender’ works to institutionalise women as victims, subjecting 
them to special considerations, identifying them as having special needs, legally and 
culturally.99 It operates, in other words, to obscure ‘the relevance [of gender] to men and 
to concepts of masculinity in any given context’,100 because they continue to be 
characterised simply as perpetrators, rather than being understood in a more complex 
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way.101 Lewis, for example, distinguishes ‘the “Male Perpetrator”, the “Strategic Ally” 
and the elusive “Male Victim Subject”’ in her critical examination of ‘international 
materials and documentation’.102 
Perhaps it is not the term ‘gender’ that poses a challenge to gender-inclusiveness. 
Rather the problem is that language (including supposed gender-neutral terms) is generally 
coded-masculine to signify the normality of human experience and reactions.103 Where 
language is coded feminine, women are framed as less significant, which explains why 
‘gender-based’ crimes are taken less seriously, as they are identified as crimes affecting 
mostly women. 
Notwithstanding, in the context of ‘even-handedness’ theory,104 this standard 
categorisation is of limited usefulness. Looking at the condemnation of particular 
governmental actions, Eric Heinze argues that since its inception, human rights law and 
accompanying discourse has been manipulated by some experts to condemn abuses in 
conspicuously arbitrary ways, ‘when one internationally responsible actor is singled out 
for condemnation, whilst others escape censure for similar abuses.’105 Similar claims can 
be made regarding the issue of rape and the recognition of men as victims.106 Though it is 
true that rape is a crime largely perpetrated by men against women, it does not mean that 
male-male or female-perpetrated rape should be side-lined.107 In future developments, the 
gender dimension will need to be further inflected to consider the impact of rape on non-
                                                          
101 El Jack, ‘Gender and Armed Conflict’, p.6. 
102 Lewis, ‘Systemic Silencing’, p.203. 
103 Sherryl Kleinman, Opposing Ambitions: Gender and Identity in an Alternative Organization, (Chicago, 
IL and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.129. 
104 Eric Heinze, ‘Even-handedness and the Politics of Human Rights’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 
(2008), 21, 7-46, p.7. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See for example, Cécile Allegra, ‘Revealed: male rape used systematically in Libya as instrument of 
war’, The Guardian, 3 November 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/03/revealed-male-
used-systematically-in-libya-as-instrument-of-war, (accessed 16 August 2019); Ferrales and McElrath, 
‘Beyond Rape’, p.673. 





Using the perspectives that arise from the work of Brownmiller in particular, these 
interpretations continue to pose a challenge to both Foucauldian and many feminist 
theoretical arguments surrounding the perceptions of rape as a crime, in both national 
communities and international law. An extra challenge for feminist scholars addressed in 
this chapter is that their arguments claim a need for a paramount principle of equality to 
ensure the inclusion and protection of all groups. As Chris Dolan points out, a serious 
consideration of males as victims of rape is in line with feminist principles, which 
emphasise ‘equity, inclusion and intersectional approaches’ to daily life.108 In practice, 
however, numerous feminists such as Cahill and Plaza effectively disregard this principle 
in making their argument about the need to emphasise the greater significance of rape for 
women.109 Lewis makes the point that when these feminists continue to insist on framing 
women as providing the main category of victims, the result is to encourage attitudes where 
male victims are either overlooked or have their experience absorbed into femininity when 
it is likened to that of female victims. This framing works to downgrade the validity of any 
claims they might make to be victims on their own terms. The consequence is that ‘male-
directed sexual violence is “neglected, under-reported and hardly addressed”’ by the UN 
or other programmes when addressing the issues surrounding rape and sexual violence.110 
A further feminist dimension to the debates was added in the shape of equity 
feminism, which sought to respond to the criticisms of figures like Dolan. Equity feminism 
advocates the need to establish equal legal rights in the present rather than continuing to 
emphasise historical inequalities between the sexes based on gender assumptions. Equity 
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feminists have sought to address the challenges  associated with linking the terms ‘rape’ 
and ‘sexual violence’ as a part of a gendered experience. Sommers, for example, builds on 
classical liberal philosophy, which sets her at odds with many non-equity feminists in her 
wish to ignore the past and start afresh. Instead, she proposes a gender-neutral conception 
of rape as part of a process of establishing equal legal rights. Discussing US criminal law 
and its approach to rape on university campuses in the 1990s for example, she argues that, 
from an equitable standpoint, viewing rape as: 
[A] crime of gender bias (encouraged by a patriarchy that looks with tolerance 
on the victimization of women) is perversely to miss its true nature. Rape is 
perpetuated by criminals, which is to say, it is perpetuated by people who are 
wont to gratify themselves in criminal ways and who care very little about the 
suffering they inflict on others.111 
Sommers adds that whatever the historical reality, it is now necessary to realise that rape 
is no longer rooted in the economic, structural or social ‘divisions that oppose men and 
women in a closed binary.’112 For her, it has become ‘just one variety of crime against a 
person, and rape of women is just one subvariety.’113 The real issue is how to prevent or 
stop violence. To do this:  
[W]e must find ways to educate all of our children to regards violence with 
abhorrence and contempt. We must once again teach decency and 
considerateness. And this, too, must become clear: in any constructive agenda 
for the future, the gender feminist’s divisive social philosophy has no place.114 
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The challenge her comments pose to gendered feminist approaches needs careful 
consideration. Sommers picks up on Foucault’s arguments that it is essential to reflect 
more on the need to change traditional conceptualisations of power within the gender 
hierarchy. The question of whether this approach provides a way forward that discards the 
circularity of Foucault’s feminist critics is not easily answered. 
While Sommers’s suggestions do have some value, her analysis lacks the necessary 
flexibility and breadth of focus to make it acceptable as a way of moving the debate 
forward to enable a wider consensus. In particular, her perspective is insufficiently radical 
because of its rejection of the part played by historical attitudes to rape. It could be said to 
represent more an ambition for the future than a prescription for today. Sommers was 
seeking to introduce a new public language which could contextualise a more equitable 
understanding of the issues involved in defining rape as an offence, but she has failed to 
convince the majority of her fellow feminist scholars on the issue. Many of these feminists 
have been scathing when commenting on her recommendations. Cahill, notably, dismisses 
her suggestions and continues to claim the importance of referencing the historical 
dimension when she insists that gender as a cultural reality plays an important part in the 
perpetration of rape by men and is no less relevant than its biological realities. Her point 
is that any analysis looking to forge a gender-neutral meaning of rape ‘by discarding the 
artificial, socially imposed, gender-specific meanings’ seriously underestimates the social 
significance of gender because of ‘the various ways sex and gender are co-constituted.’115 
Cahill’s stance remains that ‘[i]f rape is socially constructed as a gender-specific method 
of supporting, producing, and enforcing a gender hierarchy, then that construction will be 
basic and essential to…any one instance of rape.’116 Given the evidence explored in the 
                                                          





previous chapter, it is difficult to combat such a conclusion. Yet simply endorsing this 
perspective on the debate continues the practical problem that equity feminism seeks to 
address, that overall, the term ‘gender-based violence’ encapsulates many of the same 
circular challenges found in the term ‘sexual violence’.  
 
Discontinuing the terms Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Violence? 
In 2018, Germaine Greer caused controversy arguing that the categorisation of rape as a 
crime of sexual violence needs to be reconceptualised.117 She insists that in most cases, 
rape should not viewed as a violent crime but be seen as a careless, insensitive and lazy 
act.118 From Greer’s perspective, most rapes do not involve physical injury, implicitly 
suggesting that any other harm to the victim is the result of a sense of personal grievance.119 
She disputes the view that rape constitutes ‘one of the most violent crimes in the world’ 
and one of the worst things (the ne plus ultra) that can happen to a woman.120 Instead of 
viewing rape as a crime of violence, she suggests that we should regard it in most cases as 
‘non-consensual… that is “bad sex”’, where there is no tenderness, communication or love, 
taking it out of the criminal category effectively, or leaving it at best as a summary offence 
on some grounds.121 In cases where rape is obviously violent, she argues that longer 
sentences be given by the courts, but that, as a corollary, rape trials and sentences should 
be shorter to avoid women being humiliated for extended periods and encourage a 
conviction.122 
Her focus in this media piece was on rape perpetrated in peacetime civil society 
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contexts, recognising that rape by strangers is significantly less common than rape 
perpetrated by family members, friends, colleagues or acquaintances. Greer seems to echo 
Foucault’s point about biopower and the power the individual has to reshape identity 
through the potential to alter one’s thoughts. She exclaims, ‘[y]ou might want to believe 
that the penis is a lethal weapon and that all women live in fear of that lethal weapon, well 
that’s bullshit. It’s not true. We don’t live in terror of the penis … A man can’t kill you 
with his penis.”’123 It represents a provocative stance, but one that has left her open to 
evidence-based criticism in relation, for example, to gang-rape consequences, although 
such instances would presumably constitute violent rape under her theorisation. 
Throughout Greer’s subsequent book elaborating on her original media piece, her 
criticisms about the assumptions made by many feminists on the symbolism of rape 
constitute a dominant theme. Greer’s comments serve to highlight how, historically, rape 
has been seen as a major crime because of the affront caused to men. 
Her statements on the topic have been widely condemned, and their tone can be 
summarised in the response made by Natalie Collins to the effect that Greer’s comments 
are harmful to women because they diminish the seriousness of rape.124 Other critics less 
invested in the feminist approaches discussed here have been kinder to Greer’s book.125 
Some of them have agreed that it at least makes some valuable points, promoting debate.126 
In recognising that currently, the low levels of convictions for rape trials requires a 
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revisiting of how rape is conceptualised in the domestic courts, Greer is right. However, 
as Brownmiller points out,127 she fails in her goal of achieving a usable perspective through 
her insistence that most incidents constituting ‘bad sex’ rather than sexual violence. 
Nevertheless, Greer does reveal the extent to which the continuing framing – by 
feminist thought as well as mainstream societal thinking discussed in this chapter – of 
women as permanent victims who must live in fear of men remains an obstacle to 
successful prosecutions. She underlines the extent to which women have bought into this 
model as part of their wider critique on the role of patriarchy in modern society. Her stance 
that this approach has been damaging for women, because it reinforces the idea that women 
are simply sexual objects, relate to the challenges raised elsewhere in this chapter. Greer 
claims that society wants women to believe that rape destroys them, and women have 
foolishly bought into this mythology.128 Nevertheless, her argument does not provide a 
better resolution to the challenge of how ‘to acknowledge and destabilize these defining 
aspects of rape, while cautioning against tendencies to essentialize rape as a static 
component of our social formation.’129 In particular it takes little account of the realities 
of rape perpetrated in the context of armed conflict.  
 
Recommendations 
On balance, it is clear that the terms ‘sexual violence’ and ‘gender-based violence’ can 
both symbolise the harm associated with conflict-perpetrated rape, recognising that 
women are raped because they are women and men that are raped because they are men, 
and that rape is used as a violent weapon of power in war. The problem lies in their 
practical application, because these theoretical perspectives have not reflected changes in 
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entrenched cultural attitudes. These terms therefore continue to be used in ways that 
remain too gendered because of their deep roots in traditional understandings of rape. If 
these concepts are to be used effectively as part of a lexicon of rape in modern international 
law, existing gender constructs as well as the roles played by hegemonic masculinity and 
hypermasculinity must be revisited, in order to provide a more accurate and inclusive 
depiction of men and women as both victims and as perpetrators. Moreover, the 
experiences of men as well as women and the need for them both to be identified as victims 
and as perpetrators must be respectively recognised, not likened to, or rooted in one 
another.  
To achieve this result, social and cultural education – something emphasised by 
equity feminists – is required. As a starting point, guidelines should be created which 
explain how rape is used primarily as a tool of power by and against either gender. This 
emphasis on power could potentially steer the conversation beyond the idea of women as 
permanent victims and men as perpetrators, and start an educative process required for a 
genuine cultural shift to take place. 
 
Conclusion 
The usefulness of categorising rape as a form of sexual violence has been extensively 
debated since the mid-twentieth century. Following Foucault’s postulation that rape is no 
different to being punched in the noise and, as such, should be simply framed as another a 
type of violence, feminist scholars as varied as Cahill, MacKinnon and Plaza have sought 
to set the record straight. For these feminists, rape is different to other types of assault, 
because it is systematically used men as a tool in order to oppress and control women. The 
term ‘sexual violence’, they argue, symbolises this reality and plays an important role in 




violence does work to communicate important messages, particularly with regards to the 
use of rape as a weapon in war.  
However, there are limitations. Though Cahill, MacKinnon and Plaza make 
valuable points about the significance of the term ‘sexual violence’ as part of a lexicon of 
conflict-perpetrated rape in modern international law, their analysis remains mostly 
limited to the experiences of female victims and the damage inflicted by male perpetrators. 
Little consideration has been given in the debates to whether this concept reflects the injury 
committed by female-perpetrators. Male-male rape victims are also largely overlooked or 
their experience is simply likened to that of female victims. Similar problems are found in 
the term ‘gender-based violence’. Originally coined to describe violence committed by an 
individual because of their gender, gender-based violence is typically used to refer to 
violence committed by men against women. If these terms are to continue to be used as 
part of a lexicon of rape in modern international law, it is vital that they are understood 
and applied in a way that reflects the gender-neutral definitions of rape created by the 
ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC.
 
 








Chapter 5 examined the value of the terms ‘sexual violence’ and ‘gender-based violence’ 
as part of a lexicon of rape in modern international law. It considered whether they could 
be employed in ways that effectively reflect the gender-neutral definitions of rape 
constructed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 
1993-2017), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-present). This chapter undertakes a similar 
exploration focusing on the concept of dignity, which to date remains undefined in 
international law.1 It examines the legal and theoretical frameworks in which damage to 
human dignity as a criminal act has evolved and has been incorporated in practice into 
modern international law. Whether such understandings of dignity complement the 
aforementioned gender-neutral definitions of rape will be considered. This analysis will 
identify the usefulness of the dignity as a descriptor within the lexicon of rape in modern 
international law. Central to this investigation is consideration of the historical cultural 
contexts in which dignity as a legal concept emerged. 
Between the medieval and early modern period, concepts of dignity and honour2 
were substantially entwined as a linguistic expression of the hegemonic masculine, where 
male responsibilities set the agenda and female inclusion was strictly in support of male 
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family members. This relationship has long presented a challenge to its employment in 
political and legal discourse. Examining these terms in order to consider the reasons for 
duelling (a quintessentially masculine event) during the Enlightenment period,3 Immanuel 
Kant attempted to reconstruct ‘dignity’ in a way that would separate it from honour.  
Kant’s work has proved influential, culminating in a reconceptualisation of dignity 
that has spread its scope beyond a masculine elite, making part of civil and, then, human 
rights.4 Between the nineteenth and the twentieth century, as human rights started to 
surface as a universal concept a connection was, from its inception, drawn to dignity.5 In 
human rights thinking, it was held that dignity encapsulates the idea that by virtue of being 
human, every individual is born with the right to self-respect, self-worth, physical and 
psychological integrity and empowerment. A violation of human dignity is therefore held 
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to be a violation of human rights. Invoking this nexus, dignity has increasingly been used 
in international law to bring charges for war crimes – notably by the ICTY, the ICTR and 
the ICC.6  
In the context of prosecuting conflict-perpetrated rape, this chapter questions the 
usefulness of this development, particularly given that while male-female rape is often 
prosecuted under this headline, male-male and female-perpetrated rape are routinely 
dismissed as constituting an outrage upon human dignity. An initial focus has to be on the 
complex relationship between the terms ‘dignity’ and ‘honour’ and their accompanying 
cultural baggage in Western thought. This chapter explores the efforts from the 
Enlightenment on to separate dignity from honour, examining the contribution of Kant and 
its subsequent development. It then explores the extent to which the two terms, dignity and 
honour, remain linked culturally and the consequent impact this relationship has on the 
categorisation of rape as a violation of human dignity in international law. Problems 
relating to polarising understandings of what constitutes dignity in different cultures 
globally will need to be considered as part of an assessment of the extent to which ‘dignity’ 
should continue to be used as part of the lexicon of rape in modern international law.7 
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Since ancient times, the terms ‘dignity’ and ‘honour’ have been substantially entangled.  
In Roman law, dignitas referred either to an individual’s personal status8 or to the authority 
of, and respect accorded to, certain institutions, such as the senate and, later, the emperor 
and the state. The term ‘dignity’, in other words, invoked the concept of honour.9 Honour 
was accorded to someone on the basis of their individual achievements or familial status.10 
This understanding meant that appointment to public office, which provided an individual 
honourable status, also ‘brought with it dignitas.’11 The continuation of this understanding 
of dignitas is mirrored in the thirteenth century French definition of dignité, which referred 
to ideas of honour and privilege.12 
A consultation of dictionaries and their definitions further elicits the extent to 
which the language of dignity has served to define the term ‘honour’. The Latin honos 
referred to the concept of dignity.13 An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, 
describes honour as ‘[d]ignity; reputation; nobleness of mind; reverence’.14 From a 
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historical perspective, the concepts of honour and dignity seem intrinsically linked.15 As 
J. E. Lendon points out, ‘[d]ignitas extends back into the sources of honour to signify a 
claim to honour, and, like honos, can refer specifically to office as the source of that claim. 
But in its sense of “worthiness” it extends in the opposite direction to imply the attraction 
for favours, honours, and all good things that honour confers.’16 
As part of the re-evaluation of the traditional bonds of deference and duty within 
communities, the role of dignity played an important part in philosophical debates in the 
Enlightenment. During this period, philosophers revisited notions of liberty, fraternity, 
tolerance, and government as well as the role of the church and state and the burdens these 
placed on society, in order to challenge those, which unfairly oppressed individuals.17 Kant 
was central to this development, linking both moral duty and dignity to argue that the 
autonomy of the individual in making moral choices, based on rationality or 
reasonableness was one that had weight regardless of social hierarchy. He saw moral 
imperatives as tantamount to natural law, where willingness to accept objective moral 
principles was an end in itself, and that acceptance conferred dignity upon the individual. 
This claim to dignity was rooted in the free will required for submission to what he termed 
‘reasonable’ legislation.18 For Rachel Bayefsky, Kant defines dignity as ‘the inherent 
worth of the human person’ achieved as a result of not treating other individuals ‘as mere 
means’ but as intrinsically worthy of respect in their own right.19 This understanding 
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Springer, 2010). 
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established a complex conceptualisation arising out of the idea of the individuals as 
autonomous agents, capable of choosing their own destiny and deserving of respect 
independent of their position within the state hierarchy.20   
The Kantian dignity model is widely held to represent a shift from the traditional 
understanding of dignity, which was rooted in the hierarchical concept of honour.21 As 
Roger Sullivan observes:  
Kant’s entire moral philosophy can be understood as a protest against 
distinctions based on the far less important criteria of rank, wealth, and 
privilege… ‘Respect’ is radically different from the notion of ‘honour,’ which 
rests only on societal roles and prudential distinctions.22  
Manfred Kuehn explains that ‘honourableness or Ehrbarkeit was for Kant a merely 
external form of morality… He realized clearly that it depended on the social order’.23 A 
requirement to treat other individuals ‘honourably’ was rooted in knowing their place in 
the social hierarchy relative to your own, and not on the respective intrinsic worth of 
individuals. Kant therefore located personal morality and the responsibility for 
maintaining it in human relations in the notions of pure reason, rather than in the 
established expectations of a traditional code of honour.24 However, the point can be made 
that for Kant, ‘pure reason’ means independent of any further social facts attributable to 
the person and not (as is often falsely thought about Kant) dependent upon the person’s 
ability to reason. 
Kant’s reconceptualisation of dignity as representing the human value of an 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid, p.812. 
22 Roger Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, (New York, NY and Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p.197. 
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individual has had a continuing appeal in modern society, as part of a rejection of a 
traditional social status-based system. However, the extent to which Kant successfully 
separated dignity from patriarchal notions of honour is questionable given the gendered 
nature of the values in his original model. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful 
and Sublime, Kant explored models of understanding and distinguished two distinct types: 
‘that of the fair sex’ (woman), which considers the beautiful ‘and that of the noble sex’ 
(man), which is concerned with the sublime.25 In other words, ‘[t]here are sciences which 
require a sharp mind, much reflection, and profundity. These are for the male sex. On the 
other hand there are sciences that require wit and a kind of feeling, and these are proper 
for women.’26 Kant determined: 
Nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, nothing of obligation! Woman is 
intolerant of all commands and morose constraint. They do something only 
because it pleases them, and the art [of moral education] consists in making only 
that please them which is good… I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of 
principles… in place of it Providence has put in their breast kind and benevolent 
sensations.27 
For Kant, woman’s wisdom is not to do ‘with what is rational, but with feeling.’28 By this 
token, women possess rationality and the power of reasoning ‘to a lesser extent’ than man 
because they are guided by their feelings more than by rational logical thinking.29 It is on 
this basis that in the On the Old Saw: That May be Right in Theory But It Won’t Work in 
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Practice, Kant listed not being a woman or child as a qualification for citizenship.30  
Taking this point further in the Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Kant argued that 
‘[n]atural laws of freedom’31 and the ‘equality that accords with this freedom,’32 meant 
that women were not fit to vote or be active members or participants of a commonwealth.33 
He reasoned that because women depend for their ‘subsistence and protection… on 
arrangements by others’,34 they have no claim or right, to guide or ‘manage the state, to 
organize,’ or work for or towards the introduction or creation of certain laws.35 This point 
has widely been accepted as amounting to not only a denial of women’s citizenship rights, 
but their claims to equality. As summarised by Sally Sedgwick, a woman ‘has no reason 
ever to expect on the basis of Kantian morality equality under the law.’36  
For Mari Mikkola, while his comments regarding women might initially seem 
troubling, on closer examination Kant’s views are actually more complex.37 Indeed, 
elsewhere in his work, Kant describes women in a different way to that outlined above:  
If one attends to the course of conversation in mixed companies consisting not 
merely of scholars and subtle reasoners but also of business people or women, 
one notices that their entertainment includes… arguing… Now, of all arguments 
there are none that more excite the participation of persons who are otherwise 
soon bored with subtle reasoning… than arguments about the moral worth of 
this or that action… Those for whom anything subtle and refined in theoretical 
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questions is dry and irksome soon join in when it is a question of how to make 
out the moral import of a good or evil action… and to an extent one does not 
otherwise expect of them on any object of speculation they are precise, refined, 
and subtle in thinking.38 
This passage indicates that Kant does not claim that women are always unequivocally 
apathetic to morality, (although he does not clearly state that ‘women’s moral conduct 
elicits esteem’).39 On this basis, Mikkola argues that it would be unwise and inaccurate to 
conclude that Kant saw women to be deficient in moral character in the sense outlined, 
‘since his remarks are not sufficiently informative.’40 
Others are less convinced of the value of the Kantian model. Feminist critics like 
Sedgwick argue that Kantian theory is intrinsically gendered.41 As Jean Grimshaw points 
out, Kant’s ‘ideal of moral worth itself encapsulates qualities seen as paradigmatically 
masculine, and excludes those seen as feminine.’42 Women are ‘imperfect members of 
humanity, or only imperfectly human’.43 Only men naturally possess autonomy and so, 
human dignity.44 Women, instead, have grace.45  
By excluding women from the concept of dignity, Kant sustains the patriarchal 
ideology entrenched in the traditional understanding of honour, and perpetuates the 
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relationship between these two concepts. This framing continues to have an impact on 
modern conceptualisations of these terms, which relate to the legal conceptualisation of 
women and their share of human rights in international as well as national legislation. It 
can be argued that the core premise Kant puts forward about what constitutes dignity can 
be stripped back to omit his accompanying caveats about women and their individual 
capacities, which can be seen as reflections of his time. That achieved, Kantian notions of 
dignity can be described as being free of gendered as well as of hierarchical expectations, 
promoting instead the value of the individual on his (or her) own terms. The problem lies, 
in the ways in which this framework feeds into and perpetuates the strongly polarised 
debates regarding dignity and its association with honour.   
The debates regarding the gendered notion of the Kantian model of dignity aside, 
the question remains whether Kant successfully separated the concept of dignity from 
honour. An analysis of the cultural thinking that underpins a range of legislative systems, 
suggests not. As touched upon by Meir Dan-Cohen, some commentators and practitioners 
still use the term ‘dignity’ as an extension of or synonym for honour.46 This understanding 
becomes apparent when consulting modern national dictionary definitions of these terms 
– an important exercise given that in cultural linguistics, ‘[d]ictionaries are considered 
culture mines’.47 In English language dictionaries published in the England and the US, 
dignity remains synonymous with honour,48 and vice versa.49 The result of such research 
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is that the usefulness of categorising rape as an outrage on human dignity under 
international law is left open to question. 
 
Rape in International Law: From a Violation of Family Honour to an Outrage of 
Human Dignity  
The exploration of dictionary definitions reveals therefore that the association made during 
the twentieth century between human rights and a Kantian understanding of the term 
‘dignity’ is not as straightforward as it seems on the surface. Instead, it is complicated by 
the ways that the linkage brings together conflicting cultural traditions without any 
recognition of the problems this causes, most particularly when seeking to categorise 
conflict-perpetrated rape as an outrage on human dignity. The complication arises because, 
historically, international law emerged from a cultural context in which rape was, in line 
with hegemonic masculine thinking, initially framed as a violation of family or female 
honour. Aspects of this legal customary norm continued to manifest itself in international 
law as it developed during the eighteenth century.50 This continuation encouraged the 
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incorporation of a traditional gender dimension into an understanding of dignity even 
while the class dimension was rejected, because the concept of honour was still understood 
as being essentially masculine and so ‘something lent to women by men’.51 In detail, 
dignity as honour for women maintained its link with a woman’s visible possession of 
purity52 and chastity.53 This framework meant that where a woman had been raped, she 
was considered to have lost honour by being soiled and so disgraced.54 The victim – rather 
than the assigned masculine protector – could also be held culpable for the crime where 
circumstances permitted an interpretation that she had wilfully made herself vulnerable to 
attack. In this context, moral injury, in the sense of the ‘damage done to one’s conscience 
or moral compass’, was seen as a failure on the part of the victim to ‘prevent acts that 
transgress their own moral and ethical values or codes of conduct.’55 Sufferers from moral 
injury included those who bore the responsibility for their attack because they had 
supposedly made themselves vulnerable to the assault.56 Women could be privileged 
persons deserving of special shielding measures only because of their subordinate social 
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status. Such language reinforces ideas of the importance of ‘male entitlement and female 
chastity’,57 where a woman’s family honour was lost because of her own misconduct.58 
The legacy of this interpretation of rape and its aftermath lingers on, as noted in previous 
chapters.  
Unsurprisingly, a continued framing of rape as a violation of family or female 
honour has been contested by feminist scholars. For Rhonda Copelon, to imply that the 
woman’s honour is lost following rape is tantamount to blaming the victim for the crime.59 
This understanding negatively affects both the social and familial position of the woman 
because it reinforces the stigma attached to the offence.60 Another critic, Alona Hagay-
Frey, suggests that an invocation of the concept of honour not only diminishes the gravity 
of the injury caused by rape, but conceals the individual physical, social and personal harm 
caused to the victim.61 Where rape is framed as a violation of honour, the focus is on the 
damage done to family honour, not the individual.62 Perpetuation of this understanding of 
rape reinforces hegemonic masculine thinking, including the idea of the woman as a man’s 
property.63 The language of honour ignores the violent nature of the crime and the impact 
on the victim.64 It normalises and renders invisible issues such as women’s subordination 
to men, as well as man’s supremacy.65 A further challenge is that, historically, rape was 
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understood solely as a crime perpetrated by men against women. This understanding has 
left a legacy in cultural attitudes contributing to incidents of male-male and female-
perpetrated rape being overlooked.66 Indeed, the categorisation of rape as a violation of 
family or female honour undoubtedly had implications for its prosecution in the post-
WWII war crimes trials of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT, 1945-
1946) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1947).67 As 
touched upon by Catherine Niarchos, labelling rape as a violation of honour has the power 
to make it appear less deserving of prosecution than other injuries, such as limb or sight 
loss.68  
Though rape is no longer explicitly framed as a violation of family or female 
honour in modern international law, its categorisation as an outrage upon human dignity 
has, seemingly, continued this understanding, as indicated in the work of the ICTY. During 
the Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (2001) trial, for 
example, Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV was referred to, which stipulates that all 
women shall be ‘especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular 
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.’69 Attempting to 
explain what was meant by honour, the Trial Chamber stated in a footnote that it 
interpreted ‘“honour” in the sense of “dignity”’.70 This understanding was not to detract 
from the ‘view that these are violent crimes.’71  
                                                          
66 See for example, Augusta DelZotto and Adam Jones, ‘Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime: 
Human Rights’ Last Taboo?’, unpublished paper presented to the Annual Convention of the International 
Studies Association, New Orleans, LA, 23-27 March 2002: 
http://adamjones.freeservers.com/malerape.htm, (accessed 24 August 2019). 
67 Hagay-Frey, ‘Sex and Gender Crimes in International Law’, p.190. 
68 Niarchos, ‘Women, War, and Rape’, p.674. 
69 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković (Trial Judgment), IT-96-23-T & 
IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para 531. 
70 Ibid, fn.1299. 
71 Ibid. 




This circular understanding is apparent in the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija trial 
judgment. Clarifying the seriousness of crimes against human or personal dignity in 
international law, the Trial Chamber stated: 
The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and 
indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human 
rights law; indeed in modern times it has become of such importance as to 
permeate the whole body of international law. This principle is intended to 
shield human beings from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such 
outrages are carried out by unlawfully attacking the body or humiliating and 
debasing the honour, the self-respect or the mental well-being of a person.72 
By failing to provide any further clarification, the Trial Chamber appears to have 
reinforced the notion that these concepts are intrinsically linked in international law, 
which has wider implications for the prosecution of rape. It is worth reiterating the point 
made in Chapter 4 that male-male rape, for example, was routinely ignored under this 
heading by the specialist international courts. 
The linguistic challenges associated with the term ‘dignity’ are not limited to its 
relationship to the concept of honour. Indeed, the term ‘dignity’ does not exist as an 
independent concept in some languages. For example, in Hindi, there is no equivalent to 
the term ‘dignity’. Barker writes that if the term was to be translated it would have to be 
replaced with the language of ‘worth’, ‘honour’ or ‘self-respect’, something which 
fundamentally changes the understanding of Indian law and its utilisation of these terms.73 
This point leads us to consider the impact of cultural relativism on international law. 
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Cultural Relativism  
A key issue within the development of international law is cultural relativism, ‘[t]he 
position that there is no universal standard to measure cultures by, and that all cultures are 
equally valid and must be understood in their own terms.’74 In this context, the concept of 
dignity has provoked much discussion.  
In the West, the concept of dignity is currently employed in legal language 
alongside that of equality to promote and protect women’s parity of access to human rights. 
This understanding is illustrated in the UN’s adoption of the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979 (CEDAW),75 which prohibits 
discriminatory acts against women. The Convention aims to protect women against rape 
and supports prosecutions of alleged perpetrators. CEDAW acknowledges, for example, 
that ‘extensive discrimination against women continues to exist’.76 It asserts that acts of 
discrimination violate ‘the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity’.77 
In order to monitor compliance, the UN introduced the CEDAW Committee (1982-
present) – a body consisting of 23 women’s rights experts, which is responsible for 
assessing whether the Convention has been implemented by State parties and providing 
recommendations for improvement where permitted.78 Since its creation, states have 
challenged the universal applicability of CEDAW. In 2008, for example, several Member 
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States submitted Declarations, reservations, objections and notifications of withdrawal of 
reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,79 on the basis that CEDAW’s secularised terminology undermines aspects 
of their domestic laws, which aim to protect the rights and dignity of women differently.80 
From the perspective of many Islamic states, women’s right to the possession of individual 
dignity needs to be included within the broader conceptualisation of the family and how 
that operates. King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia (2005-2015), argues that ‘[i]t 
is absurd to impose on an individual or a society rights that are alien to its beliefs or 
principles’.81  
Taking this point further in its reservations regarding Article 16 (see Appendix 3),82 
Egypt maintains that in Sharia law, women’s marital rights are adequately protected; it 
accords women with rights ‘equivalent to those of their spouses so as to ensure a just 
balance between them’.83 The best guarantees of ‘true equality’ between spouses, Egypt 
argues, lies in acknowledging equivalency which ensures complementarity, rather than ‘a 
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quasi-equality that renders the marriage a burden on the wife’.84 Egypt insists that balance 
is achieved because in Sharia law the husband is required to provide financial support, 
even in the event of divorce.85 The wife, on the other hand, retains full property rights and 
is not obliged to support, maintain or provide for either herself or her husband.86  
The reservations submitted by Morocco make similar charges, stipulating that 
equality of the kind espoused by CEDAW is ‘considered incompatible with the Islamic 
sharia, which guarantees to each of the spouses the rights and responsibilities within a 
framework of equilibrium and complementarity in order to preserve the sacred bond of 
matrimony.’87 Iraq also insists in its reservations about CEDAW that Sharia law works to 
secure ‘women rights equivalent to the rights of their spouses so as to ensure a just balance 
between them’.88 As part of its ideology of ‘equal but different’, the point is made that 
there is a balance of advantages possessed by each sex. Yet as supporters of CEDAW point 
out, Sharia law in its various manifestations does restrict ‘the wife’s rights to divorce by 
making this contingent on a judge’s ruling, a restriction which does not apply to the 
husband’.89 Moreover, many Islamic states continue to reject marital rape as a viable legal 
concept. Under its most recent revision of the penal code, Egypt continues to overlook 
rape within marriage, denying the personal dimension to forced intercourse.  
Neshmiya Adnan Khan argues that these reservations should not be viewed as 
either a rejection of women’s rights or a violation of their dignity. These states, she 
maintains, are simply seeking to pronounce these rights within an Islamic framework, 
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which requires that the biological differences between the two are recognised on an 
equitable, but not equal (in the sense of the same) basis.90 It needs to be understood, she 
insists, that the women as well as men in these states ‘derive their identity from their 
cultures and traditions’, which include their religious beliefs, and that ‘any attack on their 
culture, is an attack on their identity.’91 For women brought up with these religious and 
cultural values, ‘their honour also forms part of their identity’.92 As such, their dignity is 
best served by preserving that identity rather than having the ‘ability to exercise their 
rights.’93   
Taking a practical perspective on the arguments presented by those Islamic states, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (1994-
2003), acknowledges that the global situation is more complex than is recognised by 
CEDAW and its supporters. In the wider context of non-Western societies, the women of 
these nations predominantly ‘identify with their culture’ and feel insulted rather than 
protected by outsiders who condemn their approach to doing things.94 Coomaraswamy 
insists that ‘[s]ince their sense of identity is integrally linked to the general attitude towards 
their community, their sense of dignity and self-respect often comes from members of the 
larger community.’95  
Coomaraswamy produces no sociological evidence to support her claim. On those 
grounds, her conclusions can be described as being less than robust. That said, there is 
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validity to some of the points she raises about identity and the imposition of Western values 
on non-Western societies. This view is reflected in the reactions of some Western feminist 
commentators to these charges of what might be called ‘conceptual imperialism’. Camilla 
Barker, for example, agrees that those individuals or groups that feel that their beliefs and 
culture are under scrutiny or attack are likely to react by rejecting the proposed provision 
of protection, by distancing themselves from those offering the provision.96  
Both Western feminist critics of Islamic states and pragmatists like 
Coomaraswamy and Barker who seek reconciliation between the sides insist that a 
patriarchal understanding of Islam is entrenched in Sharia law. For Khan, for example, any 
implementation of domestic law, which remains ‘conditional upon the complete 
subjugation of the wife to her husband’ is unacceptable.97 The gulf manifested by these 
divergent stances suggests that cultural relativism still poses an obstacle to the evolution 
and application of a mutually agreed definition of dignity in international law. This reality 
in itself provides a test of the potential usefulness of dignity as a part of a lexicon of rape 
in international law. 
There are potential ways of navigating around these problems. Here, the 
engagement with and response to cultural relativism debates within Africa provides a 
useful example. Various experts have written on the subject in reaction to concerns raised 
regarding practices such as female genital cutting and forced marriage.98 In response, 
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Africa has created tools like the Protocol to the African Union Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol, 2003), which set up 
the parameters of human rights law in a way that engages with their own culture as well 
as international standards on women’s rights.99 In the context of establishing a specialist 
international court like the Rwandan Tribunal, then, it can use its own human rights tools 
to set the parameters for how to navigate the problems addressed in this chapter. Even so, 
this does not fully resolve the challenge of the use of dignity as a framing term for 
prosecutions for rape in international law because the linguistic and cultural tensions over 
what is conveyed by dignity remain unaddressed. 
 
Recommendations 
In 1998, at a time when both the ICTY or the ICTR were developing their prosecution 
protocols, a UN report had warned that both the terms ‘dignity’ and ‘honour’ in 
international law have damaging connotations for women. It concluded that these concepts 
are: 
[L]ent to women by men, and that a raped woman is thereby dishonoured. 
Failure of these instruments to categorize sexual violence as a violent crime that 
violates bodily integrity, presents a serious obstacle to addressing crimes of 
sexual violence against women. It directly reflects and reinforces the 
trivialization of such offences.100 
Emphasising this point, Valerie Oosterveld argues that listing rape as an outrage upon 
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either human or personal dignity represents a backward step rather than an advance.101 It 
sends an out-of-date and damaging message that these crimes should be assessed based on 
the injury done to the victim’s modesty, chastity or honour.102 Kelly Dawn Askin concurs, 
having found that such a delineation of rape as violation of human dignity or a crime 
against honour grossly miscategorises the crime and entrenches harmful stereotypes.103 
Even experts who identify honour and dignity as separate concepts accept that, 
quite independently of the challenges of cultural relativism, the language of dignity is 
failing to capture the harm caused by rape. For Copelon:  
[W]hile the concept of dignity potentially embraces more profound concerns 
[than honour], standing alone it obfuscates the fact that rape is fundamentally 
violence against women – violence against a woman’s body, autonomy, 
integrity, self-hood, security and self-esteem as well as her standing in the 
community. This failure to recognize rape as violence is critical to the 
traditionally lesser or ambiguous status of rape.104   
Other scholars question the usefulness of applying a single term like ‘dignity’ to categorise 
a criminal act, because of differences in understanding and perception of language. Ruth 
Macklin, for example, suggests that calls for dignity are either restatements of other ideas 
or slogans that add nothing of value to the topic.105 Mirko Bagaric and James Allan argue 
that as philosophical or legal concept, dignity is incapable of justifying or explaining ‘any 
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narrower interests; it cannot do the work [that] nonconsequentialist rights adherents 
demand of it’.106 It is on this basis that the conclusion is reached that the term ‘dignity’ 
should not be included in the lexicon of rape in modern international law. 
 
Conclusion 
The use of dignity as a legal concept in modern international law continues to polarise 
experts in ways that highlight the need to work out solutions that recognise the challenge 
provided by cultural relativism. Catherine Dupré, for example, argues that the dignity is a 
useful concept that embodies notions such as human worth, equality and freedom.107 
Mohammad Hashim Kamali, on the other hand, fairly identifies problems relating to the 
practical application of the term, including different understandings of what constitutes 
‘dignity’.108 Additional challenges are raised in societies where the term does not exist.  
However, when applied in cases of rape in modern international law, as this chapter 
underlines, dignity reveals itself as providing a flawed approach in that it raises as many 
(if different) problems as it solves. Etymologically, the origins of the term are deeply 
entrenched in patriarchal conceptualisations of honour in a wide range of cultures. Since 
the Enlightenment period, philosophers, notably Kant, have attempted to reconceptualise 
dignity, and separate it from traditional notions of honour; yet they continue to be 
interlinked in practice. This ongoing relationship presents a number of challenges for the 
categorisation of rape as a violation of human dignity in international law. In both national 
and international legal systems, the term ‘dignity’ works to reinforce the traditional 
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understanding of rape simply as a defilement of a woman’s chastity and man’s property, 
ignoring the violent nature of the crime. It also overlooks instances of male-male and 
female-perpetrated rape. Indeed, the ICTY nor the ICTR routinely overlooked male-male 
or female-perpetrated rape under this heading. On this basis, this chapter concludes that 
dignity cannot usefully be employed in the lexicon of rape for use in modern international 
specialist courts. This conclusion leaves open the consideration of the categorisation of 



























The previous chapter reviewed and rejected the value of characterising rape as an outrage 
upon human dignity for inclusion in the lexicon of rape in modern international law. 
Attention now turns to the usefulness of classifying rape as a crime of torture, which shifts 
the focus of the argument onto the public/private dichotomy in international law. Here, an 
examination is undertaken of whether such a categorisation can provide a constructive 
alternative, avoiding a perpetuation of those pejorative cultural and gendered overtones 
traditionally associated with victims of conflict-related rape.  
In seeking to clarify what constitutes torture and other acts of ill-treatment, the UN 
General Assembly (1945-present) created the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT, 1984),1 which 
defined torture as a breach of human rights in broad terms. Though not explicitly listed in 
the Convention, rape was later identified in international law as ‘gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights’ which can cause severe physical and mental pain or suffering 
when inflicted by individuals acting in some way as a state actor or in an official capacity.2 
On the one hand, this identification has the capacity to conceptualise conflict-
perpetrated rape as being politically motivated or sponsored. An act of rape therefore has 
the potential to relate to the inherently public sphere of international law, rather than 
constituting an escalation of an essentially private harm, which is the outcome of a purely 
individual or personal choice or reaction. On the other, there are practical problems 
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regarding the use of torture in applications by modern international criminal tribunals and 
courts. For example, when negotiating the relevant boundaries between the public and the 
private sphere, and deciding how to conceptualise the nature of a crime involving rape, 
these bodies have relied on pre-existing cultural bias and experience. Such bias can lead 
to a presumption that rape should be categorised as a private harm, rather than as a 
reflection of state policy, especially where incidents of rape seem to embody 
(hetero)normative understandings of the crime. For example, in the proceedings of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014), male-female rape was 
rarely labelled as torture. This infrequency could be linked to its identification as a 
(hetero)normative private harm.3 Even where, in some instances, torture was invoked in 
the charge, the categorisation was inconsistent. Sometimes rape and torture were 
prosecuted as separate offences. At other times, rape was prosecuted as torture only. This 
might suggest that cultural relativism is also a factor to be considered. For Maila Stivens, 
for example, the boundaries of that dichotomy between the public and the private differs 
widely across different cultures and societies, but its manifestation in international law 
invokes Western standards.4 
One constant, however, has been the continuing focus in the debates on the sexual 
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element of the crime. In contrast, where male-male rape was prosecuted as torture, for 
example, little mention was made of the sexual dimension to the crime, suggesting its 
identification as both non-normative and a public harm.5 Though it can readily be 
identified as non-normative, female-perpetrated rape (committed against either sex) has 
yet to be prosecuted as torture.6 The implications of these inconsistencies for a culturally 
powerful and persistent continuation of traditional gender essentialist thinking regarding 
rape are considerable.  
To contextualise the relationship between gender essentialist thinking and the 
public/private dichotomy in international law, and the impact this nexus has on rape 
prosecutions, it is important to consider the role played by hypermasculinity and 
hegemonic masculinity. As part of this exercise, the historical realities associated with the 
prohibition of torture in international law and its accompanying cultural baggage will be 
examined, in order to determine the usefulness of this categorisation within a lexicon of 
rape in modern international law.  
 
Historical Context 
Historically, torture was considered both an acceptable form of criminal punishment and 
an effective method of interrogation for those considered threats to state security in various 
countries.7 During Antiquity, for example, the ancient Greeks and Romans routinely 
tortured slaves to ensure their testimony was reliable.8 Torture played an important role in 
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the trial proceedings of medieval Europe.9 It was used as a legitimate form of either 
criminal punishment or method of state-endorsed interrogation. As the latter, its use by 
armed forces and other related bodies acting on behalf of the state was intended to enable 
the state to defend itself against threats to its security, a position reflected in state actions 
throughout the world in previous centuries.10 Torture was used in a similar way in ancient 
China, as a lawful method of extracting a confession.11 In the eighteenth century, attitudes 
towards the use of torture started to change. Enlightenment theorists had expressed concern 
regarding its uncivilised nature. Questions were raised about the usefulness of testimony 
produced by such measures.12 Italian philosopher and jurist Cesare Bonesana di Beccaria 
in his treatise On Crimes and Punishments (1764), for example, condemned torture.13 By 
1800, use of all methods of torture had been officially abolished in Western Europe and 
the US, diminishing its association with legitimate political strategies.14 
As part of the emergence of international humanitarian law in the nineteenth 
century, recorded uses of torture in conflict-related environments started to decline. 
Various legal instruments that sought to regulate the conduct of war were introduced, 
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Foundation for the care of victims of torture, 2001), 7-,20, p.11; Niccolò Machiavelli, ‘The Prince’, in 
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which (at least implicitly) prohibited torture among other acts. The Lieber Code 1863, for 
example, stipulated, albeit ambiguously, that ‘any revenge wreaked upon him [a prisoner] 
by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of 
food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.’15 Under the Hague Convention 1899 
and 1907, ‘[p]risoners of war… must be treated humanely’, but again no clarification is 
provided by what this term means.16  
Surprisingly, at least from a modern perspective, this lack of clarity provoked little 
comment during the war crimes trials following WWII. As Dan Plesch points out, there 
had been few discussions of torture as a concept in the war crimes trials conducted by the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT, 1945-1946) and the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, 1946-1948). This absence, he explains, was 
due to there being ‘a surprising consensus on what constituted torture’ amongst legal 
scholars, including the UN War Crimes Commission (1943-1948).17 During the Cold War 
era (1947-1991), that international consensus began to dissolve. By the 1960s, it became 
clear that several UN Member States – including the US – disagreed on what constituted 
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Attempting to clarify what amounted to such acts in international law, the UN 
General Assembly introduced the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
1975.19 Though not legally binding, the Declaration is an important instrument, because it 
established as a principle in international law that ‘every act of torture is a grave offence 
against human dignity’.20 It also formally acknowledged the precedent set by the IMT and 
IMTFE war crimes trials – that prosecutions for torture must look beyond traditional 
understandings of what amounts to such crimes, but still without going into detail.  
Building on this model, in 1977, the UN General Assembly ordered the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (1946-2006) to draft a binding treaty based on the 
Declaration, which would prohibit acts of torture. In 1984, UNCAT was introduced, which 
hoped to ‘achiev[e] a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition under 
international and national law’.21 Echoing the definition provided in the Declaration, 
UNCAT defines torture as: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
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the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.22  
The UNCAT definition relies on three key factors: the intensity of pain or suffering 
experienced, the identity of the perpetrator as a state actor, and the official purpose of the 
torturer to emphasise the public nature of torture.23 However, judgments about the 
threshold of severity of pain and suffering involved, moving an event from the private to 
the public sphere of law, was at the discretion of judges and prosecutors. 
Though rape is not formally listed as constituting torture, the provisions contained 
in UNCAT played a pivotal role in the decisions potentially to categorise rape under this 
heading by the ICTY, the ICTR and the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-
present).24 This potential was realised in a number of cases, but without consistency or 
explanation. The consequent lack of clarity leads to a questioning of whether this 
development does constitute a constructive advance in practice.  
 
Rape as a Crime of Torture in International Law 
The reports of systematic rape in the former Yugoslavian and Rwandan wars in the 1990s, 
which created an international demand for such incidents to be prosecuted, ensured that 
these tribunals considered rape as a headline war crime. Taking into consideration the 
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pervasive and orchestrated nature of rape,25 these ad hoc tribunals determined that the 
physical harm caused by the act should not be the only factor considered.26 The cultural, 
social and political context in which these crimes were committed was agreed as 
potentially having equal importance when determining state responsibility or action. For 
example, as touched upon in the previous chapters, in some communities, female chastity 
continues to be held as central to a family’s honour and the stability of its immediate 
community and, more widely of the national society. Rape victims belonging to these 
communities are often stigmatised, shamed and ostracised.27 In light of this cultural 
context, if acts of rape were identified as being state endorsed weapons of war or acts of 
genocide, this could constitute torture.28   
Hypermasculinity and the associated concept of hegemonic masculinity have also 
been identified by feminist scholarship as playing an important role in the use of rape – 
perpetrated by and against either gender – as a state-sponsored strategy in conflict. From 
a hypermasculine perspective, associated with legal processes endorsing patriarchal 
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Conflict’, p.268. See also, Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić aka ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo aka 
‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalić (1998) upheld the Akayesu decision. Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucić aka ‘Pavo’, 
Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo aka ‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalić (Trial Judgment), IT-96-21-T, ICTY, 16 November 
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authority, deviation by men from the heteronormative standard are ‘othered’ and acquire 
a lesser value.29 The incidents of male-male rape prosecutions mentioned throughout this 
thesis characterise them as having typically been used in conflict-related environments to 
lower the social status of victims, by casting doubt on their sexuality, stripping them of 
their masculinity by feminising them.30 This tactic is held to break the enemy and 
undermine wider community structures, emphasising the state involvement in this 
strategy.31 As pointed out by Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General (1997-2006), ‘[t]he 
sexual abuse, torture and mutilation of male detainees or prisoners is often carried out to 
attack and destroy their sense of masculinity or manhood’.32  
Adam Jones describes male-male rape as ‘[o]ne of the most lethal gender roles in 
modern times’,33 and rhetorically asks, ‘what greater humiliation can one man impose on 
another man or boy than to turn him into a de facto “female” through sexual cruelty?’34 In 
light of their assessment, the ICTR, the ICTY, and the ICC recognised that rape by and 
against either gender can constitute torture in international law. In so doing, the question 
is raised how far they were recognising, in the context of civil war, the hegemonic 
masculinity inherent in state authority. 
This discussion returns us to the debate identified earlier in the chapter over the 
extent to which charging rape as torture, and thus a public act, represents a constructive 
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advance. For feminists like Susan Brownmiller, rape is ‘nothing more or less than a 
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.’35 
This comment, while extreme, serves to underline the broader political dimensions to 
conflict-perpetrated rape, in terms of the impact not merely on the victim but also on the 
victim’s family and community with all the implications that has for the stability of social 
hierarchies in targeted groups.36 In keeping with these claims, Catharine MacKinnon 
argues that the characterisation of rape as torture in international law is progressive. It 
brings an acknowledgement that rape is ‘neither individual nor random’, but defined by 
shifting socio-political power distribution.37 The way rape is used as a gendered political 
tactic in order coerce or intimidate women is also acknowledged.38 Taking this point 
further, MacKinnon suggests that all sexual crimes, including rape, constitute a violation 
of human rights and, as such, should be identified as identified as acts of torture.39 Such a 
move would, in her mind, define rape as an offence which is sufficiently serious to 
constitute torture regardless of whether or not it was perpetrated in a conflict-affected 
context.40 But it is particularly urgent to recognise its political nature in conflict-affected 
environments because, she argues, the political authority of either belligerent side is 
typically complicit in the execution of rape perpetrated against women, either endorsing 
or tolerating such acts.41 For her, then, what is crucial to understand is that rapes 
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perpetrated in conflict can never be seen as private acts. Her point is that ‘the abuse is 
systematic and known, the disregard is official and organized, and the effective 
governmental tolerance is a matter of law and policy’.42  
The emphasis, here, is placed on the group nature of conflict-perpetrated rape 
incidents, which, in MacKinnon’s mind, amounts to a justification of its classification as 
torture. There is some value to her claim. Indeed, by categorising all rape as torture, women 
(through organisations such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) have the 
opportunity to assert their rights to claim protection under human rights legislation on an 
equal basis with men. This works to reinforce the idea, in line with Brownmiller’s thinking, 
that the real harm of rape is less about the individual experiences of victims than it is about 
the need to identify rape as an exercise of male power and authority. By classifying rape 
committed in conflict as torture in international law, the state endorsement of male 
authority over women by any means is prioritised in prosecutions, to the advantage of 
women’s status in law.   
Other feminists remain unconvinced of the value of this perspective on conflict-
perpetrated rape. Sarah Diebler provides one alternative point of view, in which she 
challenges the idea that prosecuting rape as torture would be an advance for women. In an 
echo of the arguments rehearsed in Chapter 5 on the intrinsically gendered nature of rape, 
she insists that to classify ‘rape as inherently an act of torture, not merely torture by virtue 
of a legal re-categorization’ has the effect of undermining traditional notions of rape to the 
detriment of women victims.43 In order to engage with these debates, the evolution of 
torture as a crime in international law needs to be revisited to comprehend the value of the 
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inclusion of rape under this category. Diebler’s point is that in considering all rape as 
coming under this categorisation, torture is affirmed as the most serious crime, while rape 
as simply an element within that, diminishing the ability of victims to emphasise the 
individual harms they experience.44 For her, rape is trivialised thereby, sending the 
message that the crime itself ‘is not necessarily bad’, or that ‘rape per se does not harm.’45 
Presenting a further critical perspective on this matter, Karen Engle expands Diebler’s 
argument by suggesting that in describing rape as torture, a situation is created where the 
legal stance is that ‘women are not capable of not being victimized by the rapes.’46 Engle 
insists what is significant is the recognition that for many survivors of conflict-perpetrated 
rape, their lives have been irretrievably damaged by the violation. This individual 
experience, she insists, cannot be subsumed into the universal because it does not recognise 
the range of suffering experienced.47 For Engle, generalising the harm caused by rape, as 
MacKinnon advocates, works instead to reinforce the idea that rape is especially damaging 
to women. More, that as a ‘fate worse than death’,48 the effect is to cement the status of 
rape as a viable weapon in conflict, because it confirms its lasting impact on the individual 
and their community. In so doing, it also works, she claims, to perpetuate the traditional 
image of women as helpless victims of conflict.49 
From a practical perspective, the prosecution of rape as torture by the ICTY and 
the ICTR demonstrates that fundamental problems remain with its application as a 
prosecution strategy. Male-female rape, for example, continues to be inconsistently 
prosecuted a form of torture. For Blatt, the failure to recognise male-female rape as 
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constituting torture ‘is partially rooted in a systematic blindness to the connection between 
issues of gender and gross human rights violations.’50 She argues that the rape of a woman 
is perceived primarily as a sexual offence by the courts. As such, little consideration is 
given to the political dimension to the crime.51 In contrast, male-male rape, (when not 
ignored) has been prosecuted under this heading. By prosecuting male-male rape in this 
way, the traditional gendered political dimension to conflict-perpetrated violence is 
emphasised. This is especially the case given that female-perpetrated rape is equally 
overlooked under this categorisation of what amounts to torture. The conclusions reached 
by feminist commentators from MacKinnon to Engle is that these different types of rape 
crimes continue to be valued and understood differently, with rape continuing to be 
prosecuted on the basis of traditional conceptualisations of rape as a crime committed by 
men against women. Thus, acts of rape committed against men are typically more easily 
understood as constituting a form of torture, not rape. This point is further emphasised by 
cases where prosecutions for conflict-perpetrated male-female rape identify an act of rape 
as a separate entity in the charge to torture.  
That these differing prosecution strategies have attracted much criticism from 
feminist scholarship has already been noted. Addressing the separation of offences in a 
range of war crimes prosecutions, Blatt argues that current prosecution practices result in 
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rape being the one act of violence an individual may employ which is not automatically 
identified as torture.52 Such a framing of rape incidents as separate to torture also means 
that the experiences of victims are subjected to further analysis by the courts to test the 
legal validity of the label. They must first prove that they are rape victim and, second, that 
their ‘rape amounts to torture, or alternatively that any distinctions in their treatment 
compared to the norm (read: male) justifies the creation of an exception to the rule.’53 
Using this approach in rape prosecutions makes it possible to argue that women are not 
treated equally in international law.54 
Labelling male-male rape as torture only also has its limitations if a full range of 
gender experience is to be considered. Valerie Oosterveld argues that this methodology 
‘obscures the sexual’ dimension of the crime and other implicit assumptions about rape 
and responsibility for men as well as women.55 Building on this point, Sandesh 
Sivakumaran suggests that its categorisation as torture only works to underpin the widely-
held hegemonic masculine notions that men cannot be the subject of sexual assault and are 
not vulnerable to rape.56 This perspective entrenches the notion that rape is a crime that 
affects only women and girls in conflict-affected environments.57 It operates to cement 
assumptions derived from hegemonic masculinity when identifying responsibility for 
rape.58  
For Torbjørn Herlof Andersen, this stance is mirrored in the use of language within 
society in general as well as the courts and other agencies. Often, he insists, there is no 
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discrete set of phrases which can be used by males to articulate their experience of rape as 
men.59 At first, Andersen’s claim may seem far-fetched to some. Indeed, there are, 
seemingly, various different terms that can be used to describe an act such as rape. How 
else can we explain the ability of female rape victims to explain the harm that has been 
committed against them? But, for Andersen, this is part of the problem. Men, he explains, 
are conditioned to think of rape victims as being female, and so accept the established 
female terminology associated with vaginal rape to articulate their range of pain and 
suffering.60 Certainly the English language features no distinctively masculine terms 
which can be used to describe the experience of male rape.61 This lack of descriptive 
terminology perpetrates the illusion that rape is a phenomenon that does not affect men.62 
A gender-balanced perspective on male-male rape is therefore difficult to achieve given 
the importance in courts, as well as in a culture, of the ability effectively to describe and 
so label a harm committed against an individual.63 When male victims fail to describe their 
experience of rape accurately, except in ways that are predicated on descriptors used for 
and by female rape victims, they are susceptible to being feminised. The preference for 
male-male rape to be categorised instead under the broader heading of torture is explained, 
at least in terms of providing a practical strategy for prosecutors.64 
In the broader context of the MeToo Movement in 2017, Melissa Burkley explored 
the issue of sexual assault and language, has suggested ways of tackling this problem. 
Focusing on a statement provided by Terry Crews, an actor, where he likened his 
experience to being a prisoner of war, Burkley argues that using symbolic terms to describe 
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male-male sexual assaults is useful. It works to frame the harm in a way that does not 
feminise the male victim.65 Indeed, as Alejandra Azuero Quijano and Jocelyn Kelly point 
out, the United Nations (UN, 1945-present) and international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) increasingly use metaphors to describe acts of sexual violence 
committed in armed conflict, which has, in turn, permeated the way in which the media 
reports accounts.66 In theory, the use of symbolic or metaphoric language can be employed 
in a way that avoids the pejorative undertones associated with traditional gendered 
descriptors for rape. From a legal perspective, however, describing male-male rape in such 
terms is far too vague and unspecific to be usefully applied in the international courts and 
tribunals.67  
In this light, perhaps, rather than focusing on the application of symbolic language, 
emphasis should be placed on resolving the issue that rape continues to be understood and 
interpreted as a sexual crime perpetrated by men against women. As a result, men do not 
feel comfortable giving detailed evidence which would label their experience as rape. It is 
for these reasons that male-male rape continues to be buried in the language of torture, 
which focuses on pain and suffering in more general terms, avoiding the challenge to their 
masculine identity resulting from men having to use terms culturally associated with 
female experience.  
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https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-social-thinker/201711/describing-sexual-assault-in-
language-men-can-understand, (accessed 11 August 2020). 
66 Alejandra Azuero Quijano and Jocelyn Kelly, ‘A Tale of Two Conflicts: an Unexpected Reading of 
Sexual Violence in Conflict through the Cases of Columbia and Democratic Republic of the Congo’, in 
Morten Bergsmo, Alf Butenschøn Skre, Elisabeth J. Wood (eds), Understanding and Proving International 
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This chapter demonstrates that the specialist international courts have struggled to use the 
terms ‘rape’ and ‘torture’ in ways that signal an equal appreciation of the nature of the 
harm caused. It has revealed a preference of instead continuing to emphasise a distinction 
between male-female and male-male rape that is rooted in gendered thinking. In other 
words, they have often failed to acknowledge the crime of rape as well as the use of rape 
as a form of torture on a gender-neutral basis. It is essential that this problem is addressed. 
It is important for these modern international tribunals and courts to identify clearly when 
and why an act of rape does or does not constitute a form of torture. As touched upon by 
Sivakumaran, ‘[a]n accurate classification of abuse is important not just to give victims a 
voice,’ but ‘to break down stereotypes and not merely to accurately record the picture.’68 
Taking this point further, L. M. Finley points out that language generally, and legal 
language especially, ‘reinforces certain world views and understandings of events… 
Through its definitions and the way it talks about events, law has the power to silence 
alternative meanings – to suppress other stories’.69 It is important that these accounts are 
not suppressed.70 Describing rape as a crime of torture, rather than separating these crimes 
in the charges and sentencing stages is a central aspect of this process.71 A comprehensive 
explanation for why an act of rape has not qualified as a crime of torture is equally 
important. This will help address the issue of ambiguity present in current judgments.  
To monitor the success of these recommendations, future institutional development 
and decisions must be examined. For example, it is important to look at international 
                                                          
68 Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict’, p.257. 
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70 Sivakumaran, ‘Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed Conflict’, p.257. 
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bodies, such as the ICC, focusing on the quality and clarity of judgments.72 The Committee 
against Torture (1988-present) – a body of 10 independent international experts that 
monitors the implementation of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by its State parties – could also take a 
more active role in the interpretation of the Convention by providing additional comments 
on decisions, which would identify whether such outcomes were in line with best practice. 
In agreement with John Parry, this approach would not necessarily eliminate the issue of 
ambiguity but it could potentially reduce the areas in which ambiguity appears.73  
 
Conclusion 
In theory, the categorisation of rape as a form of torture in international law should operate 
as a useful advance. It has the potential to describe the degree of physical and mental pain 
and suffering caused by acts of rape without the pejorative stigma. By characterising 
conflict-perpetrated rape as a political harm, the pervasiveness of the crime is also 
underlined. It recognises that in some cultural contexts, rape carries consequences that go 
beyond the short-term suffering inflicted. From this perspective, this framework should 
cement the identification of rape as a serious war crime.  
From a practical perspective, the prosecution of rape as torture by the ICTY, the 
ICTR and the ICC demonstrates fundamental problems with its application as a 
prosecution strategy. For example, male-female rape continues to be inconsistently 
prosecuted as a form of torture. Where male-male rape is described as a crime of torture, 
the political as well as the gendered dimension to the violence is prioritised. Female-
perpetrated rape, on the other hand, is largely overlooked under this category. These 
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contrasting approaches underline that these different types of rape crimes continue to be 
valued and understood differently. This issue is rooted in the traditional conceptualisation 
of rape as a crime committed by men against women. Thus, acts of rape committed against 
men are typically understood as constituting a form of torture only, not rape. In contrast, 
the rape of a woman is considered an act of rape first. Only after a separate analysis has 
been completed will the element of torture be considered. In order for torture to be 
employed as part of an international lexicon of rape, it is important that these problems are 
addressed. Drawing together the threads of the arguments presented in this thesis thus far, 
the next chapter explores the role played by international bodies, particularly the UN, given 
their accepted authority as the institutions through which international law and its practices 
have evolved. In that they have been, since 1945, the key players for sanctioning 
international legal processes, the framework that such bodies provide for understanding 
the full range of factors needing to be considered when exploring the context in which a 

















The Role of Institutional Authority: The United Nations 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapters critically examined the lexicon of rape in modern international law. 
They focused on the historical and cultural dimensions in which the terms used to 
categorise rape in modern international law have emerged and been used by authorities 
within the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC, 2002) to prosecute offenders. Building on this analysis, this chapter 
now considers the role played by the institutional authority which oversees these modern 
specialist international courts – the United Nations (UN, 1945-present) – in that the 
cultural agendas of its associated bodies derives from that source. Attention here will be 
on the institutional culture within the UN in order to understand the ways in which that 
culture influenced prosecutions for conflict-perpetrated rape within the ICTY, the ICTR, 
and continues to do so within the ICC. 
As the central force behind the creation of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC, the 
UN has undoubtedly influenced their cultural framework of operations, including the role 
of their sitting judges and other officials. As previous chapters have underlined the impact 
of the sitting judges on prosecutions and their outcomes has been significant. However, 
the appointment of such individuals is done according to the expectations conveyed by the 
broad cultural agendas purveyed by the UN. It is critical, then, to explore the UN’s attitude 
towards and response to conflict-related rape, in order to determine the extent and 
significance of the cultural messages disseminated by the organisation on these specialist 
international criminal courts. Key to this analysis will be the role played by leading UN 




figures, notably the Secretary General, and the UN Security Council, the body visibly 
responsible for passing the series of Women, Peace and Security Resolutions which 
contexualise recent war crimes prosecutions. Consideration also needs to be given to 
claims that, as a male-dominated institution, the UN itself perpetuates hypermasculinity1 
and, as such, continues to promote a culture of impunity towards rape among other related 
crimes.2 While its response towards reports of rape committed by its deployed 
peacekeepers will not be addressed in detail within this chapter, the criticisms of the UN’s 
attitude to such claims provide corroborating evidence of the existence of such a culture 
within the UN, and of the impact it has on UN appointed and sanctioned bodies. This 
analysis will work to establish how far the historical legacy identified in Chapter 2 has 
underpinned the workings of the UN (and, in turn, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC),  and 
institutionalised a cultural approach to the prosecution of rape which is, despite the official 
claims, very far from gender neutral in practice. 
 
Background 
The rationale behind the UN’s decision to establish the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC is 
seated in its founding mission of maintaining international peace and security by either 
preventing conflict or creating an environment within which peace and security can be re-
established in the aftermath of war. As part of implementing this mission, the UN has also 
made a concerted effort to create a cultural framework which can address more broadly 
the topic of rape committed in (post-)conflict situations. It has sought to achieve this 
outcome through various peace and security instruments, most notably landmark UNSCR 
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1325 (2000).3 Since its inception, the UN has introduced numerous other resolutions 
focusing on women and remedies for injustice perpetrated against them during conflict, in 
the context of achieving and maintaining international peace and security. In light of the 
discussions in the previous chapters, the usefulness of these instruments in supporting the 
operations of courts like the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC itself is questionable. Critics of 
the UN like Anne-Marie Goetz, for example, argue that these resolutions continue to 
employ (to varying degrees) traditional gender essentialist standards, which undermine 
attempts at achieving a more balanced inclusionary strategy for women in peace and 
security initiatives broadly.4 This thesis sees this gendered perspective as being endemic 
within the UN, and as having also had a damaging effect on the culture within which both 
international tribunals and the ICC frame their operations. It is important here to note that 
the ICTY and the ICTR both pre-date the core Women, Peace and Security Resolutions 
which have been so strongly critiqued by figures like Goetz. While the ICC was set up at 
a time when these Resolutions were continuing to appear, it needs to be understood as 
providing a continuing reflection of the intrinsic culture of the UN, expressed through the 
comments of individuals like the Secretary General and the debates of the Security Council 
when evolving the Resolutions. 
The perpetuation of cultural essentialism within the UN, which is, here, allied to 
gender essentialism, primarily views men as natural aggressors (relating to both 
hegemonic masculinity and its expression in a hypermasculine culture), while leaving 
women as agentless victims. This framework serves, amongst other things, to normalise 
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4 See Judith Rowbotham and Fiona Tate, ‘The Global Summit: End Sexual Violence in Conflict Now’, 
Law, Crime and History, (2014), 4(2), 91-8. 
 




instances of heteronormative rape in (post-)conflict5 and ignore female-perpetrated rape 
(committed against either gender) and male-male rape, both of which are more prevalent 
than traditionally assumed.6 It is important to integrate into the considerations made by 
this thesis a recognition of the cultural power of official bodies. Previous chapters have 
addressed this dimension when considering the approaches to prosecutions for conflict-
perpetrated rape of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. But the purpose of this chapter is to 
explore the overarching impact on bodies like these of supra-national institutions, notably 
the UN, over the workings of bodies set up under their umbrella. This will start with an 
analysis of hypermasculinity to reveal how its role within the UN supports a culture of 
immunity and impunity for actions relating to conflict-perpetrated rape. 
 
Hypermasculinity, Immunity and Impunity  
Core to the analysis provided in this chapter is the concept of hypermasculinity (as 
discussed in Chapter 1). While most regularly used to describe military institutions, 
hypermasculinity can also usefully be invoked to explain the culture within many state-
related official bodies, such as a nation’s civil service or other bureaucratic institutions. 
Hypermasculinity refers to the amplification of traditional masculine behaviour and traits, 
including aggression, strength and sex drive, which can be manifested in bodies which 
derive their power from a traditionally patriarchal view of authority and identification of 
who has the right to wield that authority.7 In the context armed conflict, hypermasculinity 
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has been used to describe men’s propensity to use violence, including sexual, against 
others to safeguard their families, communities, and nation as something intrinsic to the 
biological male.8 Kimberly Theidon concludes that ‘[c]onstructing certain forms of 
masculinity is not incidental to militarism; rather, it is essential to its maintenance. 
Militarism requires a sustaining gender ideology as much as it needs guns and bullets.’9 
Women, from this perspective, are necessarily framed as natural targets for male violence, 
needing either to be protected or sexually exploited depending on the view taken by the 
dominant military authority.10 The outcome is the normalisation of war and male-
perpetrated violence in patriarchal societies.11  
As touched upon earlier, critics of the UN claim that hypermasculinity has played 
a significant role in the development of their peace and security initiatives regarding rape, 
including in the operations of the international courts and tribunals. Elizabeth Defeis 
argues, for example, that as a male-dominated institution, the UN itself perpetuates a 
hypermasculine culture which tolerates rape, because such acts are identified as natural 
outcomes of military involvement in peace and security.12 Indeed, Yashushi Akashi, 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cambodia (1992-1995) simply 
retorted ‘boys will be boys’ when asked about allegations that UN peacekeepers based in 
Cambodia had committed sexual exploitation and abuse (discussed in Chapter 1) against 
civilians in the 1990s.13 This kind of response from a senior UN figure normalises rape as 
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inevitable masculine behaviour, something which has clear and wider implications for the 
ability or genuine willingness of UN-sanctioned and instituted courts to bring prosecutions 
for conflict-perpetrated rape.14 This indicates the importance of reflecting upon the 
Women, Peace and Security Resolutions passed from 2000 on. This can aid an 
understanding of the challenges to the underlying culture of the UN and its present lexicon 
of rape in international law posed by the cultural attitudes they sought to encapsulate. It is 
important to note as part of this reflection information about which country holds the 
presidency of the UNSC at the time that a relevant Resolution is passed. Just as the make-
up of a bench has been shown to be a factor when understanding the outcome of 
prosecutions, so too with the Security Council, the framing and language of resolutions is 
affected by the attitudes of the country holding the presidency when a resolution is 
passed.15  
 
UN Security Council Resolutions   
(a) UNSCR 1325, 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106  
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), as mentioned earlier, is widely regarded as 
an important instrument within the international community. While passed after the 
establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR, it is illustrative of the UN attitudes of the 1990s. 
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Indeed, the factors leading to its evolution and passing are very similar to those 
encouraging these tribunals to prosecute rape and come up with definitions for this 
purpose. The background to the emergence of UNSCR 1325 can be held to lie in the 
Beijing Declaration in 1995, and the subsequent lobbying by various civil society groups, 
notably the Coalition on Women and International Peace and Security. Notably, Namibia16 
held the presidency in October 2000, and having no agenda of reservations, it sponsored 
an open session on Women Peace and Security, which resulted in the adoption by the 
Council of the Resolution. UNSCR 1325 represents the first resolution to address 
specifically the impact of war on women and girls as well as the role of women in conflict 
management, prevention, resolution and peacebuilding.17 To ensure, for example, that a 
gender perspective is incorporated into all peace and security initiatives, the Resolution 
recommends that gender mainstreaming be implemented, and promoted by the provision 
of gender training.18 It urges all parties involved in ‘armed conflict to take special measures 
to protect women and girls’ from rape and other forms of sexual violence (see Appendix 
3).19  
For those experts supportive of the UN’s actions, like Nicola Pratt, Sophie Ritcher-
Devroe and Amy Barrow, UNSCR 1325 remains significant because it addresses the 
experiences of women in conflict situations20 and frames rape as a weapon of war.21 The 
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Resolution explicitly urges an end to impunity for such crimes.22 Significantly for this 
thesis, the Resolution’s agenda is intended to challenge the patriarchal norms, belief 
systems and traditions which influence gender relations within societies.23  
The extent to which UNSCR 1325 advances understandings of rape beyond the 
scope of traditional hypermasculine standards is questionable. The Resolution makes no 
substantive attempt to broaden the basis on which victims could be identified to avoid 
prejudicial gender assumptions. Women and girls are grouped together and are identified 
as victims in need of special protection. This grouping is particularly damaging for women, 
because it frames them as immature agentless victims in need of masculine protection,24 
reinforcing patriarchal norms as well as endorsing gender essentialist standards rather than 
challenging them.25 Men are not engaged or confronted with the implications of their 
cultural masculinities and gendered attitudes for women. Since mention of men as potential 
rape victims is not included in any direct way, the possibility of women acting as 
perpetrators is also overlooked.26  
 Critics of UNSCR 1325 insist that the language used to convey the remedies 
outlined in the Resolution is simply rhetorical. It fails to address the patriarchal roots of 
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Network, APN working papers, (2017), no.12: https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-
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24 Róisín Burke, ‘Shaming the State: Sexual Offences by UN Military Peacekeepers and Rhetoric of Zero 
Tolerance’, in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds), Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and 
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25 See for example, Maria Martin de Almagro, ‘Transitional Justice and Women, Peace and Security: A 
Critical Reading of the EU Framework’, LSE Women, Peace and Security Working Paper Series, (2017), 
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rape perpetrated in conflict because it does not tackle the need for an eradication of gender 
privilege in post-conflict states.27 As F. B. Gumru and J. M. Fritz point out, without a legal 
requirement to enforce compliance, UNSCR 1325 ends up being inconsistently and 
ineffectively implemented.28 This lack of enforcement is a consequence of the passive 
language employed in the Resolution where, amongst other significant indicators, troop 
contributing countries are asked merely to ‘consider’, or are ‘urged or ‘called upon’ to take 
certain actions. The resort to the purely discretionary in that area is indicative of the 
implication that discretion is also to be used when considering the priorities accorded to 
rape prosecutions. It emphasises that without the creation of legal rules requiring and 
enabling enforcement, law becomes empty rhetoric.29 It is a declaration of desired intent 
without a duty to implement, a choice that raises the question regarding the genuine will 
of the UN to enforce its declared position.30 The absence of accountability, evaluative and 
disciplinary mechanisms within the Resolution limits its effectiveness.31 The Resolution 
is to be condemned for not indicating clearly what is meant in practical terms by ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ in relation to peacekeeping operations. There is, notably, no stipulation on 
how gender mainstreaming processes should operate within the peace and security 
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framework, and this lack has implications for a similar omission within the culture of the 
courts.32 Neither is there provision in the Resolution for establishing monitoring processes 
to assess the impact gender mainstreaming strategies have on either court prosecution 
choices or strategies for reducing rape by peacekeepers.33  
Reflecting on UNSCR 1325, Goetz comments that while it is to be seen as a failure, 
this is not necessarily because of the actual terms of the Resolution. The problem lies with 
the UN’s lack of will to realise the standards they advocate.34 This reluctance perpetuates 
the institutionalisation of hypermasculinity within the organisation because the UN as a 
whole, and the UN Security Council (UNSC, 1945-present) specifically, continues, as 
Gina Heathcote puts it, to function ‘through a series of gendered normative assumptions’.35 
The resulting ongoing culture of impunity towards rape is a direct consequence of this lack 
of action. Goetz and Heathcote’s comments underline the need for an alternative focus on 
removing institutionalised gender privilege, instead of relying upon the established 
masculine norms, which serve to justify exploitative male behaviour as ‘normal’ conduct.36  
In addition to UNSCR 1325, women’s participation is addressed in a series of other 
resolutions on conflict-related sexual violence, including 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 
(2010) and 2106 (2013).37 Spearheaded by the UK and US representatives within the 
UNSC, who are known to have paid particular attention to initiatives regarding (post-
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)conflict sexual violence (including rape), each of these resolutions refer to women’s 
participation as a necessary component to ‘either to protect women from conflict-related 
sexual violence or to add preventative measures.’38  
Yet, despite their intention, each of these resolutions are lacking in the ability to 
promote practical implementation of strategies for boosting women’s participation. This 
deficiency has implications for the degree of urgency (or lack of it) accorded by the ICTY 
and the ICTY, and subsequently the ICC, to bringing prosecutions for conflict-perpetrated 
rape. For example, recognising the systematic nature of rape in armed conflict and its 
enduring impact, UNSCR 1820 builds on UNSCR 1325 by explicitly linking such offences 
to peace and security responsibilities in the broadest sense (see Appendix 3). It calls for an 
end to impunity, by demanding that ‘all parties to armed conflict immediately take 
appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of 
sexual violence’, including rape.39 Passed during the presidency of the US in June 2008,40 
UNSCR 1820 does display an unusual imperative by detailing some strategies. These, 
however, focus more on measures aimed at the training of troops entrusted with 
peacekeeping duties rather than on international and local court personnel. The evocation 
of issues relating to sexual violence is characterised by an emphasis on strategies for 
enforcing disciplinary measures relevant for peacekeeping, but not on how to create a 
sympathetic environment within the courts, especially for potential witnesses in rape 
prosecutions. Even more tellingly, Resolution 1820, like UNSCR 1325, cannot produce 
adequate change, because it also lacks the capacity for enforcement.41 No penalty is listed 
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for failure to implement such training The Resolution provides only that ‘women and 
children under imminent threat of sexual violence… are to be evacuated’, without any 
consideration of the potential need for protection of witnesses and the preservation of 
evidence of rape or other forms of sexual violence.42 The continuing emphasis on the need 
to protect of women and girls in particular cements the traditional perspective that these 
are special, vulnerable groups in need of military protection.43  
For Sandesh Sivakumaran, it is where the language used in UNSCR 1820 is either 
inclusive or exclusory that is most telling.44 When attempting to describe problems of rape 
as part of general procedure, the language is inclusive.45 Where it moves to specify 
methods of enforcement or implementation, the language used changes to being 
exclusory.46 That discrepancy appears in passages where implementation and descriptive 
methods are considered together or where specific and general measures are addressed 
together.47 For example, in discussion with the Secretary-General, troop-contributing 
countries are encouraged to ‘consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the 
responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect 
civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and 
girls in conflict and post-conflict situations.’48 Sivakumaran observes that when 
heightening responsiveness and awareness, again, the language is inclusive of all groups.49 
But when the subject changes to matters of practical strategy in the prevention of rape, 
females are the only objects of protection mentioned directly.50 This framework 
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perpetuates the idea that women and girls are the prime victims of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence, while ignoring the reality that men too are vulnerable to such attacks. This 
lack helps to explain the persistence of gender essentialism by these courts operating under 
a UN umbrella. Though the Resolution refers to rape and other forms of sexual violence 
committed against civilians, its focus presents little space to account for male rape 
victims.51  
UNSCR 1820 cannot be dismissed as totally ineffective. Coupled with UNSCR 
1325, some important changes have been made more broadly, which have created 
opportunities for women to petition and advocate for social change during moves from 
conflict to peace.52 Notwithstanding, UNSCR 1820 fails to cover the aforementioned 
complexities associated with rape experienced in situations of armed conflict. Gender 
biased understandings about conflict are perpetuated in ways which fail to address the 
changing practices of political violence.53  
Similar problems are found in UNSCR 1888 (2009). Like its predecessors, the 
Resolution expresses its intention to organise ‘interactive meetings with local women and 
women’s organisations’; urges the Secretary-General, ‘Member States and the heads of 
regional organizations to take measures to increase representation of women’ in both 
mediation and decision-making processes; and encourages Member States to increase 
female police and military personal ‘all with a view to preventing and representing 
conflict-related sexual violence.’54 In sum, these provisions work to place a detrimental 
emphasis of women’s victimisation.55 
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Some attempts at advancement is seen in UNSCR 1960 (2010),56 in that it sets up 
a so-called ‘naming and shaming’ mechanism. Once again, passed under the presidency of 
the US, and with the UK having held it the previous month, the mechanism meant that , in 
theory, ‘parties that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns 
of rape and other forms of sexual violence’57 are to be identified and listed in annual 
reports, which are to submitted to the Secretary-General along with information on such 
parties.58 Though it clearly addresses sexual violence committed against women and girls, 
‘because its operative paragraphs are gender-neutral’, Engle explains, the Resolution has 
been read as also applying to male victims, which is undoubtedly progressive.59 It should, 
therefore, be an encouragement to a greater level of acceptance of a need to prosecute rape 
as a gender-neutral offence, and a potential encouragement to include at least male-male 
rape as a key issue in addressing conflict-perpetrated rape. 
This point, for Engle, is further enforced in the employment of the term ‘conflict-
related sexual violence’ within Resolution 1960. According to her, the use of such 
language reflects the UNSC’s intention move away from earlier terminology,60 which is a 
necessary advance. To cement this claim, Engle calls on Margot Wallström’s statement, 
then Secretary General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict (2010-
2012): 
Sexual violence as a tactic or consequence of war could not be captured under 
existing categories. Cases against men and boys did not fall under ‘violence 
against women’; ‘harmful traditional practices’ mischaracterised sexual 
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violence as cultural or traditional; and ‘gender-based violence’ did not reflect 
sexual violence as a method of ethnic cleansing or a tactic of terror. 61 
Engle explains that UN Action similarly asserts that the Resolution symbolises that the 
UNSC now recognises that conflict-related sexual violence is a ‘self-standing issue of 
concern’, which should be considered and treated as such moving forward.62 To adopt 
‘greater specificity and disaggregation of incidents’, UN Action maintains that ‘conflict-
related sexual violence should no longer be treated as “gender-based violence” and 
“violence against women”’.63 This development has, potentially, considerable power to 
promote a greater willingness to revisit the parameters of the lexicon of rape utilised for 
prosecutions in conflict-perpetrated examples. The reality in the courts, however, has been 
less encouraging in that there remains a lack of a clear link between perpetration of types 
of sexual violence and their identification as gender-neutral offences.  
Though, on the one hand, use of the term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ does 
constitute a step forward, particularly in the context of the gender-neutral framework 
provided in UNSCR 1960, this thesis argues that it does not necessarily capture the reality 
that such acts are often used individuals because of their gender. To not recognise or 
engage with this reality, as touched upon in Chapter 5, risks ‘attacking the symptom while 
failing to thoroughly address discriminating gender relations as one of the underlying 
problems.’64 
Further challenges relevant to effective prosecution of conflict-perpetrated rape are 
presented in the ‘naming and shaming’ provision found in UNSCR 1960. Heathcote, for 
example, argues that any list created in this context:  
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will be undermined by the combination of a potential conflict of interests for 
humanitarian workers and the potential for mislabelling non-state actors, 
particularly members of armed groups, as responsible for sexual violence in 
armed conflict without paying appropriate attention to established due process 
and the rule of law.65  
This point indicates the problems for the courts of assembling the robust evidence needed 
for successful prosecutions as well as the unresolved issues relating to the protection of 
vulnerable witnesses in court cases. 
It is, perhaps, because of these problems that the UNSC itself noted that 
implementation of Resolution 1960 was slow. To address this issue, in 2013, a follow-up 
resolution in the form of UNSCR 2106 was passed during the UK’s presidency of the 
Council. This Resolution offers more operational detail and emphasises on the need to end 
impunity on sexual violence. It calls for more Women’s Protection Advisors and Gender 
Advisors in the field, and also addresses women’s participation as a way of enhancing 
women’s protection from conflict-related sexual violence.66 The Resolution also 
recognises males as sexual violence victims, confirming and continuing the trend toward 
gender-neutrality.67 Once again, however, the emphasis is on the management of 
peacekeeping. No specific measures are aimed at improving the willingness of 
international courts to contribute to this area, even though the justification for these bodies 
rests in their supposed ability to promote peace via improved post-conflict resolution of 
injustices. 
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For Heathcote, the totality of these aforementioned resolutions is to reduce the 
UNSCR 1325 framework of ‘women’s participation in peace and security matters as one 
driven by a need to address conflict related sexual violence.’68 This ‘reduction of women’s 
participation to… a protective participation model’ is, as she describes, unfortunate.69 She 
suggests that the underlying feminist model that this approach might be linked to is that of 
the US70 strands of radical feminism, ‘where women’s sexual vulnerability and 
subordination is regarded as the central site of women’s disempowerment and 
discrimination’,71 something which was reflected in the ability of women to see charges of 
rape brought against male assailants.72 This feminist approach has been strongly criticised 
for promoting a type of ‘victim feminism within the international order and exporting a 
limited feminist model into the global order’.73 It has also been condemned for framing 
conflict-related sexual violence as ‘the paradigmatic experience of women during armed 
conflict’, which, as previous chapters have underlined, has had a significantly detrimental 
effect on developments of a genuinely gender-neutral understanding in the current lexicon 
of rape in international law and its impacts.74 Heathcote argues that this understanding 
‘may deflect attention from economic needs, gender-based violence and the role of 
gendered power relations in producing the myriad of gendered harms that communities 
experience,’ which has negative connotations for the ability of victims to seek justice 
through the courts.75 At the centre of this approach is the persistent assumption that men 
are the chief perpetrators of such offences, particularly those outside of the West/powerful 
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states, while ‘deflecting attention from the inadequacies of laws in peacetime states in 
prosecuting, preventing or creating protection from sexual violence.76 The focus now 
moves to a consideration of two other Resolutions which, while they do not directly 
address the operations of the courts, provides significant insights into UN culture 
contextualising their operations and practices.  
 
(b) UNSCR 1889 and 2122 
Both UNSCR 1889 (2009),77 a product of Viet Nam’s presidency (constructed 5 days after 
Resolution 1888)78 and 2122 (2013),79 drafted by the UK alongside Spain, the president of 
the Council in October that year,80 add what Heathcote describes as ‘a model of substantive 
participation within the women, peace and security framework.’81 The former, for 
example, repeats the call from Resolution 1325 for greater representation of women in 
decision-making roles in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding while also, 
crucially, providing a recognition that a number of practical factors work to obstruct 
women’s representation and participation.82  
The problem for this thesis is that Resolution 1889 refers to the use of indicators, 
specifically in UN missions, as a way of measuring the implementation of strategies 
relating to the women, peace and security framework. Heathcote cogently points out that, 
in practice, the use of such indicators, ‘which are never in and of themselves neutral or 
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objective tools,’83 runs the risk of creating a landscape where the numbers of women count. 
Consequently, the more qualitative assessment of efforts to judge whether due attention is 
given under these initiatives to counter ‘the substantive and structural disadvantages that 
hinder women’s full participation within any community’ are overlooked.84  
An assessment of the impact of UNSCR 1889 must be that it fails to engage with 
the different needs of diverse and varied groups of women, including those involved in the 
proceedings of the international courts. Simply concentrating on the representation of a 
number of women within decision-making organs cannot ensure that women’s and 
minority needs are given proper priority in the considerations of those organs, including 
the international courts. Heathcote points out that it is worth noting in relation to this aspect 
that, collectively, the resolutions typically address the need to consult with women’s civil 
society, women’s groups and women’s organisations, ‘rather than promoting women as 
decision makers or as members of decision-making groups.’85 
In contrast, UNSCR 2122 can be argued as symbolising a turning point by 
acknowledging the diversity of women’s right and capacity for involvement in post-
conflict environments.86 This aspect of the Resolution’s provisions is particularly 
significant because it possesses the potential to mark a shift within the UNSC in terms of 
its attitudes towards its work on women, peace and security by providing a gender 
perspective that challenges gender essentialism. This point is compounded by the 
Resolution’s request that the Secretary-General’s Special Envoys and Special 
Representatives to UN missions should consult diverse groups of women’s organisations 
and women’s leaders, in order to reflect the views of women from socially and 
                                                          








economically disadvantaged backgrounds. These requirements can, as Heathcote points 
out, constitute significant indicators of change, presenting an opening for those women 
who feel they are unrepresented or even misrepresented ‘within [the] international security 
discourse to mobilise around.’87 
Linked to this point, and of particular importance to the considerations of this 
thesis, is the shift to challenge the gendered assumptions present within the UNSC, by 
acknowledging the need to consult a diversity of women’s groups, thereby presenting new 
opportunities for women’s voices to be heard. Resolution 2122, calls explicitly for an 
‘implementation shift’ in the Council’s work, rather than a reliance simply on rhetorical 
exhortations.88 Together with other provisions listed within it, that Resolution challenges 
the UN to address gender essentialism. It promotes a reductive stance that ‘assumes 
problematic gender norms’ as factors relevant only to ‘poor, disadvantaged and conflict 
societies’, failing to recognise it as ‘a component of international and/or powerful states 
structures.’89 This dimension is a direct and explicit acknowledgement of the complex 
issues surrounding the choices made by the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC in relation to 
prosecuting rape as torture, for example. 
Despite these apparently progressive developments, including the call for 
implementation strategies, UNSCR 2122 does also continue to perpetuate a gendered 
framework. As with the other resolutions examined here, its critics reflect that it does 
discuss, more explicitly, the challenges facing international bodies when providing for 
gender equality, gender perspectives, gender balance and gender mainstreaming. 
However, ‘when this is translated to strategies for action’, its emphasis remains focused 
on simply an increase in numbers of female participants in various aspects of peacekeeping 
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(including – at least implicitly – the courts), and not on the more qualitative dimension that 
Heathcote identified as being essential.90 This focus works not only to eradicate the 
diversity of women’s experience and needs, but to undermine ‘women’s existing 
contributions to peace and security – locally, regionally and internationally’.91 These are 
effectively ‘rendered as doubly invisible and unimportant often because they are located 
outside of formal decision-making arenas.’92  
Overall, UNSCR 1889 (2009), alongside 2122 (2013), do provide what Heathcote 
describes as a ‘more robust understanding’ of what was required to promote women’s 
involvement in the reconstruction of post-conflict landscapes.93 With its focus on 
participation rather than protection or prevention, the objective of Resolution 1889 was to 
address the need to provide structures to enable women’s formal participation in a range 
of initiatives.94 However, gender and cultural essentialism continue to be the dominant 
trope. The Resolutions do shift away from the protectionist perspective so visible in 
UNSCR 1325, towards a more overt gender-balanced expectation of inclusion of 
contribution by women to peace and security initiatives. However, the quantitative rather 
than the qualitative nature of such contributions leaves the emphasis on protection 
substantially unchallenged when it comes to implementation strategies.95  
Despite the identified shortcomings, Heathcote and Laura Shepherd lay stress on 
the positive aspects of both UNSCR 1889 and 2122.96 They view these resolutions as 
representing a genuine attempt to move away from gender essentialism within the UN, 
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towards an acknowledgement that the danger of adopting a uniform approach ‘overlooks 
the complex interaction of power relationships that inhibit women’s participation’.97  
 
(c) UNSCR 2467 
Despite the hopes that a new spirit is discernible in UNSC thinking, with all the 
implications that should have for that in turn being passed on to bodies like the courts, the 
ability of the existing Security Council Resolutions to address issues surrounding the 
ongoing perpetration of sexual violence remains open to question. This is underlined by 
the appearance of UNSCR 2467 in April 2019.98 Led by Germany, the Resolutions original 
intention was to provide a ‘survivor-centred’ approach with the ability to prevent and 
respond to sexual violence in conflict. As such, it addressed a series of areas that were 
deemed controversial for three permanent members of the Security Council - the US, 
China and Russia. The areas included a responsibility for UN related agencies, including 
the international courts, to take into consideration the sexual and reproductive health of 
sexual violence victims (including LGBTI victims as a vulnerable group). The Resolution 
also called for the establishment of a working group on sexual violence in conflict, with 
the conclusions of that group to be passed to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Once 
again, the record of its passage and the changes to its original draft are informative of the 
challenge still remaining to the achievement of a gender balanced approach, both in theory 
and implementation.  
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Indeed, the text relating to sexual and reproductive health in the original draft was 
eventually removed ‘due to the threat of a US veto’.99 Global Justice has referred to the 
omission from the final version as ‘a shameful concession to US hegemony.’100 The call 
to establish a UNSC working group on sexual violence in conflict in the original German 
draft also proved contentious. This recommendation was ultimately excluded from the 
Resolution following disapproval from China and Russia. Asserting its dissatisfaction, 
China stated that ‘it is important to have extensive discussions well in advance’ before 
creating ‘special mechanisms’.101 Russia, on the other hand, declared its concern ‘about 
the efforts to increase the number of bureaucratic United Nations bodies in order to create 
the appearance of robust activity’.102 Linked to this challenge, the proposed language 
reflecting on the role and purpose of the ICC was also disputed. Early drafts of the 
Resolution described how ‘the fight against impunity for crimes of international concern 
against women and girls’ had been supported and ‘strengthened through the work of the 
International Criminal Court, ad hoc international and mixed tribunals.’103 The US, which 
has taken a strong stance against the ICC, protested the reference to the Court within the 
Resolution, so it was excluded as a part of the will to combat impunity. Instead, UNSCR 
2467 simply ‘acknowledges the inclusion of sexual and gender-related crimes among the 
most serious crimes of international concern in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court’.104 
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In subsequent conversations, France, Belgium, the UK and South Africa described 
their concerns about the exclusion of such language. South Africa, for example, stated 
‘[o]n the one hand, the text calls for a survivor-centered approach, while on the other hand 
it is denying survivors essential sexual and reproductive health services when they need 
them the most.’105 Significantly for the theme of this chapter, South Africa went on to 
make that point that ‘[t]he Council is therefore telling survivors of sexual violence in 
conflict that [UN member] consensus is more important than their needs’.106 
In the course of the debate, additional changes were made to the Resolution 2467 
to secure the compliance from China and Russia, in the shape of the Informal Expert Group 
on Women, Peace and Security (IEG, 2016-present), the first official Security Council 
working group on women, peace and security. For example, though the Resolution 
‘acknowledges’ the work of the IEG, it does not ‘welcome’ it, as did the previous text.107 
Though the Resolution indicates that the Council would consider material, examination 
and recommendations from the IEG, ‘it stops short of considering measures to implement 
them’, as had earlier been the case.108  
Likewise, during the debate, reference to the UNSC’s ‘intention to integrate 
considerations of sexual violence’ committed in (post-)conflict ‘in the work of relevant 
counter-terrorism sanctions regimes’ was excluded from the draft resolution.109 This 
omission is particularly interesting given that earlier in Resolution 2242 (2015), the UNSC 
called ‘for the greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their 
agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering-violent 
                                                          









extremism which can be conducive to terrorism’.110 In the meeting of the UNSC on 
Resolution 2242 in 2015, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (2007-2016) had 
asserted that ‘[a]t a time when armed extremist groups place the subordination of women 
at the top of their agenda, we must place women’s leadership and the protection of 
women’s rights at the top of ours’.111 
It is important to note that the exclusion of such a provision from Resolution 2467 
is not related to concerns raised by feminists like Fionnuala Ní Aoláin regarding the shift 
to integrate the women, peace and security agenda into strategies for counter-terrorism and 
countering violent extremism.112 Rather, these revisions reflect the anxieties shared by 
China and Russia regarding the growth of the women, peace and security agenda and the 
potential this possesses for bringing aspects of that agenda within the remit of the 
international courts because of a promotion of changes in international law.113  
In sum, the resolutions examined in this chapter are deeply fragmented in their 
approach to addressing rape and other related crimes committed in conflict scenarios as 
well as when dealing with post-conflict peacekeeping. This fragmentation has real 
implications for the resultant culture framing the work of bodies like the specialist 
international criminal tribunals and courts. It also works to underline the limitations of the 
UN in terms of its ability to sponsor change. This criticism is made plain when we consider 
the various UNSCRs that have been created to address women, peace and security. Though 
well-intended, these Security Council Resolutions typically reflect the foreign policy 
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agenda not only of the State holding the presidency of the Council, but those states with a 
veto.114 Where consensus on the Council can be achieved only by negotiation and 
compromise, the resulting outcome is that Resolutions in their ‘wording and framings’ can 
only, ‘at best reflect what it was possible to agree on at the time.’115 
 
Final Thoughts  
This chapter has identified that within the UN, hypermasculinity continues to define the 
culture of that organisation and its general attitude towards conflict-perpetrated rape. As 
the previous chapters have revealed, it is essential to take that culture into consideration 
when examining the prosecution practices of the specialist international tribunals and 
courts. Attempts to establish a gender-balance to frame the work of those courts fail to go 
sufficiently far to amount to a challenge to the traditional heteronormative framework that 
has been shown to persist in modern international law and the strategies for its application 
within the courts. In order to address this problem, the theoretical scope of these peace and 
security resolutions must be broadened. To achieve this objective and enable later 
progression to a more nuanced comprehension of gender identity, including non-binary, 
both feminine and masculine experiences and perspectives must be included in these 
instruments.116 The role played by gender essentialism, prioritising the influence of 
masculine norms regarding violence committed against women, needs to be acknowledged 
explicitly if progress is to be made in developing a lexicon for rape that is not simply a 
continuation of entrenched cultural attitudes.117 It is important to challenge toxic 
masculinity and integrate both men and boys into agendas programmes aimed at tackling 
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violence against women.118 In parallel, how men are affected by inequitable gender norms, 
which frame them primarily as perpetrators of rape, not victims, must be included.119 As 
part of this process, a new comprehension of what constitutes masculinity needs to be built, 
which has implications for a less stereotyped femininity. Women’s roles as perpetrators 
must also be acknowledged by the international courts even if it occurs at a much lower 
rate. It is only where this dimension is included that a proper appreciation of the realities 
of conflict-perpetrated rape in modern conflicts can be achieved and we can genuinely 
achieve a gender-neutral approach to conflict-perpetrated rape in international law.    
Practical steps will also need to be taken that involve the courts and court personnel 
as well as other UN and UN-related personnel. Improved coordination and uniformity, for 
example, is essential in that such interventions are, relatively speaking, usually short-term 
and ‘involve a variety of actors in different locations.’120 It is equally important if outcomes 
from any training given, for example to court officials, are to be effectively measured and 
monitored through a process of independent collection of robust qualitative and 
quantitative data.121 To date, there is no sign of such strategies being instituted, despite the 
continuing criticism from academic and legal professionals examining the area. As Goetz 
points out, if the women, peace and security agenda is to fulfil its advertised purpose, it 
needs to be repurposed so that it ‘is not just about changing the players at negotiations, it 
is about changing the nature of peace processes’ – something of which the UN itself 
acknowledges the courts to be an intrinsic part.122 By failing to challenge or redefine what 
are understood as acceptable gender norms, the UN instead entrenches hypermasculinity 
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within their peacekeeping missions, leaving the military traditions that support 
hypermasculinity largely undisturbed. But, as Judith Gardam and Dale Stephens point out, 
the responsibility lies not just with these institutions. Feminist commentators have a 




Historically, the UN, as a male-dominated, hypermasculine institution, has overlooked acts 
of rape committed in (post-)conflict territories, exhibiting a ‘boys will be boys’ attitude. 
This display undoubtedly affected the operations of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. 
Indeed, it seems unlikely that had the UN taken a more serious response to charges of rape 
committed by its deployed peacekeepers, for example, then the ICTY and the ICTR would 
not have initially ignored the accounts of mass rape committed during the respective 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
Following global criticism, the UN has attempted to make amends via the 
introduction of various UNSC women, peace and security resolutions, which prohibit rape. 
On the one level, these resolutions have been transformative. They have worked to address 
the use of rape as a weapon of war and the understanding of rape as a serious war crime, 
which has helped identify that women and girls are disproportionately affected by such 
crimes. On another, the emphasis on achieving consensus through compromise, as with 
the operations of the Security Council, ensures that in practice, there remains a lack of 
gender perspective in UN thinking. As such, its instruments continue to reinforce the 
hypermasculinity of leading officials and states, because they cannot be challenged 
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effectively by the power structures within the body. What remains entrenched in UN 
culture is the idea that men are the natural perpetrators of rape while women are the 
victims. The lack of agency accorded to women indirectly ensures that male-male rape is 
not readily acknowledged as an issue needing to be addressed by the courts as well as 
making it difficult for female-perpetrated rape to be considered. The UN does now 
acknowledge in its rhetoric that a relationship exists between patriarchal ideas of 
masculinity and the ways in which conflict-perpetrated rape needs to be understood if 
advances are to be made in establishing a more robust lexicon for use in conflict-
perpetrated rape prosecutions. This development has particular importance if the ambitions 
first outlined in UNSCR 1325 of achieving justice for all (including women) as part of a 
post-conflict reconstruction of states and societies. International law needs to develop a 

















As a crime, rape has been reconceptualised over time and this thesis has provided a 
revealing survey of the historical context relating to this development, indicating how 
events and attitudes affected considerations of how rape should be prosecuted in 
international law. At the domestic level, it was previously considered a gendered property 
crime perpetrated against the man who formally or effectively possessed the women, 
before being accepted as gendered interpersonal violence, where the offence is committed 
against the victims of that violence. Led by Western thinking, many states now formally 
identify rape in law as a form of gender-neutral interpersonal violence. Mirroring this shift, 
modern international law now understands conflict-perpetrated rape in similar terms. 
Indeed, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, 1993-2017) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR, 1994-2014) and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002-present) each broadly defined rape as a gender-
neutral crime committed against the individual in their own right. 
In theory, this development should encourage prosecutions of conflict-perpetrated 
rape and it is to be welcomed that this has, to an extent, happened. However, it should also 
serve to promote prosecutions committed by and against either gender in international law. 
In practice, this has yet to be the case. In cases of male-female rape, for example, it is 
commonplace for prosecutions to bring a charge only for an act of rape. On occasion, that 
charge is accompanied in the prosecution case by another headline offence, such as an 
outrage upon human dignity or a crime of torture. Male-male rape, on the other hand, is 
regularly either overlooked by the prosecution when drawing up the charges, or is 




prosecuted as something other than rape – for example, torture. Female-perpetrated rape 
is largely ignored.  
In considering the reasons why international law has not responded fully to the 
challenge of engaging with a gender-neutral approach to conflict-perpetrated rape, the 
thesis demonstrated the significance of including the cultural legacies of how rape has been 
and continues to be understood. These outcomes in international law have been shown to 
be linked to the prevalence of traditional heteronormative understanding of rape in many 
different cultures across the globe, where men are held primarily as perpetrators of rape 
and women as victims.1 Indeed, female victims continue to be described in media 
commentary, and even by judges in some jurisdictions, as events provoked or instigated 
by them, because of acts to make their physical presence visible by wearing provocative 
clothing.2 It is unsurprising, then, that despite more cases of rape being reported in 2019, 
domestic records from around the world show that prosecution levels remain relatively 
low and the percentage of successful outcomes for trials have stayed persistently low.3 
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These cultural attitudes towards rape continue to impact the culture within the 
specialist international courts because of the cultural realities obtaining there. In 2019, 
Lesley Abdela recalled a discussion she had with Judge Shireen Fisher regarding her 
experience with the ICTY and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Judge Fisher reflected 
that in cases of where women claimed to have been rape by men, the initial stance of fellow 
female judges was one of belief. By contrast, fellow male judges expressed disbelief. 
While anecdotal, this perspective on the default attitude of judges within the international 
courts underlines the ongoing impact of national cultural legacies in international law.  
This perpetuation of traditional conceptualisations of rape demonstrates the 
powerful legacy of the past and justifies the emphasis placed on this dimension within the 
thesis. At this point, a remark made by astronomer Carl Sagan can be usefully invoked: 
‘you have to know the past to understand the present.’4 Finding value in his comment, I 
decided to look at the terms used to categorise rape in international law through a historico-
legal and liberal feminist lens. Using these perspectives, a critical examination has been 
undertaken of the ways in which these terms have been understood and applied by the 
ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC. On that basis, it has been able to determine whether (and 
how far) they are being used in a way that reflects the modern gender-neutral definitions 
of rape created by these specialist international courts. This analysis established that not 
only do traditional understandings of rape continue to linger in the use of the terms within 
these bodies, but that the scholarship that has sought to critique them has failed to advance 
the debates or the practices. Instead, the deliberations on international law and its 
contextualising culture has itself remained chained to cultural legacies which perpetuate a 
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will to interpret rape from certain perspectives which undermine attempts to further 
gender-neutral understandings.  
Starting with the term ‘sexual violence’, this thesis has shown that in defending the 
categorisation of rape under this heading, feminists like Anne Cahill, Catharine 
MacKinnon and Monique Plaza have largely responded defensively to Foucault’s idea that 
rape should be stripped of its associations with the sexual dimension.5 Foucault’s original 
argument that rape should be categorised legally as a form of violence only, caused offence 
when he notably compared rape to a punch in the nose.6 The subsequent feminist 
discussions of his ideas have substantially remained rooted in that offence, and as such, 
rather than taking the discussion forward, the debates put forward by feminist scholarship 
in general have largely been circular and limited in their scope by a will to preserve a 
gendered special status for women. For example, they focus on fixed traditional gendered 
understandings of masculine and feminine bodies and (social) roles as well as the 
performance of certain acts. They continue to characterise rape (in line with traditional 
conceptualisations of the crime) as being committed by aggressive men against passive 
women, excluding female-perpetrated rape. Male-male rape is either ignored, sidelined or 
diminished by this approach in feminist scholarship. Where male rape victims are 
acknowledged within these debates, for example, their experience is regularly likened to 
that of the female experience rather than being considered as having an independent 
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reality. This thesis has sought to include an understanding that such perspectives can not 
only work to damage a male victim’s sense of masculine identity, but work to reinforce 
the social stigma of rape by making it something pertaining to homosexuality, which in 
itself is frequently defined as having a feminine character. Similar problems are found in 
the application of, and circular discussions regarding the term ‘gender-based violence’. 
Turning to the concept of dignity, this thesis uncovered a different set of challenges 
when exploring the debates around the categorisation of conflict-perpetrated rape under 
this heading. Even where the challenges of cultural relativism have been responded to, 
scholars like Camilla Barker often effectively overlook the full implications of the 
etymological contexts to the languages used in the current lexicon.7 As such, its deep-
rooted relationship with the concept of honour, and the challenges this relationship 
continues to present to modern-day rape prosecutions in international law remains 
generally unexplored. This gap within the analysis is particularly damning given that 
conflict-perpetrated rape continues to be perceived in many cultures as a harm that 
damages the honour of the family (understood in masculine province) rather than the 
victim (which in such communities is identified as female).  
When examining the usefulness of categorising rape as a form of torture, including 
the question of whether this heading frames rape as a serious crime, feminist scholars have 
been more considerate of the historical dimension. MacKinnon, Deborah Blatt, Karen 
Engle and Alice Edwards, for example, have examined the concept of torture from both a 
historical and contemporary perspective.8 They have analysed torture in the context of the 
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political private/public dichotomy debate and considered where conflict-perpetrated rape 
fits within that discussion. The challenge for this thesis is that their analysis focuses 
primarily on male-female rape, and the extent to which women, as the main targets of rape, 
benefit from this development. Little attention has been paid to male-male rape and the 
implications this categorisation has for these victims. Again, female-perpetrated remains 
largely overlooked. 
Of course, the problems associated with the ongoing perpetuation of traditional 
heteronormative understandings of rape in international law are not limited to the terms 
used to categorise the offence. As demonstrated in the final chapter, a key challenge relates 
to the cultural attitudes of bodies like the United Nations (UN, 1945-present) and the ways 
in which such attitudes provide an enabling context for the perpetuation of traditionally 
gendered attitudes. The central force behind the creation of the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
ICC, the UN itself has undoubtedly influenced the cultural framework within which the 
operations within the courts continue. The final chapter underlined in particular the lack 
of gender-balanced training provided for court personnel, including their sitting judges.  
The UN has continued to be male dominated, and has routinely been accused of promoting 
a hypermasculine culture9 and, in turn, an associated culture of impunity towards rape 
among other related crimes committed by its personnel since the 1990s.10  In this context, 
it seems fair to hold the UN substantially accountable for the ongoing perpetuation of 
traditional conceptualisations of conflict-perpetrated rape within these international 
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specialist courts. This enablement helps to explain to a significant extent the 
inconsistencies in practice in rape prosecutions under their remit, despite the rhetorical 
assurances of gender-neutral thinking in international law.  
On balance then, to achieve an inclusive, modern gender-neutral understanding of 
rape in international law, this thesis concludes that not only do the terms used to categorise 
rape need to be revisited as per the recommendations outlined in Chapters 5-7. Also, and 
with a focus firmly on the UN, the traditional cultural attitudes need to be addressed and 
challenged, because as this thesis has revealed, these continue to influence powerfully 
operations within the courts. Traditional gender constructs which seemingly still influence 
legal thinking on rape must be revisited or rejected at the highest levels within the UN 
itself. But this does need to go further. While throughout this analysis it is plain that 
traditional social and biological conceptualisations of the masculine and the feminine have 
been strongly challenged by gender experts and feminist scholarship and activists, this has 
proved to be lacking in genuinely innovative thinking.11 More needs to be done by scholars 
to establish in international law a nuanced comprehension of gender identity, including 
non-binary ones, for use in future proceedings. To achieve this objective, guidelines must 
be introduced which explain how conflict-perpetrated rape is characterised by its potential 
for use as a tool of power by and against individuals because they are considered 
representative of the other side in an engagement.12 This emphasis on power could 
potentially steer the conversation beyond the persistent cultural and legal conceptualisation 
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of women as permanent victims and men as perpetrators, and instead focus attention on 
the motivation and individual harm caused by rape. 
As part of this process, toxic essentialist standards, which deny women sexual 
autonomy and frame men as natural aggressors, need to be broken down and deconstructed 
to prevent women from being valued strictly as targets of rape in war, and so encouraging 
their abuse.13 The impact of essentialist standards on men needs to be recognised and 
excluded, given that such understandings work to encourage male-male rape as part of an 
attempt to feminise men and deprive them of both an individual masculine identity and 
their community status. As conflicts show in, amongst others, Sierra Leone, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, men and 
women are capable of being both victims and perpetrators of rape. Legal languages do 
have a cultural function, in that they can introduce new terms with their accompanying 
values into everyday language.14 However, the tendency to promote legal precedents 
encourages a continuity of historical legal terms. An emphasis on maintaining stability 
must also be accepted as having a downside. The temptation to conserve a linguistic status 
quo promotes persistence of traditional understandings reflecting obsolete cultural values, 
as demonstrated in the international courts. To discuss rape strictly in terms of traditional 
understandings of masculine and feminine bodies and (social) functions within 
communities is to take a position that is no longer considered fit for purpose in law. Other 
elements of rape, which have been understood as part of or in accordance with these gender 
constructs, must be reconsidered. For example, the role played by power in rape remains 
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in line with hegemonic masculinity, particularly its expression as hypermasculinity when 
describing conduct which can be considered normal by men in positions of authority.  
Overall, there is an urgent need for feminist scholarship to be less defensive when 
discussing the genuine and substantial need for ensuring the protection of women in 
conflict-affected regions, enabling them to open up the debate to a more gender-neutral 
discussion. Without changes of perspective, a feminist hostility to such a development 
risks continuing the ghettoization of women as the only ‘real’ victims of rape, thereby 
dismissing the validity of male-male rape in its own right while also failing to recognise 
female-perpetrated rape victims. Substantiation for this point is partially provided in what 
have become the well-worn discussions on the gendered nature of rape, which largely 
differ only with the fresh incidents included, rather than as a result of a new approach to 
the material. Work on female-perpetrated or male-male rape continues to be largely 
excluded from the wider trope.15  
The thesis limited itself to a focus on conflict-perpetrated rape in international law. 
However, by invoking an interdisciplinary perspective, a number of wider issues have 
necessarily been touched on, including the significance of the legacy of cultural traditions 
on law and legal proceedings. The thesis has demonstrated their extensive influence, and 
done so in ways that underline the need for scholars and legal professionals to be aware of 
this dimension and how it affects developments both in legislative and in procedural 
reforms. Judgments need to be made about how far consciously to reject, as well as to 
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invoke, that legacy when moving forward in responses to new challenges, including the 
need to accommodate responses to conflict-perpetrated rape involving a greater gender 
fluidity. 
The in-depth investigations indicating the ongoing impact on definitions, 
prosecutions and prosecution outcomes in this area has implications for improving an 
understanding of other areas of international law and how it operates. It also provides a 
challenge for the UN to revisit how it deals with its peace and security mission overall. 
My article published during the progress of the thesis demonstrated that international 
responses to conflict-related rape, occurring as a factor during post-conflict reconstruction 
processes, is intrinsically linked to the responses of the international courts as manifested 
in prosecutions of conflict-perpetrated rape.16 Normatively gendered cultural traditions 
must be challenged before significant change can take place in international law, to ensure 
that conflict-perpetrated rape is taken more seriously. There is real potential for change on 
the basis of a greater awareness amongst feminist scholars of the damaging consequences 
of gendered special pleading. On that basis, the focus of the scholarship could move 
towards creating pressure on the UN which it would not be able to evade. Within that, the 
opportunities for an improved lexicon of rape for use within the international courts would 
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